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The purpose of this dissertation is to present the sources and 
nature of the changes that have taken place and are taking place In the 
relationship between government and business in America} and to consider 
these changes in a setting consisting of social, legal, and political aspects 
in addition to the economic aspects providing the principal orientation.
To accomplish this end an analysis of regulation in three distinct 
parts was undertaken. First, the integration of regulation in its original 
form was presented In terms of the social philosophy of individualism.
Second, the environmental changes affecting the internal consistency of the 
original integration was analysed. Finally, the pattern of regulation 
that emerged from this evolution within the environment was discussed.
This pattern of control was then related back to the principles of 
individualism to uncover and measure the elements of contradiction and 
conflict implicit in the new configuration.
One of the primary types of data used in the study consisted of 
court decisions, particularly decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, This data was selected because esphasiB upon constitutional 
procedure in the United States has placed upon the courts the final 
responsibility for consistency in social processes. Another important source 
utilized consisted of previously published works in the field of social 
control, particularly public utility regulation.
Although much writing has been done on the subject of regulation the 
present analysis goes beyond this writing in one Important respect. The 
emphasis here is upon the social underpinning not only of the original
pattern of control but of the changes that have been instituted In 
that pattern* In consequence the legislative conflict that accompanies 
specific alterations in the regulatory adjustment becomes much more 
than a simple dash of interests* Bather this conflict is indicative of an 
Ideological clash with each interest emphasizing one aspect of the philosophy 
of individual!am to the exclusion of other aspects* The dissertation Itself 
isolates the major interests in the struggle and relates each to the 
underlying social philosophy.
Individualism as a social principle requires both freedom of 
choice and equality of opportunity as its two limiting dimensions* In the 
extreme form these two dimensions would be Identical* On the basis of this 
identity government regulation was not presumed to be necessary at the 
time the Constitution was written* In economic terms the spontaneous 
operation of competition was to maintain identity between freedom and 
equality* Competition was to operate accordingto the principle of 
opportunity cost* which principle depended in turn upon complete economic 
elasticity*
As the economy developed, the degree of elasticity postulated 
was not fully attained* As a consequence the two dimensions of philosophy 
tended to separate* To restore equilibrium, a measure of government 
control was instituted*
This original pattern of control was predicated primarily upon 
an industry classification* Into one category was placed businesses in 
which inelasticities had appeared* Since inequality existed in the operation 
of these businesses to the extent of the inelasticity, regulation was
allowed as an offset to inequality by eliminating monopoly and 
discriminatory behavior * Businesses other than these public 
utilities were placed In a residual category and were not formally 
regulated*
Although regulation was instituted for utilities limits 
were placed upon its operation* for the same season that the regulation 
itself was dictated by the philosophy, the limits to regulation were also 
fashioned by the philosophy* to prevent control from resulting in a 
greater loss in freedom than gain in equality the concept of 'fair 
return on a fair value1 was adopted as the principal tool for assuring to 
regulated industries residual rights equal to those enjoyed by non-regulated 
industries* This tool, it will be noted, was simply the adoption by government 
of the competitive principle of opportunity costs*
Even while this adjustment to the regulatory problem was 
being developed by the courts the changes in the economy that had made it 
necessary were intensifying. These changes consisted of an increasing 
inelasticity of physical capital and an increasingly elastic market for 
claims upon Income. The incidence of these developments upon the 
philosophy of individualism was a growing area of Inequality and a greater 
difficulty of restoring equilibrium through regulation*
Had these changes in the environment been the only forces 
influencing control patterns an adjustment in regulation could probably 
have been made* But the required degree of control if applied only to 
utilities would have violated the principle of equal residual rights, while 
if extended to all businesses it would have violated the competitive
principle of opportunity costs, Xa opposition to these potential
inoonslstonolos the interests of freedom began to organise themselves against
extreme* In control* Thus tho interests attaching to the respective 
dimensions of individualism m m  to be arrayed against one another in the
process of setting precise metes and bounds of regulation*
The result of this ideological clash was essentially a 
compromise In elsteh regulation see extended to non-utilities end stopped 
short of the extreme for utilities. In this way regulation endeavored to 
avoid inconsistency in its operation by failing to make the economic 
environment entirely consistent with the philosophy* As a result of this 
eoaprosdee the economy was neither free nor equal* although containing as 
high a degree of each as could be made compatible with the existing degree 
of the other*
Continued development of the forces at work In this sphere 
of social relationships required a further evolution of control* The 
direction being taken by this evolution at present is the partial 
abandonment of the competitive norm end the substitution of norms determined 
by the group exerting the greatest amount of power* These norms represent 
a phase of the underlying philosophy disproportionately emphasised* To this 
extent control has lost its society-wide basis and political maneuvering is 
substituted for debate of principle, although limits to political activity 
are still set by underlying philosophy.
This newest development in the evolution of regulation in 
America —  a degree of control through power norms —  constitutes a real
threat to community solidarity* Whether or not social crisis will 
result from loss in solidarity can not be determined in the course of 
a single dissertation. The test, however, will be whether or not 
current conflict between the forces of freedom and the forces of equality 
can in time be minimized through a discovery of a larger area of common 
ground*
X
x m m w m i m
Fart Is The Problem and ite Setting
Public utility regulation in America has, in the past two decades, 
been subjected to an increasingly severe criticism by two distinct 
groups of people* There are first those persons who would like to see, 
and strive to Justify, a substantially lesser degree of control than is 
presently exercised* A second group takes the position that regulation 
errs in the direction of liberality rather than strictness, and advances 
numerous reasons for extending controls*
If either or both of these groups were obviously and demonstrably 
wrong is outlook this difference of viewpoint would be scarcely worthy 
of comment* But both groups are able to marshall to their support strong 
forces and convincing arguments* As a consequence the actual course of 
regulation is a compromise wholly satisfactory to neither extreme*
In a relatively well knit society such as the United States, where a 
common heritage and a common background are taken for granted, it is 
important to try to understand the source and the consequences of such a 
vast compromise* It is the purpose of this dissertation to make a 
beginning toward such an understanding*
Compromise in utility control falls conveniently Into two parts— control 
over the rate level and control over the rate structure* Control over the 
rate level has, since just prior to 1900, been formally constructed around 
'fair return on a fair value*9 let today this dual concept term is little 
if any nearer to precise definition that it was when originally set forth 
by the Supreme Court* Actually it seems to have been used more to carve 
out the current compromise than to add precision to control principles.
3
Fair return has teen made a wore or lees inactive partner in regulation, 
while Fair value hae almost officially been defined ae historical cost 
or reproduction oost whichever la the higher* Among the federal 
commissions there is some indication of a trend toward a more exclusive 
nee of hiatorieal cost* hot even if this were to occur the evidence 
indicates that fair return will simply he substituted for fair value as 
the compromise tool in regulation. The consistency with irfiich the Court 
recognises the existence of a zone of reasonableness is ample indication 
of this probability.
In connection with the rate structure as well as in connection with 
the rate level compromise has had an important plaee. A dual approach to 
utility rate structure is frankly implicit in the cost-of-service and 
value-of-service technique customarily used by courts and commissions. The 
inevitable degree of arbitrariness inherent In the allocation of overhead, and 
the practice of intermittent exercise of control further demonstrate the 
existence of this area for eoopromiss.
Perhaps even more important, however, than the existence of two signif­
icant areas of compromise is the fact that these areas themselves are 
consistently held to a range that is well within the limits of tolerance, 
even though the resulting adjustment is not entirely satisfactory to any 
single group. Both the compromise itself and the limits to compromise 
therefore, mast be considered as parallel phenomena in an analysis of regu­
lation in America. In consequence, the subject matter of this work will be 
the structure and concrete nature of the pattern originally intended for 
regulation, the environmental forces requiring an adjustment of this pattern, 
and the compromise that evolved from the adjustment.
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Although the above statements suggest tho contrary, this work is
not laUndid as a dissertation on society* Mevertheless tho concept of
society is implicit —  and on occasion extensively explicit —  throughout*
this concept, It is fait, Bust ho at tho base of all social study rather
than ho reserved for use in tho field of sociology# Scientists must bo
doubly careful in today* o specialised Community that understanding does
not become so particularised that interchange is impossible* Only through
and for ecunumleatioa is education an instrument of social good* As
1
Professor Parsons aptly stalest "The empirical scholar will follow his 
problems wherever they may lead and refuse to he deterred by any signs 
which read foreign Territory***
Thus the reader will find in the ensuing pages analysis that is 
more usually found in studies devoted to other subjects than economies*
Seme of the analysis in these associated fields will unquestionably 
demonstrate to experts the lack of formal training of the writer* It is 
hoped, however, that such demonstration will not be taken to prove that 
this attempt at correlation should not have been made* Overlapping 
studies today are vitally necessary* If scientists in the various social 
studies, rather than automatically label ‘unclean1 the work of the outsider, 
will be critical and cooperative the communication of knowledge can proceed 
equally with the acquisition of knowledge*
The social problem to be understood in the present instance is the 
control of industry* This is not to suggest that this problem is widely 
misunderstood today* A number of able treatises are available presenting 
social, legal, or economic aspects of the subject* likewise there are 
works that have built a foundation for a combination treatment* Outstanding
1 Parsons, Talcott, structure of Social Action* (The McGraw-Hill 
Bock Company, Mew fork, 19370 P. 759.
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anoag these are feral Foundations of Canit&ifep by john E* Commons, where
1
the economic and tho logoi arc analysed in combination* £4gfitogXJ^
Stool* Karl kaanheim, where tho ooolal and tho economic in control are 
2
ably bleadedj and Bo J^ Myloien do TravaiiSocial by Bmile Durkheim
3oho dealt with tho ooolal and tho legal in modern life. But tho few oho 
have contributed real breadth to tho field of social control are only a 
beginning* Many acre Moot follow in their footstep* In order that this 
meet significant phase of nodera life nay bo brought within the grasp of 
a much wider group within tho electorate*
The present work will attempt to build a little higher the foundation 
thus far laid* Bore three phases of regulation —  the social* the legal* 
and the economic —  will be brought into close juxtaposition in terns of 
American econonic life* Admittedly most of the gain in breadth may be 
lost in depth* Space limitations alone would dictate this result if 
inadequacy of training did not* Particularly will this be true of the 
Chapters discussing social and legal phenomena* For that reason these 
subjects are presented in outline form only, and at the beginning* The 
latter part of the work contains a detailed examination of some of the 
eeonomie implications of the concepts developed in the first part* If, then, 
students in the fields treated in outline form care to use the respective 
outlines as points of departure for additional depth a composite body of 
consistent theory will be developed* Thus, despite the loss in depth and 
detail, the writer is earnestly convinced of the usefulness of broad analysis*
1 clt.
2 (K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London, 1936*)
3 Translated by 0. Simpson under the title The Division of Labor 
in Society* originally published in 1893*
5
Because ©f the difficulty of thoroughly integrating this particular 
type of exposition in the course of detailed presentation# and in order to 
provide the reader with a basis for perspective# the core of the argument 
to follow will be summarized here* This summary will also serve to sketch 
the plea to he used in developing the subject*
The thing that distinguishes a society from a mere collection of 
individuals is a 'feeling of togetherness•| a common set of ends; a common 
culture; in short a basic and fundamental agreement as to the foundation of 
life together —  in association* This agreement will here be referred to 
as community# and will be developed as the prime social force holding 
eoapromise in the group within tolerable limits* Because of community men 
are willing to compromise marginal desires as long as the basic ends of life 
are common*
But men do not always agree in detail upon ways and means* In every 
group there is an element of disagreement* Differences arise as to certain 
of the goals of existence or the means of attaining goals agreed upon* is 
these differences take on sufficient importance to stimulate conflict a 
struggle arises between men of opposing active attitudes* Granted a 
sufficient amount of community to make compromise possible It is precisely 
this disagreement that produces the areas for eoapromise referred to in 
connection with public utility regulation* In fact the degree of community 
that exists can quite accurately be measured by the size of this area of 
eoapromise in inverse ratio*
To protect and foster the twin Ideals of equality of opportunity and 
freedom from coercion# society in America organized itself into a government* 
IQien this government was first faced with the problem of regulating business 
it was necessary to devise an approach to this problem whereby a degree of
6
restraint could be placed upon industry without violating basic community 
purposes. The principal tool with which this was done was an industry 
classification promulgated and made as consistent as possible by the 
Supreme Court, Into one class was placed the so-called public utilities.
These businesses were those found in a position of power exceeding that of 
individuals related to them in the economy. As a consequence it was agreed 
that these businesses could be restrained in their relationships with the 
public at large* In this way the public was strengthened by social 
organisation until it was equal in power to the businesses regulated. Into 
a second and residual class was placed all other businesses. These last could 
not be restrained (except as to incidental matters only) since they represented 
no threat to equality as unrestrained.
With regulation, of course, came the danger that the public would be 
strengthened beyond the point of equality with the enterprise regulated. To 
avoid this the Supreme Court devised the tool of 'fair return on a fair 
value*' Thusf although restrained, utilities must be allowed an operating 
net result equivalent to what they would enjoy if not restrained and not in a 
position of unequal power. In short, a regulated concern could not be 
confiscated.
Within the framework set by these tools detailed regulation has evolved. 
Accounting regulation, control of security Issues etc, as well as control 
over rate structures and rate levels have developed to aid society in 
measuring and devising offsets to excess power within the community. For 
without means with which to measure power and devices with which to combat 
power social ideals might become gradually though severely diluted.
Throughout the process of refining these tools, however, industry itself 
evolved Into a set of relationships from which it became increasingly difficult
7
tofollow through the classification demanded* Thus tho growth of 
intricate lnterrelatiunship throughout modern capitalism, tho growth of
overhead as an Industry problem with, the consequent difficulty of 
non-arbitr^qry pricing* and the apparently increasing threat of cyclical 
fluctuation to business stability hate together made the earlier clear-cut 
distinctions between businesses less distinct# The economic concept that 
describes this development is economic rent* which* although at one tine 
properly identified with the utilities for purposes of regulation* is today 
such an Integral factor in manybusinesa that the s ogregation of utilities 
has become less refiictio*
In one ether major way industry has evolved in such a manner as to render 
less realistic the pattern of regulation as orginally promulgated* This 
evolution has been in the property concept* As the definition of property 
shifted fTcm anoemphaais upon use value to an emphasis upon exchange value* 
the significance of the strictures against confiscation in protecting 
utilities lessened in importance* For with the emphasis upon exohang© 
value* property became associated with expectations* and it became impossible 
to correct a past injustice without cuttin across expectations in a way 
injurious to owners* Although this is not defined as confiscation in the 
regulatory pattern of today it does interfere with free choice* and is* 
therefore* in an Ideological sense* confiscation* This development In 
busInesB-govemment relationships has been treated in terms of the financial 
concept of capitalisation*
Regulation has moved to meet this ©volution in two ways* In tho fir at 
place* non-utilities have com© in for a considerable amount of control) and 
in the second place* Ubillty control has stopped far short of tho extreme 
that would have resulted had the original classification remained
a
substantially intact, Non-utilities have been sub jested to regulation 
designed to enforce competition* stabilise employment* and iaprove 
working conditions, Utility control has been modified in that fair 
value and fair return hare not been precisely defined* la that a 
•zone of reasonableness1 has been allowed by the courts* and in that
value of service and cost of service have both been given weight in
pricing* the detailed discussion following does not treat all phases of 
this process exhaustively* or even equally. Attention Is centered primarily 
upon public utility aspects* presently these in sufficient detail to enable 
the reader to visualise better thee bade processes involved;
The significance of this evolution in regulation in America in the 
development of a basic conflict between two segments of society. On the 
one side stand the proponents of equality insisting that the tools of 
power held by enterprise be still further circumscribed. On the other side
stand the proponents of freedom Insisting that only with freedom can American
ideals be fully realised. One aspect of this conflict* or course* consists 
of a rationalisation of two sides of the status quo, the other and 
potentially most important aspect is a noticeable rift In community occasion­
ed by a process of redefinition of our ideological concepts —  freedom and 
equality. This rift provides at one and the same time a basis for compromise 
in public utility regulation and establishes a better foundation for a degree 
of insight into future developments.
Part 2s Social Philosophy in America
There seems to be substantial agreement today on the proposition 
that American social philosophy has been largely identified with the word
9
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liberalism* Although this concept is by no means self-defining the 
following statements summarise the substance of itfiat Is typically under­
stood by the term, *Th© root of liberalism, in a word, is hatred of 
eoagmlsien, for liberalism has the respect for the individual and his 
conscience and reason which the employment of coercion necessarily destroys. 
"Liberalism is the belief that society can safely be founded on this self­
directing power of personality, that it is only on this foundation that a
3true community can be built,* In short liberalism is basically Identified 
with individualism.
Before attempting to describe individualism in terms of the structure 
of social control in America it is desirable to briefly sketch out the 
framework of the broader philosophy of which individualism is a part, this 
broader philosophy —  materialism —  was set forth by a series of English 
philosophers of idiom the most influential upon the development of American 
concepts was John Locke*
the materialism of Locke begins with the science of knowledge. All 
knowledge arises from experience. This must be true because, he claims, the 
mind at birth is a blank page. Whatever it becomes later must therefore 
be attributed to what happens after birth, or experience. It follows from 
this that an individual is conscious of and impressed by only those things 
that appeal to the five senses. From an economic point of view this
1 layers, Gustavos, The History of American Idealism, (Boni and 
Liveright, New Tork, 1925*1Liberalism is used here in the broad social 
sense rather than the narrow political sense.
2 Stearns,Harold, Liber all am In America. (Boni and Liveright,New fork, 
1919.) Pp. 10~U.
3 Hobhouse, L.T., Liberalism, quoted loc.cit.
3 
JO
necessitated an industrial organisation predicated upon the creation of
material things, and, what is even more significant, a social organisation
Xcoextensive with industrial organization, Locke’s defense of the state 
largely centers around the duty to protect private property, and he is 
most emphatic in hie belief that the church should be excluded from
a
organised intercourse*
This presentation should at once make cleer that laisaes-falre in
the economic sphere was no small part of total materialism. Since an
individual has few if any wants that are not material, the economic machine
becomes all-important* Since no one can know anything he has not himself
experienced, every individual must be his own judge in both production and
consumption. Finally, since society is additive of persons rather than 
3multiplicative, an individual working for himself (sensual satisfaction)
signified the noblest work of God.
The specific attempt in theory to Integrate these concepts was the
4creation of a competitive society. The core of this creation is quite
1 For a much fuller dieeussion of the philosophical implications 
of materialism see Windleband, W., A History of Philosophy. (The Macmillan 
Company, Hew fork, 1893.) F£. 430 ff.
2 Larkin, Paschal, Property in tfoe Eighteenth Century. (Longmans, 
Green and Company, Hew Tork, 1930.)
3 This does not follow strictly from philosophic materialism, 
but It came early and stayed late as economic interpretation of materialism. 
See Smith, Adam, Wealth of Kail one.
4 Eicardo, David, o£ Ppli&AWl lS2£2!SK> Classicaleconomics, of course, is nowhere as extreme as the above would indicate.
n
fantlar t© all economists ana to many others. Repetition, therefore*
need not detain ne long, hut cohesion necessitates giving some attention
to the outer workings of competition. In essence a competitive society assumes
that an individual eill work only for himself (individualism)* and will be
interested in maximum satisfaction of wants (materialism)* Therefore he will
put himself and his property to work at that task that will be most productive
(individualism -materialism). The individual being the only one who can judge
his own potentialities (individualism)* only he can properly allocate his
swrria«a or them of bis property (lolaass-falre). If someone also happens
to be doing a job that an individual believes he can do better* competition
1
is permitted even though the inferior is ousted thereby (lalsscg-fairc)*
As an essential result of this type of society the following pattern
a
of resource-allocation was expected and desired* Every factor of production*
and every unit of every factor of produetion* would be placed in the most
productive position* In consequence no unit of productive eapacity would
be able to better Itself by moving to displace some other unit. Every firm
would be operating at lowest average cost* and selling price and average
3cost would be identical* All factors would receive their marginal product* 
and no amount of bargaining could bring them more* It follows that every 
productive act would add to the well-being of its sponsor. Since this sponsor
1 Ibid* In addition any recent textbook on Principles of Economies 
will present the same theoretical construction*
2 The best brief summary of the purely economic implications of 
competitive society can be found in Miller* J.P.* Unfair Competition* (Harvard 
University Press* Cambridge* 1911.) Chapter X*
3 This terminology and in part these concepts themselves were foreign 
to the original formulation* The purpose of Including them here is to make 
the analysis more widely useful by stating it in today's terms and concepts.
ia
mould be also a wise consumer, it would add equally to total social
enjoyment. Every individual act, thus, would contribute identically to
1individual and to social betterment.
the tern * social betterment *, however, is relative* Entirely apart 
from the metaphysical problem of the existence of absolute values it is 
still true that even the broadest social motivations appear only in a 
setting that makes them really motivations rather than merely abstract concepts. 
In the above description the analysis has not concretely set forth such a 
setting. Rather it has made a complete circle. Starting the ideal of 
individualism as the motivating force behind social action and social 
relationships, there was derived a resultant social good that must in turn 
be defined in conjunction with a definition of the ideal.
The usefulness of this circular approach to individualism Is to 
emphasise that social philosophy is both eause and effect • If it is not 
both —  if it does not perpetuate as effect the conditions through which it 
is a cause —  an inconsistency arises with consequent social dissatisfaction 
and change. The problem that must next be resolved is that of sketching in 
theory the content of individualism in such a way as to make It internally 
consistent and at the same time consistent with the soolal ends postulated 
above.
Two concepts, better than any other, can be used to describe the content 
of individualism in America. These concepts are free choice and reciprocal 
power 0 Tree choice was demanded by the fact that the individual is his 
own judge and jury. Reciprocal power was demanded by the fact that
1 Smith, Adam, Theory of Moral Sentiments. It is In this essay that 
Smith develops most carefully the ’•invisible hand* that guides individuals 
acting selfishly toward the betterment of society as well.
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individuals work for and by themselves and thus individuals would always 
be compared with Individuals rather than with organisations, these two 
aspects ©findividualism frequently go by the more popular tonae of 
freedoo and equality.
- 'it? Is meat important to note at the outlet that although 
individualise may properly be said to have two dimensions* they a re not 
all separate abd diet 1 not entitles. Actually they are so much a part 
and parcel of the same thing that neither can be defined except In terms 
of the other* Free choioe can not exist except where reciprocal power 
exists* and reciprocal power essentially means free choice. It Is 
for this reason that ears must be taken to avoid the tendency in popular 
parlance to lay disproportionate emphasis upon one or the other.
Vet only are the two special aspects of individualism consistent 
with one another. In addition* this philosopny is identical as both cause 
and effect. A situation characterised by free choice and reciprocal power 
could not result in anything different* and at the same time a resultant 
free choice and reciprocal power could not be produced by a different 
eituatiWtts cause, -'hile these two statements may seem to be a belabouring 
of the obvious yet the Indicated internal consistency is a prim© requisite 
tor any working ooolal philosophy.
It is not enough* however* th-t a philosopny be oonceptually
V
consistent. To be accepted and utilised as a framework for group living 
it must also be reasonably consistent with the external environment* It must* 
In short* fit the facts. In the days of John Locke* the typical business 
organisation was the family-farm* This period* too* was th© age of the frontier 
when the next best alternative to the status quo was movement to tho frontier* 
As long as opportunities were plentiful on the frontier an individual always
u
had a desirable alternative available* This lack of organisation and 
this availability of tho frontier made a philosophy of free-choice and 
reciprocal power reasonably believeable, producing a degree of consistency 
with tho foots adequate for stability sod solidity*
Contrary to this view, It has boon argued that ooolal philosophy 1a 
America was inherently unstable from tho beginning* a® evidence It has boon 
demonstrated that tho Constitution was written by property owners to protest 
property* However, In the contest of the economic organisation of 130 years 
ego that feet dees not warrant the extreme conclusion sometimes drawn from 
it* Hunan rights were at that tine still so nearly identical with property 
rights that it Could not be said that the emphasis upon property was 
injurious to fcdstaa rights in 1790, nor that as a consequence tho Constitution 
represented a bade conflict between forces*
The property bias of the Constitution was very important in another 
way, however* That bias, incorporated into law and court decisions, made 
property the vested interest in American econode history* As a consequence 
control over property by the organised community m s  placed on the defensive 
and expanded only with difficulty* As control expanded the vested interest 
naturally allied itself with the freedom dimension of social philosophy, 
while regulation was primarily justified on the basis of the equality dimension* 
Control over property would not have been developed, of course, In an 
environment identical with that prevailing in 1790* It was only after an 
evolution in economic relationships had produced an environment clearly 
violative of the ideal that regulation as we know it today began to develop. 
With property (freedom) entrenched as a vested interest it is only natural 
to look for violations of the equality dimension in a search for an 
environmental basis for regulation*
15
The essence of economic equality as It has boon eaphasised in 
America, to a condition la which social organisation precludes the using 
of individuals merely as means to an end. In other words advantage is to
be taken of no one. Undue advantage exists if and when one individual
has a right not correlated with an equal responsibility. Such a non-
1correlation of rights and responsibilities produces privilege, not equality.
It is a well-known fact that a right is relative; that for every
right there la a corresponding duty. If "A* has a right to work, HBH has
a duty not to prevent *A**» working; if "A" has a right to board a train;
*B* has a duty not to step "A* from so doing, etc. But this type of 
correlation, which is definitional rather than substantive, provides no 
guarantee of equality in society. It could happen, and has, that most rights 
are concentrated in the hands of a few, while most duties are concentrated 
with the remainder, the few in this case are privileied, not equal. The 
significant criterion of equality is the distribution of rights as compared 
with the distribution of duties.
For this reason equality is here predicated upon the correlation of 
rights and responsibilities for each social unit, rather than upon the 
correlation of rights and duties for the group as a whole. The distribution 
of rights and duties is fair (equal) when and only when every right for an 
individual creates for this same individual a social responsibility. If, 
therefore, an Individual is held accountable as a member of society as well
X A fair exposition of this viewpoint by an economist can be found 
in Hadley, A.T., Standards of Public Morality. (Putnam and Sons, Hew fork, 
1396.)
2 Hall, Jerome, Readings in Jurisprudence. (The Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Indianapolis, 1933.) Chapter XX.
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Xas In his individual capacity, society sill bs integrated*
thus it is that a competitive society such as the one outlined 
earlier in extreme terms is not,in theory, an atomistic society, and 
sot integrated merely by the fact that the self-interest of different 
individuals are coincidentally harmonious* Rather such a society is 
integrated by the fact of agreement on the desirability of the social 
non, Xt is tills implicit and more or less automatic faith in the 
equation of rights and responsibilities that constitutes equality and 
freedom, that keeps individual activity within the bounds of harmony*
Thomas Hobbes in The leviathan clearly presented the consequences of 
the truly atomistic society —  the war of all against all* The subsequent 
writings of many classical economists were intended to prove Hobbes wrong* 
What they did prove rather was that society was not atomistic in the first
a
place —  net that the consequences pictured by Hobbes were erroneous*
Stated in more general terms the self-interest postulated in Classical 
economics is the calculated type of social relationship* However, self- 
interest does not operate in an unlimited field* Xt is built upon a 
community underpinning, a basic and common set of values that spontaneously 
closes to the individual self-interest a large part of the theoretical field 
of activity* The real sovereign even in this society is thus the community 
spirit*
1 For a fins presentation of this approach with reference to the 
individual and the social side of private property, see Ely,Richard T*, Property 
and Contract* (The Macmillan Company, Mew York, 19H#) Voluran X*
2 Parsons, opv cit*, pp. 89 ff.
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If# in original outline, society was spontaneously integrated, it
beeomee of vital Importance to understand why and how this spontaneity
was lost* Modern business organization, in contrast to that in the
1eighteenth century, Is a process of bargaining* Capitalism itself is
practically synonoaaoue with exchange, since a high income for a society
presupposes specialization, and; specialization necessitates exchanging
surpluses* thus, economic purpose, as we know it, is centered upon exchange9
not upon the isolated dual exchange that constitutes a single transaction,
Z
but the series of such exchanges that the courts recognize as a going 
3business. Concretely, this purpose is a maximum net of output over Input 
in whatever terms these are measured in a particular case. In popular terms, 
the aim of a business is to maximize net profits through buying and selling. 
Every exchange relationship contains potentially an opportunity for a strong 
party to dominate a weaker party. Wet profit is the excess of domination 
over submission* Wet loss is the opposite result, the type of society that 
we have defined as representing the social ideal — - a free and equal society-** 
would leave no net balance either positive or negative. For a right is a 
dominance; a responsibility is a submission. Where these two have been
1 See Clark, J.M., Social Control of Business. (The McGraw-Hill 
Book Cospany, Mew Iork,193o •) %11 ff *
2 23s U.S. 153; 223 U.S. 655; 287 U.S. 178; 792 U.S. 290; 292 U.S. 398.
3 Modern economic theory is using more and more the idea of a "stream*
of and outputs, which stream Professor Conwions considers the going
concern. Commons, John &., legal Foundations of Uapitaliam* (The Macmillan
Company, Mew fork, 1924.) Chapter ?.
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accurately correlated, therefore, they cannot diverge*
But freedom in society presupposes choice* Where tha principal
social organisation la a prowess of bargaining, the actual choices that
nan make are of paramount importance. Essentially these choices will be
X
to earn a living in one way as compared with another* In a free society
these decisions will be made on the basis of the net result as above
outlined* Individualism necessarily forces every individual to have regard
for that course of action that will prove most advantageous*
Each of the choices that an individual makes as to alternative courses
of action amounts to a choice of degrees of power over others, maximum
advantage being the highest possible degree of power over others In the
2
game of business* or the largest net balance of domination in the economic
order* Lalsaea-falre economics correlated rights and responsibilities
quantitatively; that is* predicating only one degree of economic power as
basic* In technical economic terms this degree of power represents
equality between average cost* marginal cost, and selling price for every 
3seller* Advantage to every bargainer was equated to disadvantage; or to 
general social advantage* Society was equal because it could not be other* 
wise*
In the face of the development of an environment substantially 
different from the one on the basis of which the philosophy was originally 
constructed* it was inevitable that basic inconsistencies would arise and in
1 Knight, Frank H** "Ethics of Cocqpetition", Quarterly, Journal q£ 
Economics, Volume XXXVII, pp* 611 ff«, August, 1923*
2 Cojssoons, sa* clt, * chapter III.
3 Myers* Albert, Elements &f IM o m  Economics* (Frentice Hall, Inc., 
Hew fork 1911*) Revised Edition, chapter XIII*
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time product dissatisfaction. Xt tat also to be ejected that a pattern 
of adjustments would be worked out to lessen the degree and one-aidenes* 
of the dissatisfaction. this pattern of adjustments Is otherwise known 
at regulation*
At regulation expanded the original bias in favor of property 
protection lost wteh of its force, and society found it necessary to 
balance More and More carefully the interests involved in order to assure 
a compromise of agreement rather that a compromise through power. Today the 
gap in philosophy that must be bridged by regulation is so wide that power 
compromises are becoming apparent in some areas. Evidences of this type 
of social relationship are 1 log-rolling* and legislation through blocs and 
pressure groups. Through these and similar elements in our government it 
sometimes happens that calculated interests become formalized into law 
through power rather than compromise.
Summarised as part of an introduction the above process of develop- 
amnt appears clear-cut and single. Actually forces of extreme ©onplexlty, 
operating in many and devious ways, have all contributed to the result 
Indicated. With primary emphasis upon economic forces, and drawing material 
mainly from the field of public utility regulation, this dissertation attempts 
to trace some of the significant phases of the indicated evolution.
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CHAPTER X
m  w m *  patm m  or m m u t x m
A social philosophy, of course* can not be understood solely 
through an understanding of it* broadest sources* aims* and principles*
To bo really useful in integrating a society* philosophy must bo ultimately 
translated into narrower terns consistent with the concrete environment. The 
oooood stop toward on understanding of social philosophy in America ie 
therefore to reduce it to the problems that its application brought to tho 
surface* Tho purpose of this chapter is to oonsidor tho too dimensions of 
indivldnaXtsm in term* of the broadest problems of application* while tho 
following chapter will consider thorn in terns of a still narrower sot of 
applications*
The principal subject natter of this chapter still bo the Supreme Court 
of tho United States* So closely allied to philosophy is regulation that
jurisprudence naturally plays an important part In working out the details
*
of social organisation* This Is particularly true in the Halted States whore*
for reasons that will bo made more clear later* a supreme jurisprudential body
1
was created for precisely this purpose* As Felix Frankfurter aptly remarks#
*0ur basic probleias— whetfter of industry* 
agriculture* or finance—  sooner or later 
appear In the guise of legal problems*
Professor John R* Hemmon* is therefore 
justified in characterising the Supreme 
Court of the Halted States as the 
authoritative faculty of economics'1*
1 law and Politics* (Harcourt, #raee and Company, Hew York*mmmmm  assssvss ewMHSHewpeeMWMMMP *  ^  “1939.) P. *#.
Xt, mow* for purposes of analysis* 0* toko the position that 
tho working out of tho pattern of social control in the United States 
eon be * funnelled1 through tho Supreme Court* we must at the outset 
concede the corollary of that position* We must understand that individual 
court decision* ere net isolated facts In our political coianuniiy but are 
carefully Integrated by human minds assiduously trained in the art of 
consistency*
On the basis of this corollary it Is at once obvious that a first 
step in presenting the legal pattern of regulation will be to set forth the 
principle of integration in terms of which individual court decisions are 
consistent* Xt will be suggested immediately that the Constitution 
provides such a principle* However it is one of the specific aims of this 
chapter to demonstrate that the Constitution is not the sol*~~-lmd*ed» not 
even the fa,imary-~~«ource of consistency for regulation* The deeper source 
is a fundamental community belief in free enterprise* individualism* equality 
of opportunity —  from which belief the Constitution Itself was derived*
law or regulation Is an attempt by the community to protect Its 
values* Whenever the action of individuals or groups violates a basic 
cemmanity value laws ere passed* Since In the typical case a law affects 
only a small group within the community It can perhaps be fairly said that 
law Is the Imposition of the will of the community (through force if 
necessary) upon those who by their actions have Indicated a tendency to 
live outside the area of proper behavior Illicit in community ideals*
Xt is not at all strange that* in a society predicated upon freedom 
and equality* the first legal principle the Supreme Court actually set forth 
was the principle of principles* If the iivlividual (enterprise) is to be 
the vital element in the economy it is imperative that the individual know
22
the rules of the game whenever he wishes to make a eomaitment* Mo one
can plan either a life or a business if such important factors as the
attitude of government are unknown or subject to change without notice.
For guidance on this point the Court went to the Constitution and took
the provision against ex^post facto laws as a concrete demand for a
principle in all things. John R* Commons has elaborated upon this
statement in the Constitution and has developed what he claims la the essence
of the relationship between the individual and law in American capitalistic 2
society. This principle is that no individual (business) can be punished 
(controlled) as an individual (business) but only as a member of a group 
of individuals (businesses). Thus no law can be passed punishing John Bones 
for murder* A law can be passed, however, punishing all murderers of whom 
John Jones may be one.
Assuming, now, the existence of principle, it might be helpful to 
inquire into the reason for its desirability. The average person, of 
course, takes principle so much for granted that to even ask the question 
may at first seem foolish. But the underlying basis for emphasis upon 
principle is so intimately and intricately related to the entire system of 
underpinning for the American way of life that a brief examination may be 
well worthwhile*
Behind our Constitutional system is a fundamental belief in natural
1 Since our form of government is predicated upon reason it is 
evident from an even broader viewpoint why it is believed that principles 
are possible. Generali cation (principle) is the essence of reason.




















Emphasis upon principle must he Intended, otherwise every ease 
would be decided as it arose rather than in advenes, the essential 
element in standards is their relationship to the future# A principle 
laid down by law is the pre~judging of all subsequent eases, law thus 
establishes a continuing and consistent probability for persons to base 
their calculations of the future upon. It mist be continuing because 
principles are invoked until alteredg and it must be consistent because 
only so can control by mood be avoided.
It could hardly be overemphasised that a lav for the future has 
been peculiarly favorable to the growth of the modern institutions of 
capitalism. A business concern, engaged in producing or distributing the 
goods that asks up our standard of life, is predicated upon profits.
1Profits (or losses) are closely related to the unknowable* in enterprise, 
lav could be a sufficiently large unknowable —- presumable in an adverse 
way — * to severely limit technical advancement were it not for the 
provisions against retroeative law. This is more and more true as fixed 
and specialized capital makes up a larger and larger proportion of total 
business assets.
Having firmly established the principle of principles, and starting 
with a presumption against government Interference, it was next necessary 
for the Court to establish a principle to enable a determination as cases
1 Recent distribution theory is placing more and more emphasis 
upon the relation of risk and profit. The classic thesis can be found 
in Knight, Frank H., SJ& front. (Houghton-lilfflln
Cojqpany, Hew Xork, 1921.)
as
cross as to what regulations would ha permissible and what regulations
would not be permissible* Analysis of this problem it tha principal
requirement few a discussion of tha legal pattern of regulation and to
it tha remainder of this chapter will be devoted*
Tha process of defining proper subjects for regulatory laws mist
be approached la two distinctly different ways* It mist be defined in
tarns of tha Constitution! tha 5th and 14th amendments, and also in tarns
of the season law, tha source of tha police power*
Police power is tha right of a government to govern. Originally
police power scant only tha right of a government to establish conditions
relative to any or all activity that affects tha public health, safety,
X
and morals* However, when the traditional definitions of these terms 
mads them inadequate to the task of enabling government to cope with the 
capitalistic economy that had developed under a substantive laissez-faire 
approach to business relationships the police power was expanded to include 
the right of a government to determine proper prices to be charged 
consumers by any business declared to be ‘public utilities9.
It is at once obvious that police power is neither a self-defining 
nor a static concept* Experience in the form of specific judicial 
pronouncements is constantly defining and re-defining its Implications*
The problem then is to attespt to uncover with some exactness the content 
and limitations of the police power*
A superficial answer to this problem can be immediately given*
Police power is defined through its polar partner due process in the




5th and 14th amendments* Bat this clarification la scarcely helpful.
For duo process la itself neither self-defining aor static, tha result 
tor regulation la that ce hare polar approaches to tha relationship 
between government and Industry, both of which east be aonsldarad as 
mutually Halting and defining the other, but neither providing a 
sufficiently precise or fined content to serve as definition or limitation 
of tha aphere for government action.
Since these polar and mutually limiting approaches to regulation 
are so far apart it could appear that there is room for a considerable 
amount of arbitrary dealing by regulators, Actually the relationship 
betceen government and business in this country could not be said to have 
bean arbitrary at any time in its development. Bather the rules existing 
at any one time have exhibited a rather high degree of consistency, and 
chile there hae been, as could be expected in a nation as large and 
dynamic as America, a changing trend in the relationship of government to 
business, this change Itself has been consistently and gradually in the 
same direction. Although there are a fee oho night refer to this trend 
as arbitrary most could agree that, considered in the large, it has not 
been so,
Xt strikes the thoughtful person Immediately and forcefully that 
a consistent pattern of regulation in both the dimension of time and the 
dimension of space is itself proof that regulators — * finite men that
1 Due process is not to be thought of in the procedural sense 
of trial by Jury, but in the substantive sense of Just compensation.
they m * do utilise principles sad standards* It is tho belief
of tho writer that tho principles available for this purpose can
come from only one source —  social philosophy* the fact that at any
given time regulation le consistent is evidence that tho community
ideal has a tendency to penetrate most minds similarly* the fast that
thoro has been a discernible trend is tho.scops and content ©f regulation
siŝ ply demonstrates that community ideals change as the external
1
environment, so to speak, poses new problems*
Given, now, the existence of a division of labor between the police
power and the due process clauses of the Constitution, it should next
prove instructive to examine the direction this division of labor has
taken in the history of regulation. The division has developed in two
parts. The first of these is in terms of the scone of regulation, or the
balance between public utility regulation and general police power
regulation* The second is in terms of the pxftePjt of regulation, or the
balance between confiscation and due process*
Historically the police power has been divided into the two
categories mentioned earlier* The first of these gives the government,
federal or state, power to establish conditions surrounding any or all
%activity that affects the public health, safety, and morals; the second
1 This type of analysis has been most powerfully developed in 
the field of sociology* See Parsons, Taleott, £&« olt«* p* 193*
Z Fruend, Hr nest, op. cit* The Police Power. This la an exhaustive 
account of the development and status of this category* It is noteworth 
that this volume includes all government activity in America under this 
one head.
2B
give* tha governamnfc* federal ©r state* power to determine proper 
prleee to be charged consumers* by apy business declared to be qi public 
utility!
7he economic thesis of the Supreme Court in defining these separate
and distinct approaches to the police power* although never explicitly
stated* seems to have been the following* control over business details
affecting public health* safety* and morals is by nature m  incidental
control that has little or no relationship to the ability of the controlled
to stay in business or make a profit. On the other hand* control over
1
prises is in very essence an external “attach1* upon the most vital aspect
a
of the entire business process, therefore it was a most logical step
for the court to permit virtually any regulations that could be demonstrated
3to be merely incidental to the major operation of the business concerned* 
but to be extremely cautious about permitting over-all regulation of a 
particular business. Since economic freedom had become deeply instilled in 
public consciousness* it was felt reasonable to suppose that price 
regulation should be placed on the defensive.
1 this is* perhaps* the proper word* for the reason that while 
the doctrine of public interest was being formulated, the cases coming into 
court were attempt* by government to limit the sphere of action of 
transportation cofl$>anies.
Z In other words* what J.IS. Clark calls the heart of the contract. 
Op. cit.f pp.176 ff.
3 HEegolation to be valid must tend to some ulterior good to 
which the destruction or curtailment of rights Is merely incidental•“
11 Am Jur. 1007* See State vs. henry* 37 N.M. 336.
m
But the court1s entire economic thesis is not cosqplete at this
point • the justices seemed to be emphasizing that activity in our
industrial society Must be interpreted in one of two ways; either it is
composed of single, isolated aets having no substantial relation to a
business considered as a whole; or It consists of general acts,
interrelated with the composite of all other acts making up the particular
business process under consideration. The former group consists of any and
all acts that, taken in and of themselves, permit of superficial and
extensive control without detriment to the ability of the business to
sustain itself. The latter group consists of those acts that directly
relate to the financial well-being of the concern, and do not permit of
superficial control. The court has apparently felt that any all-embracing
act must be regulated on an intensive basis, and that regulation of such an
act must be justified on somewhat more elaborate grounds than control of
1
superficial acts*
The position of the court, admittedly complex and confusing because 
never stated forthrightly, can perhaps be made clearer by pursuing a 
slightly different line of discussion* Let us suppose that an act, a tiny 
fnaction of the ooŝ tosite activity of a concern, is considered detrimental 
to social well-being* To prohibit this act will leave the business in the 
same position as before. As justification for its regulation, therefore, 
a legislature must prove only that this particular act is injurious to the 
public interest if unchecked*
1 “ In the first place, it is established by a series of cases that 
an ulterior public advantage may justify a comparatively insignificant taking 
of private property* * *tt Justice Holmes in Hoble State Vs. Haskell,
219 U.S. 104* Emphasis supplied*
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Let us now suppose that another act, an act which itself
embraces numerous acts-** say quoting a priee to a consumer-—  seems
also detrimental to social well-being* &ut in controlling or
limiting this one action, limits are also placed upon many (perhaps
1
all} other acts of the business* Thus control spreads itself to 
action not specifically contemplated by the law Itself until it 
embraces the entirety of the operations of the concern controlled* 
Thus control is established over, not an act, but an entire business 
process* Therefore, a legislature must prove that, not the act, but 
the entire business* if unchecked« is potentially injurious to the 
public interest* Actually, in Munn vs. Illinois the first and 
precedent-setting case in the matter of price regulation, the court 
came as close as it ever has come to establishing the above-stated 
economic thesis* In that decision Chief Justice $aite remarked:
Indeed, there is no end of regulations 
with respect to the use of property which may not 
be legitimately prescribed, having for their object 
the peace, good order, safety, and health of the 
community, thus securing to all the equal enjoyment 
of their property; but in establishing these 
regulations it is evident that compensation to the 
owner for the use of his property, or for his 
services in union with it, is not a matter of any 
importances whether it be one sum or another 
does not affect the regulation, either in respect
1 Xt is a well established principle of American 
Constitutional law that Constitutional guaranties are no bar to 
legislation "not operating unreasonably beyond the occasions of its 
enactment • • ♦ H 11 American Jur. 991. See also Borden vg,. Louisiana 
State Board of Education, 168 La* 1005*
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to its utility or mode of enforcement. One say go,
in like manner, through the whole round of regulations
authorized by legislation, State or municipal, under
what is termed the police power, and in no instances
will he find that the compensation of the owner for the
use of his property has any Influence In establishing
them* Xt is only tdiere some right or privilege is
conferred by the government or municipality upon the
owner, which he can use in connection with his
property, or by means of which the use of his property
is rendered more valuable to him, or he thereby enjoys
an advantage over others, that the compensation to be
received by him becomes a legitimate matter of
regulation. Submission to the regulation of compensation in such
cases is an implied condition of the grant, and the State, In
exercising its power of prescribing the compensation, only
determines the conditions upon which its concession shall be
enjoyed* When the privilege ends, the power of regulation
ceases.
Essentially, then the court demands the same proof, whichever 
category of the police power is being invoked. Xn the one case, however, 
proof of public Interest is extended to a single act; while in the 
other case this proof is extended to the entire business. So far as 
the writer is aware this fact has never been made clear by textbook 
writers in the field of public utilities. Once it is clearly recognized 
it can be further used as a tool for investigating the ramifications 
of the coi2rt,s economic postulates.
This 'hll or nothing" approach by the court, pushed to its ultimate 
conclusions, looks weak when judged in the light of today*s economy. But 
it should be noted that when the principle was first set forth the 
economic environment and thus the need for regulation had not yet 
developed to a point intricate enough to actually push the court's approach 
to anything like its ultimate conclusions. What is important here is that
1 94 B*Sf 113,146
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a principle was required delineating the proper sphere for government 
control* In order that thia principle might be as definite as 
possible the court formulated the line of demarcation between the 
environment to be controlled and that not to be controlled in extreme 
terms.
Two things stand out at this point* First, all regulation 
has a common denominator* That common denominator is, as would be 
expected, public interest as defined in terms of social philosophy* 
Second, price regulation was forcefully placed on the defensive —  a 
result clearly called for by the ideal. A succinct understanding of 
these significant facts will help clear the way for an understanding 
of the second part of the division of labor between the common law 
and the Constitution —  the balance between confiscation and due 
process.
Obviously the fact that the Supreme Court defined the categories 
of regulation in absolute terms, could not, in our social setting, be 
interpreted to mean that the right to control was itself to be absolute. 
Such an interpretation would be the equivalent of placing the public 
utility industries at the mercy of the law rather than within the sphere 
of legal protection. Accordingly it was necessary that a supplementary 
principle be devised to set forth the proper extent of government 
regulation. As such a supplementary principle the Courts promulgated 
and developed the legal concept *fair return on fair value* and its 
opposite fconfiscationf, both interpreted in relation to due process.
Government regulation has been replete with references to the
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Xdue process clauses of the Constitution* Thus persons may not
be deprived of property without "just compensation." This test —
called the test of confiscation —  is invariably applied in utility
rate cases as a constitutional limitation upon the exercise of this
aspect of the police power. Yet it is a "firmly settled" concept of
law that the due process clause has no effect upon the exercise of
the general police power (protection of the public health, safety,
2
and morals) •
At first glance this would appear to be an irreconcilable
conflict between the Constitution on the one hand and the police power
on the other hand. However, an examination of decisions makes a
reconciliation of the conflict quite simple* Xt is said, for example,
3that due process limits the improper exercise of the police power.
Also it Is said that due process prevents unreasonable or arbitrary
4exercise of the police power. The conclusion to which we are thus 
forced is that the court will disapprove an injury to property rights 
only if the injury is improper, arbitrary, or unreasonable. Sometimes
1 Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments*
2 11 Am. Jut. 998* See also Murphy vs* California, 22$ U.S. 623. 
There are numerous state cases emphasizing this same point.
3 Grenada Lumber Company vs. Mississippi, 21? U.S. 433*
4 Dobbins vs. Los* Angeles, 195 U.S. 223*
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private rights can be abrogated, and sometimes they can not*
However, nowhere in all the multitude of pertinent decisions handed 
down by the courts on this subject, are the terms improper* arbitrary, 
or unreasonable unambigously defined* Such a definition is one of the 
legislative problems in the sphere of regulation* The group that 
defines these terms is, to all intents and purposes, a substantive 
legislative body* even though the elected representatives of the people 
do write the formal language of the law* Thus the Supreme Court has 
forced itself —  or been forced —  to become a basic legislator on the 
subject of property rights and their limitations.^
The legislative position of the Supremo Court can perhaps be 
understood more adequately by reference to an earlier point* Disapproval 
of regulation is found inside the Constitution in the 14th* 10th, and 
5th Amendments* Approval of regulation is found outside the Constitution 
in the police power* Thus the responsibility of the Court is to steer a 
consistent course between the Constitution and the police power. In the 
absence of explicit definitions to serve as standards a consistent course 
must utilise certain Implicit definitions or standards* Since the court 
has been quite consistent in its Interpretations it seems proper to think 
in terms of an integrative principle for decisions* In the nature of
1 Jerome Frank has contributed a candid recognition of the 
fact of judicial legislation. Frank* Jerome* Law and the Modern 
Mind* (Tudor Publishing Company, Hew York, 1955.) 6hapter #•
thing* it M t u  inescapable that this principle can be no other than
the dimensions of social philosophy presented earlier*
The question as to the specific content of due process is not
so easily dismissed, although in general terms it follows a rather
definite pattern* "dust compensation” in the Fifth Amendment and "due
process of law” in the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments are equivalent 
1
terms. Just compensation and "fair return on a fair value" are alsoa
identical in connotation* Although the precise substance implied by
these vital regulatory concepts is primarily economic, the strictly
legal implications do warrant further examination here* The purpose
will be to link more closely the balance set forth by the courts,
between general and public utility regulation on the one hand, and between
confiscation and due process on the other hand*
An important corollary of the philosophy upon which our society 
3is based is free will* An equal society must be one in which membere 
have equal choices. Ordinarily, therefore, the government may not
1 Smyth JSLm Ames, 169 B*S* 466* Here "due process" was not 
argued as sueh* Instead Justice Harlan centers his famous remarks 
around "Just compensation. n The equivalence of these terms is inherent*
2 Board of Public Utilities Commissioners va. N.Y. Telephone 
Co*, 271 H,S* 23, Here Justlee Butler appears to use the two phrases 
interchangeably*
3 Since much of our early constitutional thinking was inspired
thereby, reference might be made to John locks9 s tyo Treatises
on tenant, so influential in solidifying England^ judicial system,




c* sr ̂  ft* I* at flit*






























Without unduly extending this analysis the above relationships 
can be brought into even eloser juxtaposition, the typical case of 
government intervention is one that can in soms sense be described as 
monopoly as contrasted to the free competition upon which unenforced 
equality must be dependent* Xt is a well recognized characteristic 
of monopoly that the choices of actual or potential consumers are much 
more narrowly circumscribed than where enterprise is competitive • Thus 
government intercedes for the consumer when the latter^ choices are in 
danger of being Interferred with by business* And this process is 
precisely the obverse of intercession by government for business when 
the latter*s choices are in danger of being Interferred with by the 
public interest*
Xt might be helpful here to summarize the legal pattern of 
formal control to this point* The argument has been developed as follows* 
Beneath and behind society in America is a belief in natural law* a belief 
that envisages government as a resultant of society rather than a cause, 
and itiich considers equality of opportunity as the natural and thus the 
ideal social state* Mien it became necessary to super impose a minimum 
of government upon this superstructure of equality the need for principles 
of control became paramount* Without principles some few might pass 
beyond restraint while at the same time others might drift outside the 
protective custody of society*
To meet this need for principles two opposing ideas have been 
constantly counterpoised against one another, both in determining the
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scope of regulation and in determing its extent* The first of these 
is the police power, or the positive right t© govern* The second is 
the Constitution, or the negative obligation to respect the status quo*
The result of this opposition insofar as the scope of regulation is concerned 
was, as would be expected, a compromise. For most businesses the victory 
was with the status quo* with the exception that clearly incidental 
regulation to protect the public health, safety and morals was to be 
allowed* But for some businesses —  called public utilities —  the 
victory was with police power in that price regulation as well as 
incidental regulation was to be allowed. This key problem of industry 
classification is not automatically solved, of course, by the division of 
labor indicated* The actual process of classification can only be 
accomplished through a rather general agreement as to what is necessary 
for the realisation of the twin ideals —  equality and freedom*
Insofar as the extent of regulation is concerned the same 
opposition between the Constitution and police power is evident* Here, 
however, the principal factor is primarily type of regulation and only 
secondarily type of industry* Where regulation is merely Incidental 
the police power is absolute* The charge of confiscation can not be 
successfully raised to avoid such regulation* But where regulation goes 
to the heart of the contract the Constitutional provision of due process 
is utilized to check the operation of the police power* And again the 
ultimate determinant as to which shall rule must be a general agreement 
as to what is necessary for the realization of the underlying ideals. In
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making final determinations as regards both scope and extent of 
regulation the Supreme Court plays a most important part.
To this point the legal pattern of regulation has been 
discussed without extensive reference to the legal terms that are 
most commonly heard in this connection —  rights and property* It 
seems desirable now to fit the above analysis firmly Into a more 
traditional terminology.
It is a relatively common thing to define property in terms of 
rights* Private property thus becomes rights accruing to Individuals.
a
But these private rights are not absolute* The state may decrease or 
increase these rights, not capriciously, but according to certain 
reasonable principles* These principles all comprehend or are 
comprehended by the poliee power*
The police power comprises all the power of 
the State except the power of taxation and the 
power of eminent domain, and these powers are them­
selves merely auxiliary powers in aid of the police 
power* The object of the power of taxation is to 
raise money to enable the state to exercise the 
police power and the object of the power of eminent 
domain is to enable the state to acquire property 
for the same purpose*’
1 "Property is a bundle of rights*" This is the classic
formulation of Richard T* Ely* Property and Contract * (The Macmillan
Company, New fork, 191A*) Volume I, p*60*
2 "Rights and privileges arising from contracts are subject to 
regulations for the protection of the public health, the public morals, 
and the public safety, in the same sense and to the same extent as Is all
property." 11 Am Jur. 1000* See Stephenson vs* Binford, 287, U.S. 251,
and Thornton vg* Duffy, 254 U.S. 361*
3 Long, J.R*, Cages on Constitutional Law* (The Lawyers 
Cooperative Publishing Co., Rochester, New fork, 1936.) Third Edition, 
pp. 1069-1070*
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This statement has a peculiar significance in the field of
regulation* *t could accurately be said that regulation by the state
is the source of all limitations on the sphere of rights surrounding
private property* If* then, the police power is also the source of all
2
regulatory property-right limitation, there must exist a relationship 
of identity between the police power and regulation*
A semi-syllogystic presentation of this significant relationship 
between regulation and the police power might be outlined as follows f 
(1) All limitation of rights stem from the police power* (2) All exercise 
of the police power results in a limitation of rights. (3) All limitation 
of rights stems from what we are here calling formal control or regulation* 
(4) All formal control results in a limitation of rights. Things which 
are equal to the same thing being equal to each other, it must follow 
that regulation (formal control) and the police power are identical 
concepts* This is a highly significant fact from the point of view of the 
student of regulation* Police power is simply the political theorist's 
name for regulation. Regulation is the economic theorist's name for
1 This is a simple truism, only formulated here to help 
emphasise a set of relationships not adequately emphasized before*
2 Or a power concurrent with the police power in a particular 
case* The courts can validly distinguish between police power and some 
concurrent power (e.g., taxation), but the former is inherent in all 
limitation of property rights. Freund, o p . cit*
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poll©* power* Stripped ©f superficial verbiage, economists and 
lawyers hare for many years concerned themselves with the same 
problems— kept apart by inadequate and often quite irrelevant dis­
tinctions that served only to becloud the issues*
Private property is the political approach of our society to 
equality* is such* equality (or some concept of equality) is enforced 
by the police power* but private property is also the economic approach 
of our society to equality. In this guise equality is enforced through 
economic regulation* Standing alone in either the political or economic 
sphere private property could have little meaning, taken together these 
two represent a most important element in what we think of as our social 
organisation* It must follow that metes and bounds in both spheres can 
likewise have little meaning unless interrelated into a significantly 
unified whole*
We have by now briefly outlined the method by which limitation
of property rights is made the common denominator of all regulation* In
a society in which equality is important this limitation cannot itself
be potentially unlimited; that is* in a world of private property, where
property is defined as a bundle of rights limitations of rights must
not be arbitrary or capricious, but carefully equated to social needs 
1
and desires. If we look upon the rights taken aw&y it would follow that
1 In the words of the court; "When the legislature appoints an agent 
to act within that sphere of legislative authority, it may endow the agent 
with power to make findings of fact which are conclusive, provided the 
requirements of due process which are specially applicable to such an 
agency are met, as in according a fair hearing and acting upon evidence and 
not arbitrarily** St. Joseph Stockyards Co, vs.United States, 298 U.S. 30*
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regulation treats businesses or persons unequally* But if we center 
attention upon the rights retained in these same cases, equality 
is evident as the governing rule* This may be merely restating the 
difference between a pessimist and an optimist, one saying his glass 
is half empty, the other saying his glass is half full* But the 
realistic approach must consider the pertinent fact to be the size 
of the residual bundle of rights* Though practical politics and 
administrative error may militate against realization of the ideal —  
equality In the size of these residual bundles —  it would be a crass and 
undemocratic person indeed who would deny that this equality in the 
size of residual bundles is the end-in-view.
In conclusion it may be helpful to point up once again by way of 
emphasis the concepts developed in the course of this discussion* In 
the first place it has been demonstrated that social control has 
numerous dimensions among which the economic, the legal, and the 
sociological are of prime importance. The economic dimension is private 
property* The legal dimension is definition of private property through 
the courts* The sociological dimension is the existence in the minds and 
hearts of men a belief in ©quality and freedom as characteristic of the 
ideal state«
In the second place it has been emphasized throughout that the 
specific approach to be taken by regulation can not be derived 
exclusively from the Constitution* Rather the Constitution and the 
police power provide polar and mutually limiting approaches to regulation, 
the precise division of labor between them being determined in the last
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analysis by the Idea existing in the minds and hearts of men ae to 
the Meaning of social philosophy*
Finally, it was pointed oat that the Supreme Court dree a 
eery sharp line of demarcation between the police power and due process 
ae to both the seenf and the extent of regulation, the court permitted 
incidental regulation of all incidental business activity, but allowed 
comprehensive regulation of only these fcjaihesses whose acts could not be 
said to be incidental, Share incidental regulation only is allowed 
due process is not invoked; while in those eases in which comprehensive 
regulation is permitted due process is relied upon for protection*
This, then, is the legal pattern of regulation* Just as In our 
society equality is considered to be important, so is the legal community 
organized to enforce that state where inequality arises* The operation 
of that organization is through limitation of rights~primarily 
property rights* Its procedure is a simultaneous restraint and protection 
for every citizen* Where a basic inequality exists police power acts to 
restrain while at the same time due process acts to protect* Where a 
non-basie inequality exists police power operates without due process on 
the thesis that no real injury is potential*
Before turning to the economic pattern of regulation there are 
a few items of broad significance that will repay mention. Regulation, it 
will be noted, was not invoked to protect the Freedom dimension of 
philosophy* This was to be expected since freedom or the private use of 
one*s property was the vested interest in terms of basic philosophy* Thus 
the equality dimension was the stimulus for control.
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Xt Hill be noted too that this legal pattern operated An such 
a nay as to keep the freedom dimension in the vested interest category 
by placing property fight limitation on the defensive* And, so difficult 
was it made to classify an industry as a utllityf there was really very 
little price regulation for many years* In this situation freedom m s  
scarcely touched by regulation* Obversely, the reason freedom was touched 
but slightly was because inequalities had net extensively developed* thus 
it was easy for both sides to compromise their differences, and it follows 
that the compromises required were small* As a consequence the motivation 
for power control rather than compromise control was limited, the result 
was a situation in which relationships were largely harmonious*
Finally, to anticipate briefly a later part of the discussion, the 
concretely harmonious adjustment of property relationships does not 
characterise the entirety of the history of regulation in America* As 
capitalism matured control was forced to operate in areas and directions 
not contemplated from the beginning. The result was a modification of 
control to allow for a somewhat different interplay of interests and a 
somewhat different economic environment* The following chapter presents 
the concrete framework for modification by outlining in some detail the 
specific steps regulation must take to insure the existence of reciprocal 
power where inequality is threatened* The present chapter and the 
following one can be considered as Phase X In the development of social 
control. Later chapters will present further phases of this evolution*
m m m  n
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the function of the law In proportioning the two dimensions of 
individualism*—  freedom and equality— is not limited to the broad 
function of classification ae might be inferred from the preceding 
chapter. In addition the courts hare the task of applying the 
classifications and assessing limite to them In particular cases.
However* the tools used in the process of detailed application are 
primarily economic rather than legal* Xt is for this reason that 
this more detailed pattern necessary to give concrete substance to 
regulation is termed in this chapter the economic pattern*
Before elaborating upon these economio tools several important 
relationships should be made more clear. In the process of regulation 
as such freedom was not an important consideration for the reason that 
the issue of freedom was decided through classification. Business 
organizations that were to be ♦free* were set aside and regulation was 
not allowed* Businesses not mo set aside were those that the dimension 
of equality demanded not to be free in the same sense, thus* up to the 
point of confiscation* at which point residual rights were considered 
equal* regulation did not need to concern itself with freedom.
If the dimension of freedom was not an important consideration for 
regulators* the dimension of equality assuredly was* Xt has been developed 
that utilities were defined as threatening inequality* For this reason 
they were to be regulated* Still* however* regulation was net to be 
wanton. Every regulatory act was to be reasonably related to the end in
view, namely, greater equality. This requirement is a part of the 
concept ©f equal residual rights* Freedom, by definition, ©an ©a&st 
only where ©quality exists, and as long as regulatory procedures are 
specifically designed to produce equality, freedom, as broadly conceived, 
could not be an issue# It is precisely for this reason that it w&i 
necessary that rights and responsibilities be defined carefully to permit 
of accurate equation* From this necessity the economic pattern of 
regulation directly stems.
Eight equal to responsibility means reciprocal power* means
that no one shall eaoert a greater amount of control over the economic
system than the economic system exerts over him# It means that no
business may be given authority to extract from others a greater sacrifice
than others may extract from it* It means that there is to be no net
balance of domination at any point in society* Xt means that the outward
flow of transactions shall equal the Inward flow of transactions, both
quantitatively and qualitatively* Xt means finally that economic input
shall equal economic output* Economic theory would define this concept
as a condition in which every factor of production received its opportunity 
1
cost —  A*S>, a sufficiently large sum to keep it producing at maximum 
efficiency, in other words, cost-of~®erviee♦
It is not to be thought that society ever does actually equate 
sacrifices In anything like this ideal way. Even this all-important
1 Gemnill, Paul F., Fundamentals of Economics. (Harper and Brothers, 
Sew York, 1939.) Third edition, pp.390 ff.
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element in government must follow the very pragmatic economic
principle* Thus if formal control can work to close some gap
between right and responsibility, without opening a bigger one
somewhere else, control Is very apt to become an established fact*
Following the economic principle further, scarce enforcement
facilities will be transferred from a small gap to a larger one until
1
both are approximately the same size* Thus, making allowance for
politics and mistakes, society simply does the best it can* At any
time, therefore, regulation may be said to represent the nearest practical
approach to the ideal.
The legal right of a seller is the right to charge a price
for his goods; the right of a utility is to make a charge for its
services* The economic responsibility of a seller is the responsibility
to reward factors of production for their services* As a matter of
practical expedience both of these are measured in dollars* Formal
control cannot stop with equating these superficial emblems, however,
2
but must endeavor to assure that the dollar sacrifices really 
represent the real sacrifice involved. This last is probably as 
important as the comparison of dollar amounts. Regulation has tended 
to concentrate mainly on dollars* Recent trends, however, are toward
1 Knight, F.H., g&gfe, Unortalnty an£ Profit, p. 65.
2 See Clark, o p . clt* * chapter VII, for an analysis of dollar 
versus other social sacrifices*
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a broader ii««, the approach here taken will include both dollar 
and raal sacrifice*.
Right and responsibility ara equal if payments by customers 
equal payments to factors. this condition suggests that prieo and 
average coot should bo equal. Xt implies, further, a quality between 
average long~run coot and average long-run revenue, tho orthodox 
competitive equilibrium*
Thia aquation between consumer payments and factor payments 
immediately suggests the problem of knowing the magnitude of each. 
Inequality might conceivably be remedied by raising one magnitude or 
lowering one magnitude , or possibly both methods might be used. If 
consumer payments exceed factor payments, for exasqple, factor payments 
might be raised or consumer payments might be lowered* in the typical 
case the latter is most apt to occur. Where factor payments exceed 
consumer payments, on the other hand* a reduction in payments to the 
factors or an increase in payments by the consumers may equally solve 
the problem. But before remedial measures can be adopted the 
magnitude of the inequality must be known.
this question of knowledge is famtlar to students of regulation 
as control over accounts and reports* All comprehensive regulation 
must make use of this particular tool or fail. Although this fact is
1 West Ohio Gas Company ys. Public Utilities Commission of 
Ohio, 294 U.S. 63. There have been a number of recent decisions of this 
same general nature.
quite obvious regulation had developed quite far before accounting
1regulation became an accomplished fact*
A business is a flow of transactions, this flow is always 
in two directionss the inflow of assets; and the outflow of assets* 
this exchange of assets is the business or bargaining process. The 
inflow of assets represents the relationship between the business and 
the environment which it dominates (rights)* The outflow of assets 
represents the relationship between the business and the environment 
which dominates it (responsibilities)* The economic difference between 
the two is the net balance which the business desires to maximise If 
positive, or minimise if negative, and which regulatory authorities 
desire to minimise whatever the direction*
But these asset-flows cannot be measured by the business world 
In general terms* They oust be reduced to the unit of account**** money —  
in order to be comprehensible and comparable. The translation of these 
flows, for purposes of record, into monetary terms, is the accounting 
process* The result of this accounting process is formal evidence of the 
size of the two flows of assets* As such it indicates the existing 
relationship between rights and responsibilities* This latter relationship 
is the starting point of control*
But this relation between asset-flows is a valid starting point 
for regulation only if the recorded flow in dollar terms is identical
1 Wilson, towing, and Eutal.r, PublloUiillfer Economic.. 
(Th. McGraw-Hill Book Coapaajr, tow Xork, 1938,) Chapter IT.
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with the actual flow in dollar terms. In other words the accounting 
fact oust be consistent with the actual fact. If the asset-Inflow is 
understated, or the asset-outflow is overstated, the net balance of 
right-responsibility indicated by the formal records will not be 
representative of a true substantive relation.
Thus accounting regulation must first beware of actual fraud.
This is done by forcing the business to submit production reports, 
sales reports, etc.. to enable the regulatory authority to satisfy 
itself that all outflows of dollars represent inflows of assets, and 
that all inflows of dollars represent outflows of assets. By thus 
correlating physical units and monetary results the controllers can 
exert a considerable pressure for honesty on the part of the corporation. 
The more items of income and expenditure the business must have proofs 
for, the more careful they are apt to be about not distorting facts.
The economic pattern of equating rights and responsibilities
is not complete with an exposition relating to equality between the
recorded dollar facts and the actual dollar facts* An equally important
problem for the regulatory authority is to be certain that the recorded
and actual dollar facts are consistent with the economic facts purported
to be represented. If, for example, the economic fact involved is greater
than its symbol stated in dollar terms, the business has assumed rights
in excess of Its responsibilities. If the dollar fact as stated is
greater than the economic fact, the business has assumed responsibilities
in excess of its rights* In the first case the business is earning
1
a profit in excess of factor—cost. ^n the second case the business
1 Boulding, Kenneth E., Economic Analysis. (Harper and Brothers,
New York, 1941*) Chapter XX.
i» net fully relmfeureing the factors used,
Stating these facto In torso* of the accounting problem
suggested above pvoNMtt :tĥ  fbiioMng: ^ o business is a
series of eeemetsie happenings* *o»a are favorable end seme are un-
1
favorable, in the profit sense. Bet all of thee taken together 
make up the business organisation) favorable happenings corresponding 
to rights, unfavorable happenings corresponding to responsibilities, 
these tee sets of circumstances are dual in nature. On the one handa
a real sacrifice Is Involved, On the other hand there is set up a 
monetary sysbol as representative of the real scarifies. To some 
extent there Is a tendency to concentrate on the symbol to the neglect 
of the substance beneath. But the problem of regulation considered 
here Is hoe to asks actual dollars (assuming they h&v® actually been 
spent} correspond precisely to the flow of economic goods and services 
Into the business. In more orthodox terms this simply means that the 
productive process Should be economical in the real sense rather than 
merely in the monetary sense,
There are innumerable aspects of this problem. To satisfy 
them all would be to outline the entire set of ramifications of economic
1 Commons, gg, gift,. chapter V,
2 Sacrifice is used here to mean that economic resources are 
to be used, which, if used in this way, cannot be put to other uses,
3 Vsblen, Thorstein, fhf Instinct of iorkmanshio. (B,W* Huebsch Company, Ben Xork, 1918,)
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regulation* Only the basic ones will be considered* Perhaps ae good 
a startling point ae any would be the certificate of convenience and 
necessity. This is a device which permits a business to organise or 
extend its operation within the sphere of operations covered by certain 
regulations* Essentially control in this sphere aims to place an 
initial check upon rights as compared with responsibilities* *f the 
applicant is ready and willing to assume responsibilities, rights will be 
accorded him* Zf there are so many rights already in the field that there 
are no responsibilities remaining, rights will not be accorded the 
applicant* If, of two candidates seeking the same rights, one is more 
qualified or willing to assume responsibilities equivalent to the rights 
granted than the other, the former application will take precedence* If, 
after rights have been granted, the applicant begins to be lax in
a
responsibility, his rights may very well be taken from him*
This initial check is not solely for the purpose of making 
business responsible to society. It might equally be designed in a 
specific situation to make society responsible to business* If when an 
applicant wishes to extend his activity with the approval of the regulatory 
authorities,the authorities feel that there are not enough rights remaining 
in the field without injuring rights already distributed to warrant the
1 This term, convenience and necessity, has a technical and 
restricted usage in the public utility field* The connotation here implied 
is much broader than this, applying to all Inclusions and exclusions that 
legal authority must approve, rather than simply to ingress and egress.
2 Moeher and fifawford, att.li.ty Ba$H3StiSB« (Harper and
Brothers, 8#w Xork, 1933.) Chapter JtlXE.
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assumption of the particular responsibility desired, the application 
will Ini denied* this would bo tho case vhercvsr a commission refused 
to grant a certificate because operations would thereby besoms 
financially unprofitable* On every occasion that supply in a given 
industry is in ensues of the amount that ean be sold at cost* society 
has been awarded rights in excess of its responsibilities* Certificates 
of convenience and necessity are designed to provide an initial cheek 
upon all such eases where either the flow of factor-sacrlflee exceeds the 
flew of eonsumer-Hsacrif ice , or the flow of consumer~sacrifice exceeds the
X
flow of f actor-sacrifice. the need for a recognition by society of a
responsibility to business was much slower in developing than the 
assessment of business* responsibility to society* But the economic 
pattern of regulation that ©Ur society utilises does work both ways*
A further ramification of the principle of equating real 
sacrifice to dollar outlay Is closely related to accounting regulation* 
Regulated businesses frequently wish to purchase new assets or perhaps 
bid In the assets of a competitor* This would have the effect of 
increasing the inflow of assets* As to outflow of assets, several things 
sdght happen* Outflow might not be increased, or at least by as much 
as the inflow was Increased* Perhaps outflow to consumers will increase 
through being able to charge higher prices in the absence of competition* 
Or, finally productive efficiency might be increased so as to increase 
outflow by more than the amount of increase in the inflow*
Whichever happens, rights will be increased by the asset purchase, 
In the sense that the economic power of business is potentially greater*
X Loc* sit,
the first alternative marts responsibilities are not rising in 
proportion, Efficient regulation sill probably not permit the 
purchase* the second alternative refers to an increase in monetary 
responsibility, but none in real responsibility* Efficient regulation 
here else mill probably disapprove the purchase* $he last Is represent­
ative of situations, not rare, In which the monetary outflow (payment for 
the asset) is not commensurate with the real asset inflow* In such a 
case the purchase will probably be allowed, but rates to consumers will 
be subsequently lowered* In all of these cases, and others could be 
suggested if space permitted, regulation will select that alternative 
which most nearly equates right and responsibility* In selecting this 
alternative the new result will be calculated in such a way that the 
asset-inflow of domination will be equal to the asset~outflow of 
submission*
Another problem that looms large in the economic pattern of
regulation, is that of securing capital* Capital cost, with the
exception of labor in some instances, is the largest single coat of the
1
average public utility* The reason fair return has always been such a 
vital element in the theory of control is because it is important* 
Regulation can only afford to neglect minor issues, and then only until 
all bigger Issues are solved*
1 The normal public utility corporation must have an operating 
ratio of less than 70 percent in order to make 6 percent as a fair return* 
This is assuming a 12 percent capital turnover. A 70 percent operating 
ratio means that capital cost is 30 percent of gross earnings*
55
The cost of capital brings into focus an entirely now group
of personal —  the owners and creditors of the corporation —  who are
otherwise members of society Itself, thus an entirely new set of
responsibilities oust be comprehended as a part of the relationship
between this group and the corporation and the consumers, the securing
of capital produces for the corporation an immediate set of rights for
future use. The responsibilities created are continuous* emphasising
themselves whenever payments to suppliers fall due* If the rights
themselves grow less in value over time* the regulatory authorities
must consider, at least* limiting responsibilities likewise. If
opportunity arises after the bargain is consummated to limit respond**
bilities* authority must make a corresponding adjustment of rights.
This would involve an adjustment of fair return.
The Implicit content of the capital bargain* then* Is not a
single set of rights and responsibilities* but two sets. The flow of
assets into the concern must be equated to the flow of services to
consumers. Also the flow of assets into the firm must be equated to the
possibility of a flow of payments back to the capital suppliers. These
two sets of relationships emphasize* better than any other illustration
could, the triangle of regulation, consisting of the consumer* the
owner* (and creditor)* and the business, All three are related to each
of the others* but all relationships are indirect. That Is one reason
for the complexity of regulation,
A very new facet of the economic pattern of regulation is the
regulation of utility expenses. This control is not as complex as many
1
others* largely because it is more transitory or more minor. But when
1 Minor only In the sense of being scattered rather then 
concentrated into a gingle bargain* Actually it is only the more 
concentrated items that have thus far warranted commission control.
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connected with another new set of problem# in regulation —  that
of intercorporate relations it is of compelling significance. The
relationships here considered are not tho year to year relationship#
Comprehended by the capital and depreciation problems. They are the
week to week relationship# involved ae the business endeavors to keep
itself supplied with the labor and material# needed for daily operations*
These too items are the items that can most properly be referred to as
"flowing11 through the business. Together they make up about 50 percent
of a utility1 s total expenses* including capital costs, this daily
flow of services into the business process contributes to the flow of
services to consumers in a certain way.
The right of the management to stimulate this Inflow of
services is correlated with the responsibility to continue the flow through
the firm to consumers* Several circumstances may disrupt this process.
Xn the regulation of service companies the Securities and Exchange
Commission discovered many flows into these concerns that did not2
contribute to the servicing functions in any way. Since the corresponding
flow to consumers was lacking* the Coma&ssion forced the withholding of
a part of the inflow. This has been the usual treatment of non-utility
3expenses where comslssions have Jurisdiction*
1 Concern in this field dates back to the Federal Trade 
Commission investigation of holding companies, completed and published 
in 1927. Senate Document 92* 70th Congress* 1st Session.
2 Kennedy* William F.* "Regulation of Utility Servicing Under the
Holding Company Act of 1935% Journal qT Land and Public Utility Economics.
Volume XVII* pp. 27-3®* February* 1911*
5 Barnes* Xrston R.* 3&S. Economics g£ Public Utility Regulation. 
( F.S. Crofts and Company, New fork* 1942.) Chapter XXX.
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la addition to this possibility of divergence between fight
and responsibility, there is another important one* a society built
around the coopetitive principle, it is initially assumed that every
bargain is a competitive one, each party to the transaction seeking to
buy as cheaply as possible or to sell as dearly as possible* Every
JLtransaction thus is to be typified by "arms-length11 bargaining* This is 
probably an illicit assumption in view of the fact that the bargaining 
process comprehends competition only as to the net result* But the 
transfer from this view to the position that competition is a silent 
partner in each isolated transaction could not have been avoided in the 
type of society postulated* But in every transaction that results in an
a
inflow not justified by the outflow, regulation is intended to intercede* 
One more facet of the economic pattern of regulation will be 
noted —  service regulation* The quality of service furnished by a 
utility is a function of the costs to the company. High quality must 
result from high costa, and low quality must result from lower costs* For 
any quality of service there is one and only one cost that will equate 
rights and responsibilities* The commission mist so control the
1 This term was popularised by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in connection with the seals of utility securities through 
investment bankers who were friendly toward their clients* This is an 
amicable method of defrauding that the Commission has sought to cheek 
through competitive bidding of underwriting* The phrase itself, however, 
has a much more universal significance*
2 Federal Power Commission vs. Natural Gas Pipeline Company,
315 C.B. 575-
n
operations of the regulated enterprise that every flow of service-quality 
to consumer can to equated effectively to the proper flow of factor-costs*
^  *• " a" “ “ a *“ • - v  * -” 1™ * « • * -
regulatory Jurisdiction or actual practice*
In addition to the above discussion of loeasuring and equating 
rights and responsibilities throughout society at large there remains 
the mors concrete task of presenting both in term  of the rate level 
and the rate structure. Of these two separate aspects of utility 
regulation the sore significant is the rate level, this greater sig­
nificance stems from the fact that the rate level is the central meeting 
point of buyer and seller. Though not necessarily the place where 
responsibilities are equated, It is the place where they must be equal, 
Whatever happens behind the price charged must be reflected in the price 
charged, or the happening itself has no economic significance for the 
concern under consideration.
Kate structure, on the other hand, is a gross result of 
business operation rather than a net result. Errors in rate~structurs, 
from a business point of view, can be compensated for by simply shifting 
responsibilities. But errors in regulation the t affect the rate level 
are permanent errors, beyond repair by the expedient of shifting burdens.
Simply stated rate level regulation consists of two basic 
elements. In the first place, regulated businesses must be limited to a 
degree of power consistent with the competitive ideal. In the second
1 Barnes, clt.. chapter XXX.
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place,they must not be forced to accept a degree of power less than 
the competitive ideal. Xt is obvious, of course, that these two 
requirements can be consistent with a single net operating result. 
Furthermore regulation must endeavor to achieve this single result 
without guaranteeing utility earnings* Earnings received by a utility 
in a competitive environment are an economic phenomenon basically 
related to a demand and supply situation rather than to regulation.
Only government ownership can constitute a guarantee* Since government 
ownership is not here at issue, the statement that regulation cannot 
guarantee earnings is a truism*
But merely stating this truism does not exhaust the subject* The 
statement that government must allow a competitive return is the same 
as the statement that government must guarantee earnings up to a fair 
return, to the extent warranted by economic conditions. There is no 
other way of viewing the injunctions of the High Court*
The above significant concept can be graphically illustrated* In 
the accompanying diagram let K R represent the total possible revenues 
from the various possible quantities of output shown on the 01 axis* Let 
CC represent actual cost of producing various quantities of output* The
7T
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dlagrast thus illustrates what is a well known fast in public utility 
eeoaesdes, that there Is a olds range «f output that can produce a revenue 
in excess of oost«
The significance of this rang* of output producing a revenue 
la iXMii of oust Is that it demonstrates ths non-reciprocal power 
situation represented in ths sass of public utilities, %evy different 
output that could ha sold at a profit is a degree of power that ths 
utility ssn exert osar consumers* The uneoewrea choice as to whisk 
output to produce would bs determined on ths basis of ths principle of 
ths greatest not domination* ths purpose of regulation is to msks ths 
single degrea of power resulting in equality between outflow and inflow 
ths <as this result Is achieved
consumers do not make coerced choices and ths concern itself is son* 
psnsatsd to precisely the sans degree that it would be if competition 
rather then regulation United it to a single degree of power over the 
environment,
Under the conditions illustrated the ideal output is Oif, to 
be sold at price Si, this output and price essentially defines the
precise balance that the regulatory comiseion mist strive to find as
* ♦ between output, cost, and revenue, Any output less than Ok (say €®f )
would sell for soae price between kfM as a miniiaum, and HfT as
1 The maxima price at which a given output can be sold, with ofc 
without regulation, is defined by the ft ft curve. The nXnlnmm price a 
seller would voluntarily offer to take for his goods is defined by the 
G G curve.
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a maximum. The n'lC price do®a not allow the maximum utilisation of
plant and equipment. The H*T price permits economic rental® to the
factors, Any output greater than OH (say 0$**) would sell for a
maximum and Minimum prise of Nf %Z — * th® S* V  price being out of
th® question by definition. A commission could not insist upon such
an output, for It would then not be allowing an economically possible
fair return. Thus the task of the commission is always to assume as
1
full a use of facilities as is consistent with economic conditions.
But even regulated industries have depressions* Many times a fall in 
prices will strike utilities with as much force as unregulated 
industries* Such times pose the greatest problems in regulating the 
rate level. This type of problem can be Illustrated in a diagram similar
to the one above
fi
4
1 Full utilisation is demanded by the fact that a public utility 
is considered necessary to social welfare. Economic Conditions, of course, 
refer to the relation between CC and RR, as representative of the 
coordination of the rights and responsibilities Involved,
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Here there li no combination of price and quantity that will 
permit the utility to recover costs* However, since it must continue 
to operate , it oust select some combination between output and price 9 
the optimum output for all concerned dll be, under the circumstances, 
the output 0H« the revenue from this output will not return costs. But 
neither eill any other output# the real virtue of OH outputf ae compared 
dth CUf* or €Rtv is that OK cornea closer to returning costs than any other 
output#
Xt is quite plain in the two eases that, regardless of general 
operating circumstances* there is one output preferred above all others#
Xt is the task of the Conralssion and the utility together to find that 
output relative to any given situation* Such a task Is extremely difficult,
Xt Is immediately evident that for any utility operating dth OK 
output in ease 1 and OK output in case 2, actual return is less than fair 
return for the reason that the utility receives back its cost in the former 
circumstance but falls short of this goal in the latter circumstance* Ko 
regulatory commission could look upon this operating result as desirable* let 
it is dear that so remedy can be sought in case 2, Thus the commission 
(and the utility) must turn back to the situation in case 1# An output 
slightly lews than OK mould produce a surplus revenue that could be used to 
make up the deficit in case 2, Then actual return mould equal fair return.
The basic idea embodied in this latter approach is that of a time 
dimension# There is no abstract virtue in an equation of cost and revenue 
in a particular year. One year's operation in the life of a public utility 
is but one point within a process. One year's operation can no more be
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considered apart than an Individual can be considered outside the
totality of society* Indeed there is no purpose to be gained by abch
a conception. Business, to be interpreted realistically must be looked upon as
a flow, not a fund* thus the tine dimension is a really basic fact*
The portion of the economic pattern presented above has been stated
throughout in terms of equating total rights and total responsibilities#
this analysis should help shed light upon a problem that has long confused
students of regulation —  the so as of reasonableness# Many persons seem to
implicitly accept the view that several rate levels may be equally reasonable
for all concerned# Between the upper level of excessive profits to the
company and confiscation of the company's property, the commission may
1
use its own discretion as to the actual hates permitted# From our approach
It would seem that for every possible outflow there can be only one proper
inflow that will equate right and responsibility* It may be that this
theoretical ideal is unattainable» In such a ease a sons of reasonableness
might be defined as thearea between this ideal and the nearest approach
the commission can make* But if the equation of rights and responsibility
2
is treated as a practical matter, this definition would not be helpful#
1 Kabbett vs, Northern Connecticut Power Company, P.U.R. 1933 
D 119# there have been a number of similar cases*
2 Certainly it could not be agrees that his zone is the series of 
rates between competitive price and monopoly price* The correlation between 
rights and responsibilities would be wholly impossible If such a definition 
were adopted* Thompson and Smith, Public Utility Economics. ( The McGraw- 
Hill Book Company, New fork, 1941#) P* 268*
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If there I* a son* of reasonableness it is legal, not economic*
Legally, sine* the courts are not supposed to substitute their judgment
for that of the commission, there nay be such a gone* although the courts
1
have made no insisiwbrGs upon this view as an economic fact*
Equally ae difficult ae the specific problems of the rate level 
are those connected with the rate structure, or the internal consistency 
in terms of the underlying philosophy of the rates of a utility concern*
In brief the key problem here is that of penetrating into the 
indivisibility of a modern corporation deeply enough to actually allocate 
costs in terms of various conditions surrounding actual operations* It 
follows that the greater the degree of indivisibility existing in the 
regulated concern the more difficult is a solution to this key problem, and, 
perhaps, the less likely regulation is to achieve the precision required 
by the equality dimension of the underlying philosophy*
It is a well known fact that customer personnel is a variable 
group* Xt is equally well known that much property used by many regulated 
concerns does not destroy itself in the service of the consumer group
1 "It cannot be assumed that any railroad corporation, accepting 
franchises, rights and privileges at the hand of the public, ever supposed 
that it acquired, or that it was intended to grant to it, the power to 
construct and maintain a public highway simply for its benefit, without 
regard to the rights of the public* But is equally true that the 
corporation performing such services and the people financially interested 
in its business and affaire have rights that may not be invaded by 
legislative enactment in disregard of the fundamental guarantees for the 
protection of property." Smyth vs. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 545# Surely no 
clearer mandate for reciprocal duties (which must be exact by definition) 
could be given by a court.
X
existing at any given time. Utility property le typically depreciated
a
on the baale of a 40 year life* Thus it le not enough to be sore that 
over this period rights and responsibilities are equal as between the 
business and Its customers. It becomes equally important to be certain 
that rights and responsibilities to each 'generation* of customers are 
kept equal*
A machine or any other permanent asset Is a continuing flow 
of assets-in and assets-out. the conaumar-saorifice is made more or 
less regularly as long as the outflow of services continues. The 
factor-sacrifice Is made only once, when the asset is purchased* Both 
these sacrifices*, following the terminology here used, must be equal*
If the factor-sacrifiee were the result of the coneumer-saerlfice the 
problem would be much simplified. But since the factor-sacrifice is 
determinate once and for all when the permanent asset is added to stoek, 
consumer-saeriflce must be the derived element. Thus each year the 
outflow from and inflow to the business (that part of it directly resulting 
from the fixed asset) must be equal* If these two are equal over the 
life of the asset, but unequal in certain years, then the business is 
making itself under-responsible to the group of consumers over-charged,
1 Depreciable property in public utilities will represent from 
#0 percent to 95 percent of total assets*
2 The Securities and Exchange Commission considers 15 percent of 
total operative expenses as a representative figure in its calculations* In 
many instances the percentage will be higher*
and over-re sponsible to the group under-charged* It la tha function of
depreciation accounting and its control to avoid those latter injustices
X
aa much aa possible*
Bepreciation la not tha only situation in which tha two main 
flows are equal, but subsidiary flows diverge. Any business with a degree 
of complexity will have different classes of customers or different types 
of service* £&eh class of customers or each type of service represents a 
portion of the total asset-flow, both in and out* actually, for exas^le, 
customers are usually classified on the basis of their relationship to the 
total flow* Those having the same relationship to the total flow are
a
classed in one group and treated similarly*
but the classification itself, whether of consumer or type 
of service, difficult though it frequently is, only suggests the problem
3of pricing* Every pricing entity (consumer or commodity) is recipient 
of certain contributory flows from various parts of the business enterprise 
Each entity is also responsible for certain inflows from consumers. The
X For an excellent discussion of the purposes of depreciation, as 
well as things which are not purposes of depreciation, see Mason, Ferry, 
Principles of Public Utility Depreciation. (American Accounting Association 
Chicago, 1937w  The views expressed here represent a concensus of 
opinion among students of regulation*
2 Ke Bates and Bate Structures» P.U*R. 1931 C, 337. This is a 
discussion of the principles of customer classification* Courts, 
commissions, and writers alike seem to agree that classification should 
follow cost lines*
3 The problem of rate regulation proper is the problem of the rate 
level* This problem under discussion here is th t of the rate structure* 
This last is probably the most complex, but perhaps not the most important, 
for reasons we can investigate later*
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problem of the rate structure la to devise a system of pricing that
nill relate these tee opposite flows la a more or less equitable fashion*
This la similar to but not quite identical with the depreciation problem*
the pricing complication arises because the service-flow
from asset a to services la not direct* Bather the flow la first into
a central hopper* and from there out to the various services* And
since the consumer-sacrifice must again be derived from the factor-sacr1 flee *
the flow from the latter must be broken down Into its component parts as a
part of the pricing process* otherwise a situation of over-responsibility
and under-responsibility will arise between group® of customers* thus this
problem arises in all cases where an asset produces a single flow of
service* which flow contributes to more than one service or class Of
1
customer. These will be called here non-allocable flows. The regulation 
problem here is to separate flows into their component parts*
The right involved here* is the right to reimbursement 
for the factor-cost. The responsibility therefrom Is a single flow* but 
which culminates in several different places without ever actually 
separating. This series of subsidiary responsibilities must be made to add 
up to the single sight* and be themselves equitable with relation to each 
other. This problem* of course* is much bigger than the accounting problem
1 Economists typically use the term joint cost .There is* however* a 
very real difference between joint cost and non-alloeable cost. The 
former implies necessity as to the production of two products simultaneously* 
Both terms refer to impossibility of separation. But non-alloeable cost does 
net imply the necessity inferred by the term joint-cost.
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that produces it. But if the problem is not m t  at tha accounting
level* it can be effectively met nowhere*
Following from this analysis another confused point in
regulation any submit to partial illumination. It is now generally
agreed among students of regulation that value of service has little
1
significance for the problem of rate regulation* But in other
circles the concept is still current* Where this is true cost of
service is supposed to set the lower limit to price* and value of
service the upper limit. If ever there were a situation that could be
defined as the area between competitive price and monopoly price* this
2
would be that situation* As popularly interpreted value of service is
simply any point cm the demand curve for total product that is not on the
cost carve,for that particular consumer class or type of service* Any
condition of this nature* if allowed by the regulatory authorities*
gives the regulated industry several possible degrees of economic
power over consumers* If one of these degrees of economic power equates
rights and responsibilities as between a consumer class and the utility*
none of the others can* And it is very little help to assert that
cost of service is used in fixing the rate level* while value of service
assists in adjusting the rate structure* the right-responsibility
3relationship is not altered by the distinction*
1 Thompson and Smith, gp.. elt*. pp. 260 ff*
% Proman* lewis A,* Principles of Economics* (The Irwin Press* 
Chicago, 1941.) Volume II* p. 329.
3 Value of service may be invoked verbally on failure to calculate 
cost* This procedure Is dictated by expedience, however* and has no 
substantive meaning in regulation* See »arnes.po*cit*. pp. 291*292*
Before concluding this discussion of the eeonomie pattern of 
regulation a fen comments to link this chapter more closely with the 
one preceding might be helpful# Although in totality regulation 
inevitably sounds quite contrary to social emphasis upon individualism, 
this surface incongruity tends to disappear when related to the larger 
whole*
In the preceding chapter the legal approach to property defined as
*a bundle of rights1* was accepted as satisfactory* This definition,
however, considers the individual only in his relationship to his own
property, together with the tools used by the courts to protect property*
Individual rights and property protection are socially valid only if
placed In a substantive setting* Private property would have little
reason for being an integral part of a social philosophy unless society
were represented* Sly considers private property as an entity held in
trust for society, to revert back to society if ever social purpose can
1
be served better in that way* This statement, however, does not 
define the real content of the social relationship recognised* Sub­
stantively, property is more than a bundle of rights* It is also a 
bundle of responsibilities, the alee of which society is continually 
comparing with the sise of the rights-bundle. Whenever society discovers 
an inequality in the size of these two bundles that appears to be larger 
than "necessary1*, an adjustment is made or attempted.
X PTQPTty and Contract. Voluar I.
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In all of this public utilities are not unique. their 
relationship to society is fundamentally not different from the 
relationship between society and any other item of private property.
But with the above economic background much of the argument of the 
previous chapter should stand out more clearly. she economic philosophy 
of equal society Is the correlation of rights and responsibilities.
Wherever this task is efficiently performed by informal control, regulation 
is not necessary. At all points where there is a divergence between 
the two under informal control, regulation is Indicated. *n most 
business this equality is spontaneous. In public utilities regulation 
is needed to produce equality, through the concept of equal residual 
rights the net result in both eases is identical, thus all business, or 
all property, is on precisely the same footing in t arms of both the 
underlying social philosophy and the actual application of that 
philosophy to individual cases.
Professor Glaeser, in his classic treatment of public 
1
utilities, has presented an analysis of the theory of the origin of 
separate treatment for public businesses. He traces the peculiar relation­
ship of these concerns to the public back to the feudal relationship of
2
rights and duties.
1 GImmt, Martin G., £s414SSa SL tttlUfar Eoonomlca(Tha Hawaii1an Coapany, Hen Tork, 1927.) 
2 Pp. 160 tt.
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1* eoncluds* therefore* that the significance 
of the phrase "business effected with e public interest*4 
resides net so much in the character of the industry thus 
classified* as in the complex of rights and duties that 
go with such dassificstion . This incites that its 
importance is that of an Institutional development • The 
core of it is represented by the feudal conception of 
relation, shteh has been hardened into a social habit 
by becoming commonly accepted, the conception* thus 
generalised* has been given greater solidity and rational* 
coherent form by being organised into a definite mode of 
legal procedure. There was a persistent need for developing 
such forms of procedure and* as a consequence* these forms 
have crystallised into an institution which controls the 
continued performance of the function.
It mould be more than futile to deny this relationship 
between the feudal economy and capitalism. Basically* Professor
Glaeser is well grounded. But it does not necessary follow that the
feudal relationships were transferred only to the public utility 
field* Bather it seems implicit in the entire laissez-faire 
philosophy. It is & thesis of this dissertation that the "complex 
of rights and duties" is a superficial distinguishing characteristic 
of the utility enterprise* and that these rights and duties arise out
of industry itself. Certainly it could not be agreed that the
utility concept has a universally accepted connotation. Indeed it is 
a difficult part of teaching a course in Public Utilities to define 
the term. Bights and duties* in the sense presented by Professor 
Glaeser —  rights and responsibilities as we have been using these 
terms— - are the universal content of all business (private property)
1 P. 171.
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in our capitalistic society* The only thing "peculiar*1 about tho 
utility business is that its rights and responsibilities nsodsd 
formal correlation before such correlation was necessary in other 
businesses*
this chapter* like its predecessor* has presented regulation 
in entrees teres* That regulation has nowhere appeared in this form 
is essentially a result of two factors* In the first place* regulation 
would have reached this point only through a process of evolution* for 
only gradually could the business environment have changed sufficiently 
to have necessitated the extreme of social control* In the second place* 
when the environment did necessitate near-extreme measures in terms of the 
early el&ssifleatien set up by the courts* the same environment was forcing, 
changes in the classificeation and resulting In a weakening of the 
principle of equal residual rights* & consequence certain issues of 
regulation were compromised drastically* preventing extremes in control*
The two chapters immediately following will discuss respectively the 


































































new approach* ttThe essence of the conception of rent is the conception
of a surplus earned by & particular part of a factor of production over
1
and above the mintmnm earnings necessary to induce it to do its work**
Squally Instructive for our purposes is Ifrs* Robinson*» explanation as
to why rent has always been so closely associated with land* According
to her analysis the concept is reducible to a reward to the owner of
"free gifts of nature*11 these goods are free gifts in the sense that
they do not owe their existence to human effort* therefore these gifts
need not be paid to perform their function* the most important example,
historically, of economic goods that do not need to be paid to exist, Is 
2
land* The sc facts broadly outlined the discussion of and controversy
3over economic rent for well over a century*
It seems advisable here to summarize a portion of Mrs* Robinson’s 
treatment in order to secure a clearer grasp of the total rent picture,
4before proceeding into its corollaries* The first requisite for the 
existence of eeonosdo rent is an inelastic supply for the factor under
1 Ibid,* p. 102*
2 Mrs. Robinson continues as followst "But the conception of rent 
has often been too closely interwoven with the conception of land*
Particular units of factors of production which belong to the other three 
broad categories, labor, entrepreneurship, and capital, may also earn rent,”
3 For an orthodox treatment of rent as a concept applicable to the 
land factor, see Froman, £2* cit.. Volume IX, chapter XXIV*
4 Op* cit* * chapter VIII* This summary follows Mrs. Robinson’s 
analysis quite closely* No attempt has been made to be original*
W
Consideration. If It la to be had in whatever quantities desired at 
the sane price, it is in perfectly elastic supply, and no rent will be 
earned. Suppose, for example, individuals would be willing to work any 
amount for $3 per day, and that at a lower wage no one would work at all. 
the wage rate could not rise above #3, because no entrepreneur would
offer more* the wage rate could not fall below $3, or the economic* w
machine would stall completely. Thus every unit of the labor factor would
be receiving enough, and Just enough, to keep it at work, and no rent 
1
would be paid.
On the other hand, suppose that more work is to be had in a 
given industry only at the price of higher wages, hat us assume that 
100 amre workers would be available at every $1 per week increase in the 
wage ratei 1,000 men would be available at $21 per week} 1100 at $22 per 
week} etc* If wages were to rise from $21 to $22, everyone who was 
previously contented with $21 would be receiving a * free gift", or a 
“surplus* over and above that necessary to keep him at work. This rent 
arises from the inelasticity of the supply of labor, or the fact that new 
units hired cost more and the price of previous units rises for this 
reason. It makes no difference to the theory whether the new units cost
1 Mrs. Robinson uses capital as her example, rather than labor. She 
gives as the reason why interest will never rise above $$ in her 
illustration, that at a higher rate a veritable flood of savings would be 
thrown on the market, forcing the price down, this Is not implicit in 
her assumptions, nor is it necessary to complete the picture. It is 
sufficient that no entrepreneur would hire capital at a greater price. If 
he did there would be a rent.
76
a n t  k w u iM  ttq r  u *  ]» u  * f f le l* n t , or boeauao th .y  are aoro
•m “ “  “  “  * “ " *  “ “  “ ■ • « "  * “  “  * " *
are hired.
It it at once apparent that tha conception of rout here
defined la capable of two vary different interpretations or applications*
It sight rafar to tha total economy JL*&# how much whole factors of
production receive over and above necessary eoata ($300,000 par year
say ha necessary for a single top executive as long a# thara ara numerous
other #300,000 a year executives located elsewhere. But tha whole group
taken together could be cut materially without destroying these valuabla
services). Or It might rafar to the paymnts made to one segment of tha
economy —  !..£• how much fractions of faatora receive in excess of that
required to keep than in this particular segment of the economy, ^he
first necessitates defining the costs that are essential to keeping a
given factor at work* the second necessitates defining the costs that
ara essential to jceeplnfi a part g£ a given .factor, at wor^ where ig,.
The former poses tha problem of distribution 3 the latter tha problem of
regulation. It la this last connotation that is relevant to present
2
purposes, and which will be the primary concern from this point.
1 Sea Beulding, op. £&., pp.229 ff* The definition of rent given 
in this work is as follows* "Economic rent may be defined as any payment 
to a unit of a factor of production* in an industry in equilibrium* which 
is in excess of tha minimum necessary to keep that factor in its present 
occupation.”
2 Mrs. Robinson*e treatment stops short of the application of rent 
to regulation. It is at this point that the present work hopes to shed 
new light upon tha relationship between government and industry*
17
These latter application* of rent theory can best be appreciated
in tern* of opportunity cost*. In an economy a* complex a* ours*
virtually no factor of production has a single use* The versatility
of a factor, in fact, is measured in terms of the number of alternatives
for occupation that it has* Non-specialised factors have many of these
alternativesi specialised factors have fee alternatives* In a capital**
istie society the owner of every factor le desirous of employing each
unit of ownership in the most profitable of the available possibilities*
H  must follow that no unit of a factor will work in one capacity, if It
could better itself in another capacity* Thus the necessary cost of any
productive unit is that just necessary to keep it from transferring its
services to another segment of the economy* These costs are the necessary
payments made to all agents contributing to a given production and are
1
called opportunity costs*
however, there is no magic relationship between necessary payments 
to factors and actual payments* The contract between the factor and the 
entrepreneur is a product of bargaining, and nothing is a bargain if it 
could be gotten cheaper* With this qualification, opportunity or necessary 
costs represent only the minimum that will be voluntarily accepted by the 
factor* The actual payment will be worked out according to the relative 
bargaining strength of the contesting parties* Whatever the factor 
receives in excess of necessary payments ~~ which will be measured
1 Gemmlll, Faul F., Fundamentals of flconomicB. (ttarper and Brothers, Sew fork, 1939*} Third Edition, pp* 390 If*
n
by the quality of the next lowest alternative —  is ft free gift, so 
to speak, or economic rent; that which could be dispensed with 
completely without injuring economic effectiveness,
the potential amount of the economic rent depends upon the 
else of the bargaining area, this in turn is a function of the margin 
between the two beet alternatives* If the margin is wide, a factor with 
much bargaining power can retain a substantial surplus; if the margin 
is narrow the maximum surplus will be small, %  the ease of Edgar Bergen, 
margins are probably wide —- alternatives defined as "with* McCarthy 
cosqpared to "without* McCarthy, this may present the alternatives 
unfairly, but the issue can be clearly seen, the ordinary workman deals 
in small margins, that is, the amount he can get from one Industry is not 
far different from that which he might get from some other industry 
requiring about the same skill — * assuming he could get another job, 
which factor might be an important limiting consideration,
Further analysis requires additional terminology* Earnings
1
equivalent to opportunity costs will be called transfer earnings, since 
they ere the lowest possible earnings that can be paid to the factor 
without its transferring its services elsewhere. Each unit of production 
receiving no excess over transfer earnings may be said to be at the 
margin of transference, since any reduction of earnings would result in 
actual transference • The actual receipts of any unit of a factor will be
1 This termi^j|ogy is suggested in Henderson, H,D,, Supply and Demand, (Hareourt,Trace and Company, New Tork, 1922,) Pp, 94 ff. See 
also Robinson, p£, cit,. p, 104*
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called actual earnings, as distinct from transfer earnings. Each unit
receivimg more than transfer earnings will bo called an intrawflarginal
unit, as distinct tram tha unit at the margin of transference, which
unit will be known aa the marginal unit* Finally, since inira~®arginal
units may represent aa infinite variety of eases, the term degree sL
intra-aargin&lneaia eilX be employed to designate such difference*
Immediately, it can be seen that there is a unique relationship
between capitalism and economic rent* bargaining la for the purpose of
maviarising returns# The essence of capitalism is the bargaining process*
Thus every unit of a factor is most vitally interested in the greatest
net returns* Met returns has the same conotation here that it has in
economic terminology ~~ gross receipts minus cost of output* Cost of
X
output to a unit of a factor of production is its transfer earnings*
Since this is a constant amount at any given time, net returns is equivalent 
to actual earnings minus transfer earnings* Economic rent, therefore, is 
identical with net returns, and will henceforth be used In place of the 
latter term. Reduced to essentials, economic rent is the amount that 
every unit of a factor seeks to maximise in the bargaining process*
Economic rent can now be presented in a slightly different 
light* Transfer earnings represent the nearest approach to the concept 
sometimes referred to as real sacrifice* The excess of actual earnings 
over transfer earnings is a "free gift." In the terms already discussed
1 This refers to a unit of a factor within an industry, rather than 
to an entire factor* The latter analysis could be made in similar terms# 
but its essential features are sufficiently distinct to warrant its 
exclusion at this point*
so
at some Xength, actual earnings can ba thought of as related to 
individual rights; while the real sacrifice represented by transfer 
earnings can be considered the social responsibility implicit In a 
given bargain, Economic rent is aa excellent monetary measure of the 
excess of right over responsibility or vice versa.
This principle of rent maximization is quite an in^ortant 
corollary of our economic system. It is, for exaa^le, anticipated that 
a factor sill be Interested in minimising responsibilities and maximizing 
rights. Such an approach is the basic content of free bargaining in a 
capitalistic system. It has long been recognized that a firm endeavors 
to generate a maximum output with a minimum input, This has the same 
general substance as the equivalent statement —  a maximum of right with 
a mini aim of responsibility. But the firm and buyers represent only one 
side of the bargaining process, the output side, %  the other side stands 
the factor or factors that represent input, in a similar relationship to 
the firm. Our analysis of economic rent broadens the bargaining principle 
of maximization.to include all business relationships (transactions).
With the outline thus nearly completed, a restatement of the 
business process should be instructive. Free enterprise contemplates a 
struggle between the various bargaining units the prize being a 
wariness amount of net Income as compared with other units, These bargaining 
units determine their own size and extent on the basis of profitableness. 
Buyers, as bargaining units, are virtually coiqpelled to play alone. There 
are certain fundamental reasons why some business units or some factor
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units tend to grow largo more rapidly or slowly than others. But,
regardless of also or extant, ovary bargaining unit has but one
2
over-all aim —  to maximize economic rent* Tha firm, In bargaining with
buyers, casks to maximise total rent accruing to it; while the factors, In
bargaining with tha firm, seek to maximize an individual portion of this
economic rant* Tha strongest unit retains the largest share of the rent* Tha
weakest unit retains the smallest share* (It might be well to bear in mind
for future reference that strength may be a function either of else or of
a peculiarly favorable situation)* The over-all summation of rights and
responsibilities are disposed of in this way* The strongest emerge with the
largest share of the individual rights; while the weaker emerge with
responsibilities* The economic setting of regulation becomes the size of the
bargaining area and the relative strength of the opposed bargaining units*
Zt is now necessary to revert back to the generalized theory
of economic rent that is the hub of the argument in this chapter.
Brs* Robinson has very carefully pointed out that H ... if the supply
curve of a factor, drawn up on these principles, is perfectly elastic to
an industry we shall know that none of the units contained in it are
3earning rent from the point of view of that industry”* It is of much
1 These are the advantages of large scale production* For a 
fuller description see Jones, Eliot, £&a grggt Problem i& J&a United States. 
(The * « u i m  Company, Hew Xork, 19227}
2 Since It is highly undesirable to confuse the issue with the 
highly controversial consumer's surplus, no analysis will be made of economic 
rent for the consumer* Such an analysis would belong more properly to the 
larger problem of distribution*
3 Sel* eit* * p. HO*
aa
mere than academic importance to aphasias thla fact. For It follows
from the present analysis that any correlation between rights and
responsibilities must hinge upon sons relationship analogous to
elasticity of supply for the factors of production*
Perfect elasticity of supply means essentially that every unit
of factor affected is equally free to adjust itself to a new situation*
To the individual firm, elasticity of supply means a horizontal supply
curve for the factor , which In turn means that every added unit costs
1
the same as the preceding unit, and is equally efficient* For the factor, 
elasticity of supply means that the next best alternative Is an equivalent 
one, both in terms of reward and in terms of output* In both these cases 
all factors directly concerned encounter no obstacles in adapting them-* 
selves to a new dynamic situation*
Imperfectly elastic supply, on the other hand, connotes precisely 
the opposite* For the firm, added units of a factor cost more or are less 
efficient* The same phenomenon, stated from the viewpoint of the factor 
considered, refers to leaving situations of Increasingly higher reward* In 
other words, whether considering the firm or factor, alternatives have become 
separated, leaving a bargaining area between separate alternatives, which 
area meand economic rent*
It is essential to the economic principle that opportunity 
costs should tend to equalize* Unequal opportunities, viewed by a factor 
of production, are the impulse to shifts in employment by factors, the 
shift being from a situation of smaller profitableness to one of greater
X Ibid** pp. 107 ff.
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profitableness* In the process of this movement, the profitable 
opportunity will become less profitable, while the unprofitable one 
will become more profitable. The movement will stop only when all 
opportunities are equally profitable* The economic principle in these 
terms states that a factor of production will distribute itself among 
the various possible alternatives, until one more unit could be hired
a
in any one of these alternatives it being a matter of complete indifference
which alternative is selected*
From the standpoint of economic rent this equalisation of
opportunity costs has a real significance* In the first place any
factor would necessarily be in perfectly elastic supply, since an
entrepreneur adding to output could draw one factor from each alternative
employment, and therefore at the same price* By definition there would
be no difference between these factors in reward. Therefore they would
3all be available at the same price* Thus no economic rent would be paid* 
And not only would every unit of all factors find their equilibrium, but 
dynamic changes would find each factor equally able to adjust itself to 
the new conditions*
Immediately the important qualification of the theory of 
opportunity cost equalization becomes apparent* The theory rests upon
1 Gemmill, op. cit., pp. 391-392.
2 Knight, op* cit** pp. 83 ff*
3 It might be urged that these factors from different employments, 
though receiving the same reward, have efficiencies differently adapted 
to the new employment, Certainly this is possible* But to advance the 
argument is simply to add a qualitative difference to a quantitative 
problem* Ho essential damage is thereby done to the theory of the 
bargaining area advanced here. The problem only becomes more complicated*
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an assumption of complete and perfect mobility of the factors of 
production, both in terms of reward and in terms of efficiency* This 
mobility of the factors makes economic rent impossible. To the extent 
that there are obstacles to factor shifts, or opportunity cost equalization, 
eeonomle rent can and will exist*
All of this can be partially clarified by illustration* Pipe 
lines for petroleum and petroleum products have typically been highly 
profitable* During the recent depression many of them were earning 20 
or 30 percent on invested capital, while other agencies of transportation 
were going bankrupt* The reason for this anomaly is that the alternatives 
facing one who has oil to transport are not at all close to one another* 
Shipping by pipe line is cheaper than the next best alternative, whether 
the pipe line earns 6 per cent or 23 per cent, these percentages giving 
a rough index of the large bargaining area existing In the o H  trans­
portation field* Whatever capital receives In the pipe line industry in 
excess of what it would receive elsewhere, is economic rent*
The pipe line industry well illustrates the fact that divergence 
between the quality of alternatives, gives rise to an economic rent to 
the factor most favorably situated* This industry also illustrates why 
factors do not move to wipe out the differential* A pipe line is a very 
specialised commodity. Between two points one line is usually enough to 
handle all business* If one line can earn profits of 50 percent, while 
two lines would only earn a profit of one percent, the situation is not
1 Knight, gg, cit*. pp.81*2
as
ion* that can be remedied by factor movements .
Xt seems desirable to translate this illustration into the
terminology introduced earlier. Capital Invested in the pipe line
industry has transfer earnings of, let us say 5 percent, to the extent
2
that this capital eomss to earn more than 5 percent, It becomes 
intra-aarginal, The degree of intra-marginalness is the bargaining area 
beteeen the capital owners and oil shippers. To the extent that the 
capital owners have a maximum of bargaining strength, they receive all 
of the rent, A substantially different situation is quite conceivable.
To the extent that the over-all situation permits faetor adjustments, 
alternatives will become continuous again. Otherwise the inelasticity 
involved will be permanent rather than temporary.
At this point again, it should be instructive to refer to 
pure competition, and its relationship to the equation of rights and 
responsibilities. Under pure competition all factors* as well as all 
individual firm demand curves, would be characterized by perfect elasticity.
1 Xt is very important to realize that in our financial society 
the capitalization process serves to close those gaps in the continuity of 
alternatives * However, the gap cannot be closed without giving rise to an 
economic rent, which Is the item capitalized in the prodess of revaluation.
2 Xa actual practice this excess will be capitalized in the 
capital market. Here it is sufficient to note that In a particular
case capitalization is not a true "process11, but simply an occurence. That 
is, it does not take place over a period of time, but all at once. This 
is the main reason why rents are difficult to contend with in regulation.
86
Perfect mobility of productive factors would eliminate economic
inelasticity end equal!so opportunity costs* Every unit of a factor
of production would be at the cvargtn of transference* m  unite would
bo intra~»arginal, Actual rewards would represent real economic
a&criflco ( In ao far aa a sacrifice can bo measured in monetary tome),
I
and the cost to the consumer would bo the true economic cost involved*
Xt Is now possible to demonstrate more fully the essential 
nature of the bargaining area uncovered by dynamic economic change* ^he 
relationship between a factor and a firm is a power relationship* Each 
endeavors to exert a maximum degree of eecmosde power over the other* 
Under pure competition* this would still be their goal* But under pure 
competition* with all that is implied by that term* each bargaining unit 
would be faced with only one possible degree of power* equalised 
opportunity costs* This one degree of economic power would be precisely 
that degree that would equalise right® and responsibilities* (transfer 
earnings end actual earnings}*
The condition of "equilibrium" for economic units can be 
stated broadly as follows! no bargaining unit that is in position to 
decrease its economic power* has an Incentive to do $0$ while no unit 
that has an incentive to Increase Its economic power* is in position to 
do so* That generalised statement can cover every situation* whether 
economic rent exists or not* But the purely oospetitlve situation* and
1 Knight* £&. PP* 76 ff*
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that desirable if equalising rights and responsibilities Is important* 
must be stated more oarefully, Classical equilibrium for the bargaining 
unite in the economy contemplates a situation in which the degree of 
power exercised by the unit Is identical with the decree of power it 
«ue* be allowed if it is to remain at verb* ...that isf any decrease In 
the eeencnie power it escorts (its reward) would necessitate a shifting 
employment* Whenever this statement and the above generalised statement 
do not say precisely the sane thing# rights and responsibilities are not 
equal*
Obviously say bargaining area is Inconsistent with the shore
formulation* As has been indicated previously* the existence of snore
than one degree of economic power In the hands of a bargaining unit Is
1incompatible with equality in society* in so far as regulation has in 
aind enforcing equality it will operate to remove from bargaining units 
this bargaining area* Ihis will entail abolition of economic rent* which 
in turn can be accomplished only by doing away withesonomio inelasticities *
Economic inelasticity and economic power are virtually eyncaimasMis 
terms* But this power may spring iron taro different sources, first# it may 
com© from an inelasticity that* aa far as the factor itself la concerned* 
just happens* Second* it nay be an inelasticity deliberately planned by 
the factor* If the inelasticity is planned* the planning factor will 
maneuver itself into a position enabling itself to receive It* Xf the
1 The classic treatment of this subject is SSi flggEto
by Henry George* (Sterling Publishing Company* Hew York* 169k*) George* 
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allow competition fuH opportunity to adjust to dynamic change In
1
all areaa at the same time or in equal proportion. These
Inelasticities operate to convey to some bargaining units an un­
warranted degree of economic power over others. Regulation was conceived 
to destroy this privileged relationship in favor of equality*
In concluding this phase of analysis of the public utility 
concept, a final definition of inelasticity, following lines previously 
suggested, will be offered as an analytical tool. An inelasticity in 
the eeonony le any condition, or set of conditions, wherein a dynamic
change permits one bargaining unit to substantially alter the quality
of alternatives facing another unit or group of units* To the extent that 
the operation of the dynamic change uncovers Inelasticity, its result is 
economic rent, which is the quantity that bargaining unite desire toa
maximise, and which regulation endeavors to minimise.
A relation of this analysis specifically to public utilities
resolves Itself Into a discussion of the economic characteristics of
utilities* A moat common attribute by various writers is that of
3furnishing an indispensable service. Economists are much more careful
1 The situation is this more complex than it is frequently 
understood to be* Hote this statement by Wilson, Herring, and Eutsler,
op* cit* * p* 94t ”Since public utilities generally operate under conditions 
of monopoly, any given public utility Is free to fix the rates for its 
product or service at the point that will yield it the largest net profit •”
2 See Thoapson and Smith, pe> cit*. p. $6. . * The significant
factor surrounding public utilities has been the inperfect operation of
economic forces, thereby giving the utilities an excessive amount of economic
power over those obliged to bargain with them*”
3 Jones and Blgham, Public Utility Regulation. (The Macmillan
Company, New fork, 1931*) Pp. 62 ff.
bqw than formerly in the use of this term because It has no universal 
meaning, In fact it has no meaning at all without quite arbitrary 
definitions and distinctions. What is meant by the tern indispensable, the 
writer believes, is that the real quality of alternatives can be altered 
by certain dynamic changes. *f the price of electricity in a city were t© 
be suddenly doubled, the quality of alternatives for the population would 
be seriously altered. Some would be forced to curtail their comsurspiion 
sharply. This would be a definite hardship to almost any user* Others 
would cut down on other things, which curtailment would likewise be a 
hardship* In other words control over a basic service gives the 
controller degrees of economic power, not consistent with the responsi­
bilities he has assumed* The inelasticity involved centers in the fact that 
the transfer alternative is widely separated from the present alternative, 
leaving the dependent units under the control of the independent unit within 
the bargaining area thus left*
Clearly "indispensability of service1 could not stand alone 
as a justification for regulation, Probably no one would gainsay that the 
service performed by soft drinks in a city is indispensable, Xf all 
soft drinks were denied persons in the city, or the price were summarily 
doubled, the population would probably consider Itself ill-treated*
Certainly the quality of their alternatives would be substantially 
altered* But, contrary to the case of electricity, no bargaining unit by 
itself can thus control the quality of alternatives. The independent units 
in this case have no power to widen the bargaining area between the transfer 
alternative and the actual alternative for the dependent units.
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Both of the above cases can be compared with the manufacture 
and sale of the "yo-yo”# Even if control of this entire activity 
were centered in one bargaining unit, society would not be likely to 
interfere. If "yo-yos11 were suddenly taken completely off the market 
the alternatives of people could not be said to be substantially altered# 
The same would be true of any Industry making a contribution to the 
economy that is not considered particularly significant by the individuals 
who take advantage of it#
An allied concept frequently advanced describing the public
1
utility is the privilege of eminent domain, Eminent domain is the 
right conferred by the state to limit condensation for a piece of needed 
property to a reasonable amount# This power is not limited to use in 
helping public utilities, but extends to any function that the state 
wishes to perform and in which the state has jurisdiction# It is quite 
Important in the utility field# Suppose a utility needs a particularly 
advantageous water site# The owner has placed a price of $10,000 on 
the property, while transfer earnings (opportunity cost) are $5,000#
This owner, as a bargaining unit, is definitely in a position here to 
alter substantially the quality of alternatives of the utility# The 
bargaining area represented by this quality of alternatives is the area
1 Ames vs. Union Pacific Bail way Company, 64 Fed# I65. Eminent 
domain can logically be shown to be subsidiary to the public utility
concept itself*
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between $5 #000 and $10,000* this difference in money amounts is
economic rent. Eminent domain (regulation) in this situation will
equalise transfer earninga and actual earnings, thus destroying economic
rent and equating bargaining poser between units.
It ia frequently observed that public utilities are natural 
1
monopolies. A natural monopoly is a business so constructed economically
that it is impossible to operate it aa a competitive enterprise, this
definition of itself is not selective as between businesses. All
businesses have some characteristics that tend toward expansion. But most
of these are not public utilities. In the broad sense, therefore, natural
2
monopoly is only a matter of degree. But in the narrow sense, the term 
can be used selectively. The more narrow definition contemplates only 
that situation wherein a resource is used that la limited by nature. In 
this category could be listed city streets, water supply, dams, etc. This 
characterisation of the public utility as compared with the private 
business is only another way of defining regulation in terms of the 
protection of alternatives. A city desires to inaugurate a utility service. 
There Is only one suitable location for certain of the necessary 
appurtenances. The unregulated control over alternatives by the bargaining
1 Dorau, Herbert, Materials for the Study of Public Utility 
Economics. (The Macmillan Company, Hew fork, 1930.) P. 188.
2 Triffin, Robert, Monopolistic Competition and General 
Equilibrium Theory. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1940.)
utility would permit of various degrees of power. For the population 
tho alternatives uncovered by a rise in prieo would be to do without 
the service or do without the things that equivalent money would 
purchase. Either alternative is qualitatively much inferior to the 
lower price* The bargaining area (sons of inelasticity) is the 
difference between the no-profit pries and monopoly price* Monopoly 
profits are the economic rents that regulation desires to eliminate*
This elimination takes the form of identifying the actual alternatives 
with the transfer alternatives —  thus equating rights and responsibilities 
by moving the bargaining unit to the margin of transference.
It is further contended that utilities are regulated because
1
competition is ruinous, forcing rates down to unremunerative levels* 
Unremunerative levels, economically speaking, simply mean levels below 
opportunity eost for the several factors. This applies particularly 
to the capital factor. But whichever factor is forced to receive 
rewards lower than transfer earnings, It Is contributing to society in 
greater proportion than society can claim as a right against the factor•
In such a case the right-responsibiliiy divergence is opposite to the 
usual relationship, society rather than the factor receiving the economic 
rent. But poorly paid factors are, in one important sense, just as 
much a legitimate cause for concern in society as overcharged consumers. 
Thus regulation has a similar social function to perform in both cases*
1 Jones and Bigham, ££. s4i.f pp. 70 ff.
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The above suggestions should indicate in part why utilities
were selected for regulation before other businesses* But the reason
is somewhat store subtle than usually recognized* the fact that
regulated industries are frequently service industries rather than
X
producers of commodities is not significant in and of itself* What
is important is that the closer the relationship between the producer and the
consumer the more apparent is the unfairness connected with economic rents*2
So more is it significant that the product is locally consumed. This,
incidentally, is by no means universally true, except in so fay as this
is merely a restatement of the fact that services are in general regulated
before goods. The significant fact is that technical conditions make
transportation difficult, and decreasing cost factors will virtually 
3dictate market, saturation with a single firm —  thus producing a
monopoly. The statement that the products of regulated Industry are
4highly standardized, also, is by no means universally true (e»g* the 
radio industry), Again the more subtle significance of standardisation 
is that discrimination is easily visible without service (cost) differences,
1 Cooke, M*X»,, Public Utility Regulation* (The Ronald Press 
Company, Sew Xork, 1924*1 Pp. 16~17*
2 Doran, op* cit* * p. 186,
3 Economies has run into much difficulty by not consistently 
defining a market. Here a market will be defined as a homogeneous group 
of customers. Thus a market is the competitive area. Stated in this way 
a market and the cost conditions of industry take on a more correlate 
meaning than is sometimes given to them,
4 Dorau, op. cit*. p* 187*
n
but hard to detect where qualitive differences are also present*
the economic inelasticities that surround the utility
industry are the basic justification for regulation to equate rights
and responsibilities* All of these inelasticities are but
manifestations of one principal inelasticity that basically patterns
all others* This sane inelasticity is present In all Industries in
varying degrees* This inelasticity is that of capital structure* Public
utilities have a very low capital turnover, estimated by the University
1
of Illinois, Bureau of Business Research at 0*127* This turnover 
fraction means that the annual gross income of an average utility is 
one-eighth of its capital investment* This might be compared to the 
retailing business, for example, whose annual gross Is three times 
capital investment* This capital structure in the utility industry is 
basically fixed* This fixity is at one and the same time its inelasticity* 
Tor once invested it cannot be invested elsewhere, or increased without 
substantial other adjustments* The difference between the actual value 
of the investment and its opportunity cost is the bargaining area between 
the utility and the rest of the economy, the area within which actual 
returns may fluctuate without causing the specific item of capital to be 
removed. This area may be positive or negative, advantaging the factor
!> standard financial Ratios for the Public Utility Industry. 
(University of Illinois, Orbana, Illinois, 1929*)
or society. Bat in both oases its regulation status is the same*
In substance, however, it seems advisable to distinguish 
between these two possibilities. In prosperous times the economic 
rent is positive, favoring the factor• Here the inelasticity revolves 
around the fact that capital goods cannot be increased immediately, that 
some strategic location may already be taken, and that the business 
operates according to a principle of short-run decreasing costs. In 
depression years actual earnings may fall substantially below transfer 
earnings. But since capital can not be moved for technical reasons, 
the result is relatively permanent losses.
But, whether times be bad or good, the business as a 
bargaining unit must concern itself with making every individual transaction 
contribute a maximum amount toward net returns, the potential contribution 
of an Individual transaction to net returns has no automatic relationship 
to the partial right and responsibility involved. Inelasticities in the 
economic structure make it possible to claim as a right against one buyer
as contrasted with another, higher charges than could be justified by a
1
definition of the social responsibility involved,
Although the above analysis is stated in terms of capital 
inelasticities almost exclusively it is implicit that inelasticities
1 Professor J.H.Clark has furnished a full-length treatment of the 
problem of capital inelasticity, the Economics of Overhead Costs, 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1923,)
n
pertaining to human beings directly are equally conteiaplated. The 
economic environment and the criteria of success are such that the 
most effective individual adjustment ie frequently a highly specialised 
adaptation. Social dynamics can just as quickly produce positive or 
- negative rents in this as in the capital situation. When it does an 
inequality results that society nay or may not take it upon itself to 
<Mrrect.
This subject of inequalities between human beings apart 
from the external environment, of course, opens up & wide field for 
discussion. The social philosophy of America, even in its more extreme 
forms, does not postulate absolute human equality. In fact the working 
out of the philosophy in practice takes extensive advantage of the 
existence of inequality, ffoat is postulated, however, is an environment 
in which natural inequalities would be made commensurate with the 
assumption of offsetting responsibilities • As capitalism developed the 
environment lost much of this quality. As a consequence of this 
environmental development the adjustment to the regulatory problem had 
to take cognisance of the human counterpart to what has been here 
discussed in terms of capital inelasticity.
The above detailed discussion of economic rents resulting 
from inelasticities has several ramifications that are of importance? 
here. It is obvious that the fact of specialisation in the eoononywboth 
human and capital —  and the existence of great aggregations of capital
n
*ere net instantaneous in appearance, but developed to their present 
status through a long process of evolution, thus it is not surprising 
that the development of regulation has been gradual, in the sense of 
merely heaping abreast of changes in the environment, As a consequence 
regulation has slowly been intensified until in certain oases it represents 
a very high degree of control*
The relationship between rents and regulation also makes it quite 
clear that utilities are today not the only businesses that have characteristics 
aaJcing for a need of regulation* Most businesses are specialised and 
represent large aggregations of capital. The differences between businesses 
from the standpoint of control becomes one of degree only, rather than 
being capable of statement in the extreme terms once used by the courts*
▲ further io^ortaat ramification is that regulation as formal control 
is a process of equalising differentials in power throughout society (reciprocal 
power) in the face of the growth of a society of organizations rather than a 
society of individuals as was originally presumed. Men are today relatively 
less in competition with men; relatively more in competition with groups*
Most of the regulation of the past fits into a category that may 
properly be called negative regulation, or taking away rights* In the 
environment from which the social philosophy of individualism arose It was 
taken for granted that every individual would make his choices from 
opportunities some of which were favorable. Thus regulation developed to 
bring about equal treatment of Individuals by certain businesses and to 
prevent inequalities from arising, through profiteering* It is easy to see,
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however, that specialization and all that is implied by the term could 
conceivably develop to the point where all opportunities available are 
unfavorable ae defined by the philosophy. An excellent exasple of 
this is a period of depression during which large groups of people are 
unable to find esploysient and hence are unable to be Tindividuals'. In 
order to deal with cases of this sort a positive regulation has developed.
these various ramifications, in addition to illustrating 
In part how environjaental changes have forced a modification of phase X 
in the history of regulation, also serve to indicate in part the direction 
that this modification has taken. With the breakdown of the original 
classification of industries, regulation has been forced to develop 
subsidiary classifications the net result of which is to assure degrees of 
regulation commensurate with degrees of. departure from social Ideals. In 





Specialization in the economy is only one of the nays 
the environment of capitalism has developed to make unrealistic the 
original adjustment to the problem of regulation. The other principal 
nay in which this has secured has been through the development of the 
capitalisation process. The environmental changes that have taken 
place as a result of the perfection of this process have had their 
primary effect, not upon the scope of regulation as In the case of 
specialisation, but upon the extent of regulation.
It will be recalled from chapter XI that the limit to the 
extent of regulation was in large part set by the Constitutional 
provision of just compensation. Just compensation itself turned out to 
be simply the competitive return or fair return. If the norm of 
coBgfetition is attained, it was presumed, no one would be confiscated 
in the sense of losing by government dec ree the right to choose a degree 
of economic power consistent with the reciprocal power called for by 
the ideal. In this chapter a reexamination of the concept of confiscation 
will be undertaken, a reexamination made necessary by developments in 
the economy over the last 100 years.
So many of our legal relationships are shrouded by the 
fiction of the corporate personality that we frequently fail to understand 
just who it is that is confiscated by an unreasonably low rate
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1
level* It ie not th« business entity itself that Is wronged* to
have suits brought by and against business concerns nay fit the
technical requirements of a judicial system, but it is a far cry
from the dignity of the human personality upon which we pride ouh~
selves* Rather it must be recognised that individuals only can be
confiscated* If equality has any meaning in a democracy, individuals
must be compared with individuals rather than with a ledger of accounts
receivable and accounts payable *
Granting that individuals are the confiscated unit, it is
next pertinent to inquire what it is they possess that Is of value and
that the law seeks to protect* Again, it is not the business* An owner
may find satisfaction in the prestige of ownership and control but it has
never been either the explicit or the implicit purpose of philosophy
to guarantee this particular satisfaction* The choice as to whether or
not to become an owner of a business does not center around the legal2
protection of executive authority* In a legal system where free will and
choice are basic, an individual cannot be wronged by society in a
3relationship that society does not sponsor* Thus injury must follow 
philosophy*
1 In one of his first opinions as a Supreme Court Justice, Justice 
Black formally rebels against considering the corporation as a person. See 
the dissenting opinion, McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co*, 302 0*3, 419* This 
extreme position is, of course, unnecessary to realistic understanding of 
the human problem involved*
2 The right to be "boss* of a business has no legal value* Wo business 
man has an exclusive right to his authority* All business relationships, even 
in a democratic society, are entered into with a congenital infirmity —  
subject to control by government in the public interest*
3 Even if power were the motivating force, an unreasonable return 
is no necessary deterrent* A railroad executive, for example, is not sub­
stantially Injured by the fact that his road does not make a fair return*
lot
The constitutional limitation of regulation is protection 
of property. If the property of individual participators in a business 
enterprise is act the business as such, shat is it? It is simply an 
investment. And what is an investment? It is a claim* £a his epochal 
book Hature of Capital and Income. Professor Fisher does considerable
1
damage to reality by considering things of value to be physical assets*
Hhen the Stream Court changed its interpretation of value from "use^value” 
to *exchange-valuert it effectually destroyed the significance of physicala
objects as a source of value*
The creation and usage of claims to facilitate industrial
expansion was an inevitable concomitant* Increasing per capita wealth and
income were contemporary with a more and more elaborate division of
labor in society. This minute and technical division of labor necessitated
a highly developed exchange mechanism. This mechanism has more and more
trended toward a type of market in which physical goods seldom appear,
3but in their stead claims to ownership of goods are transferred*
The most obvious result of the widespread usage of claims has
Ubeen the divorce of the ownership of goods and the control of goods*
1 (The Macmillan Company, New fork, 1923*) P« 68.
2 The change of approval by the high court was parallel to a similar 
trend in academic economic circles* bee McCracken, H.l#, Value Theory and
Business Cycles* (The Falcon Press, 1933,) Book IX, Part 1,
3 Boulding, op. cit., chapter XV.
4 Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property*
(Commerce Clearing House, Hew fork,1932.)
&t fact, this phenomenon, from the standpoint of financial
efficiency, Is ths principal advantage of the exchange of claims*
Furthermore this fact furnishes a basic definition of a claim, to
aid in further analysis of the significance of these Instruments for
regulation* This definition of a claim 1st an instrument enabling the
transfer of the ownership of goods without a corresponding transfer of
the goods themselves.
Another accoŝ janying feature of the growth of finanee
capitalism was necessarily a change in the definition of property. Instead
of considering property the mere possession of a commodity, It came to be
1
thought of as the possession of a right to an income from a commodity.
At this point lies the real significance of the separation of ownership 
and control of goods. He who controls physical commodities has no 
valuable rights if another has a prior claim to the income of these 
coamodities. The valuable rights accrue to the owner of the claim. Thus 
the above change in the definition of property could not have avoided 2
making its appearance as claims became more and more socially significant.
To recapitulate in parts valuable ownership is not a business 
but an investment . An investment is not a physical good but a claim. And, 
finally, a claim is not valuable because It represents goods, but because
1 Commons, op. cit., Chapter II, gives an exhaustive treatment of 
this new interpretation of property that Professor Ely did much to 
popularize.
2 See Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 
13$ H.S. 413.
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it represents income* These statements are anything but isolated
facts* Stated separately each one virtually contains the meaning of
all together* Stated compositely they add up to one of the most
significant recent developments in economic and jurisprudential theory***
the concept of expectation*
The theory of expectations has had a rather unique history in
economic exposition* Senior developed the term 11 abstinence1* in order to
1incorporate "salting*1 into economic costs* Later Bohm-Bawerk made the
concept sore general by expanding its use to include demand as sell as
nsupply* Specifically Bohm-Bawerk asserted that "present goods are, as a
a
rule, north more than future goods of like kind and number*'1 Since
e *Bohm-Bawerk Interest theory has basically followed some variation of
this theme. "Orthodox" theory accepts this approach without essential 
3
criticism* This does not mean that there is perfect agreement among
*theoreticians as to the precise relationship between time and production, 
but only that there is substantial agreement as to the fact of this
1 Senior, William Nassau, Political Economy. This concept has 
been hinted at earlier by other writers, but a full discussion awaited 
Senior's treatment*
z Big, tn AUlW frftasry. SL (Smart's Translation, London,
1091.) ** 237.
3 Froman, gB* cit** Volume XI, chapter 26*
U Knight, Frank I*, "On the Theory of Capitalt In Beply to 
Mr* Kaldor," Econometrics, Volume VI, January, 1936*
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relationship In industrial development* due to the all-pervading
influence of tine in the nodera business system. Some of the more
important ramifications are as follows t production in advance of
demand; fixed costs and the business cycle; stock market growth ; risk
and insurance; and "average11 return In regulated industries*
Because of this very tacit treatment by the majority of
writers, it is not surprising that a student of law and a student of
economics would one day generalise tins as an all-important influence
in the social relationships of the day* ffae two men who performed this
1 2 
service were, respectively, Professor Commons and Professor Keynes*
Although there is little difference between the two writers in terms of
the basic problem treated, the work of Professor Keynes seems more
pertinent to the present study, and will be upon most heavily
3in further analysis* So effective has been the work of these writers 
that time and expectations are taken for granted today, whereas a few 
years ago they were scarcely mentioned* Here the problem will be to 
relate expectation to confiscation and the nebulous relationships that 
constitute due process*
1 gp* cit. It is not implied that Professor Commons is not an 
economist* But a careful study of his legal Foundations* particularly 
footnotes and controversial issues, demonstrates that the principal train­
ing utilized was legal rather than economic, with respect to this particular 
treatise*
2 Kaunas, John Ifcynard, Th& Qanaraa $fe2SEZ st “"Ir Interest.
end Money* (Harcourt, Brace and Company, mew fork, 1935*)
3 Perhaps the moat refined (difficult) treatment of expectations 
as a part of general economic theory is Hicks, «7*H., Value and Capital* 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1939*)
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In the sane my that an entrepreneur’s production plan is
a bundle of expectations, so is the investment plan of an institution
that has disposition control over money capital* Ivory investor Is
confronted with an almost endless maze of possible places to invest his 2
capital* Each considered possibility conveys to his mind a certain
probable (anticipated) result* These probable results are then
assembled and compared one with the other, in relation to the over-all
ambition of the investor* Finally that investment is chosen which
is expected to contribute most to the over-all goal*
The basic ambition of the investor is monetary return, and results
are principally measured with this yardstick* Financially, every
opportunity for investment has a certain qualitative desirability for the
investor, depending upon the returns which he anticipates from the
investment* This quality of desirability is the composite result of all
those characteristics that make an investor prefer one investment over 
3
another* For purposes of comparison, in the mind of the investor, this 
eosgjoslte result is assessed a certain value, which can conveniently be
1 Keynes, op. cit* * p. 24, footnote 3*
2 Keynes* terminology may be helpful at this points ”• * * the 
bundle of vague and more various possibilities which actually makes 
up his state of expectation when he reaches his decision.M
3 These characteristics are quite familar to students of finance* 
An excellent enumeration will be found in Graham and Dodd, Security 




called the present worth of the investment. The relation between 
present worth and expectation is as follows! a relatively high present 
worth is expected to accompany a relatively large composite expectation^ 
and a relatively low present worth is expected to accompany a relatively 
low composite expectation.
In addition to a present worth, every investment also entails 
a cost. This factor can be much more accurately stated, in most cases, 
in monetary terms than present worth. In fact it is because cost is 
rather easily stated in monetary terms that it is necessary to reduce 
present worth to a common denominator with cost.
When the investor is able to compare present worths and 
corresponding costs, the choice of investments is simple. The situation 
is reduced to the level of any other transaction situation in economic
a
theory. That investment will be selected which will (sxpectatlonally) 
bring to the investor the greatest excess of "value" above actual "cost.” 
It is at once evident that the significance of expectations 
in investment carries capital value clearly into the legal concept of 
choice suggested earlier. A given investment is a choice of one 
opportunity from the innumerable opportunities that are available to an
1 Williams, John Burr, Zisst Theory of Investment Value. (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1938) Chapter V.
2 It might be added that the expectional qualities embodied in this 
type of transaction are not different from those Involved in the purchase 
of any physical commodity In the economic system.
lave a tor la our society today* Thus the legal relationship between 
a confiscating agency and the economic unit (owner) confiscated is 
basically reducible to the Jurisprudential doctrine of will* the 
thing confiscated, or In danger of confiscation, is an expectation, 
and to interpret confiscation apart from expectation is apt to be 
quite meaningless*
Of course regulation does not deal with one investor and one 
investment* Its scope includes many investors and many investment®, 
Therefore, rate control facets the problem of confiscation over the entire 
capital market, rather than in one isolated segment of it* It is this 
fact more than any other that has confused some of the more fundamental 
issues of regulation* An approach to confiscation through valuation 
assumes that it is the group that Is confiscated* Approach through a 
generalized fair return makes the same assumption. Obviously the 
group, numerically at least, is composed of individuals* But the in­
dividualistic basis for American jurisprudence demands the conclusion 
that the group be considered as an aggregation of individuals, rather 
than that the group be considered as an entity in itself* Thus an 
imroator can b, confiscated ifl &  group, but only a& m  Individual.
All of this may contribute some little bit to an under­
standing of the general nature of confiscation* But it adds very little 
to an appreciation of the specific qualities of that elusive regulatory 
concept* In the market place where claims are bought and sold It is 
impossible to segregate individual expectations.
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3$ is of the essence of investments that their quality should
tend to equalise* The restless desire of individuals to part from am
Investment yielding 10 per cent and take up an Investment yielding
115 per sent assures this tendency. All economic literature, from 
the beginnings of economics as a science to the present day, has 
emphasised the levelling process in an acquisitive society* In modern
atheory this process is known as capitalisation*
Technically this process of capitalisation means that value
3flows from income to capital, rather than from capital to income* This
fact is parallel to the common definition of property as nthe right to 
4income.” But whatever the inspiration, the fact of capitalisation is
very closely related to the legal concept of confiscation*
Perhaps an illustration can best elaborate the relationship
involved* Suppose a claim is exchanging on the market for $100* This
means that the actual and expected income, all things considered, has
stimulated expectations valued at, roughly, $100 in the mind of a
composite group of investors* We may further assume that the actual
9 »income, which is expected to continue in the future, is $$ per annum*
1 Ricardo, David, Principles of Political Economy, ch, IV.
2 Fisher, op* cit,, chapter XXIX*
3 This meaning for capitalization only reaffirms basic Austrian 
economies, which states that value is in the mind. See Commons, o p .cit.. 
chapter II, for a discussion of the shift in Supreme Court decisions to 
this viewpoint•
4 Ely, ££.. cij,.
5 By the term ̂ expected to continuew is meant that this investment, 
if held, will continue to yield $5j or that if the principal were with­
drawn in the future it could be invested in a similar risk to yield the 
same income*
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This relationship indicates that the over—all expectations of
investors who purchase similar claims, warrants placing a value of
1twenty times annual income on this particular claim.
How let us suppose that the government, through lowering 
rates charged or raising taxes paid by the concern whose claim is under 
consideration, lowers the income received by the claim holder to $4 
per annum. Prior to the reduction in income the investor has a "right 
to income" which is valued at twenty years* income by the general state 
of expectation in the market. After the reduction the same situation 
persists, because it is clear there has been no fundamental change in 
general expectations by the mere occurrence of this more or less 
isolated incident. But, due to the fact that Income is U  instead of 
the investor now has a claim worth $80 instead of $100,
Following from the spirit of social philosophy it would be 
argued that confiscation has really taken place in the above example. 
After all, 20 per cent of a man’s property has disappeared through 
regulatory activity. The important fact, however, as far as 
confiscation is concerned, is that this type of thing is not confiscation 
in our legal process. The apparent contradiction in the above state­
ments makes the definition of confiscation in actual use seem arbitrary.
1 This la the "prevailing rate of interest,.w This term cannot be 
precisely defined, but it basically represents the general state of 
expectation in the money market.
But it has already been emphasized that an individual can not really 
be confiscated if he knows what his rights are in advance* Thus any 
definition of confiscation is satisfactory if rigidly adhered to by 
regulatory agencies*
However, even the no si well-meaning and conscientious government 
east have difficulty along this line. For every tine a new industry is 
brought into the regulatory field, every tine important new regulations 
are found necessary in a regulated industry, every tine a rate of return 
to a regulated company is found to be too high and adjusted downward-" in 
all of these cases the activity of governnent appears as retroactive 
legislation to all investors who do not predict governnent moves sub­
stantially in advance, Stated differently, if capitalists use the 
status q u o as the basis for discounting the future —  and this practice 
is in harmony with laisseg-faire —  any change in the status quo must out 
across expectations and thus destroy capital in the way described*
Xt is at once evident that the above is representative of the 
typical situation in public utility rate control* An investor is 
confiscated, not when the return on Investment falls below a certain 
level, but when the return on investment is forcibly and suddenly reduced* 
Even then the investor who is confiscated is not any investor who happens 
to own a claim whose return has been reduced by government action, but the 
individual who holds the claim at the time of the action that reduces 
the return* Thus confiscation cannot be represented as any given rate 
level, but as a reduction in this level*
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There are further ramifications of this approach to the
problem of confiscation* Due process means, substantively, that the
rules of the game, so to speak, will not be changed except between
innings* Section 9* paragraph 3 of the Constitution has the same 1
meaning. Restraint upon retroactivity in legislation is a promise
to citizens that no penalty shall attach to any action, if the penalty be 
2
not known to the doer at the time the activity was commenced. It Is 
the essence of financial activity that it is continuing in nature, rather 
than spasmodic* Non-retroaction in regulation requires that choices be 
not interferred with —  after they are made. Thus confiscation must be 
defined —  from an ideological standpoint —  as cutting across past 
expectations•
The important tendency for expectations to equalize 
throughout the capital market, casts further light upon the economic 
usefulness of the Fifth Amendment and its interpretation in regulation
3cases. If value can pertinently be considered in relation to expectations 
regulation not only must not take property without compensation, but it 
literally must not take property at all. Regulation is intended to leave 
everyone with equal residual rights, regardless of the number of rights
1 "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.'1
2 By "known" here is meant "part of the law." Of course mere 
ignorance is no particular defense,although basic misunderstanding might be*
3 Bye, Raymond T.. Principles of Economics. (F.3. Crofts and 
Company, New Tork, 1942.) Fourth Edition, p. 35*
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actually taken away. Fundamentally, however, regulation does not
have this decision to stake in a financial society* The process of
capitalisation is the equaliser, and regulation of Isolated segments
of the eeonoffly does not substantially Influence this process even
1
though universal and unchecked regulation might have considerable 
Influence* If compensation is paid, property is not taken; and if 
property is taken compensation is not paid* Thus* not only does an 
attempt to apply due process result in an economic inconsistency, but 
the very wording of the phrase suggests an impossible situation*
It follows from this discussion that it is virtually impossible 
to regulate without confiscating property* Whenever a commission finds 
an undesirable situation existing, it can propose a remedy only by suggesting 
retroactive action —  i.e., action that cuts across the lines of choice, 
which is by definition confiscation in our society* The course of action 
outlined by the commission may be non-confiscatory for the choices made 
from that time forward, but it is certainly confiscatory with reference 
to all past choices affected*
A case in point may be helpful* In 1920 the municipal 
government of lima, Ohio, passed an ordinance prescribing the maximum 
rates that might be charged for gas* The time specified for the operation 
of the ordinance was five years, and the rates specified called for
1 Unchecked regulation refers to any more or less whimsical 
action on the part of a "dictator**, i.e., expropriation policies on a 
large scale*
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substantial reductions iron the schedule then in offset* The company
appealed to the Public Service Commission for relief from what it
considered an unfair and unreasonable structure* the Commission revised
the schedule upward, but refused to allow as an operating expense the
total asked by the eoapany of an item called “unaccounted for gas1* —  lose
as a result of leakage, condensation, contraction* this account was
being charged annually with 9 per cent of the total volume of gas handled*
The eoanissien insisted upon whittling this item down to ? per cent of the
total volume of gas handled, on the alleged ground that proper care would
result in less loss* The company appealed the commission1 s decision,
1
which appeal was finally carried to the Supreme Court* the Supreme
Court, through Justice C&rdezo, very properly disapproved the action of
the CeondLssien, implying that it involved confiscation, although the word
was not directly utilised*
For our analysis here, only an outline of the opinion of the
Supreme Court is significant* The Court inferred that the Commission
had erred in fact, rather than that it was mistaken as to the principle
involved* Obviously such an error is confiscation in its worst form* But
at this point it seems desirable to consider the ease assuming that the
Commission was right as to the fact of waste* Of course, even so, this2
fact necessitates proof, a necessity strongly emphasized by the Court*
1 uest Ohio Gas Company v* Public Utilities Commission of Ohio 
(*0.1), 294 O.S. 63.
2 Loc. cit.
xi5
The company's business had been conducted for some time
on the basis of a 9 par eent wastage factor« It® financial relation*
ships with eiaimholders —  the general world of expectations <—  was
predicated, in part, upon this factor. To suddenly alter this
circumstance would have forced the company to make a choice between
two possible adjustments* either it would have had to be content with a
9 per eent leakage, and a 7 per cent Conuniasion allowance; or a 7 per
cent actual leakage, the additional expense of lowering this loss frost1 2 
9 per eent to 7 per eent, and a 7 per eent commission allowance*
Clearly this is no alternative at all* Either alternative, from the
faets of this case, would have meant a lowering of residual return by
about 1 per eent in 6 per cent* Such a return, unless offset by some
3kind of financial elasticity within the business itself, would cut across 
previous expectations in a most drastic way*
The case cited above is one of an existing undesirable 
situation, that ordinarily must be corrected by a regulatory order—  but
X Obviously, if the cost of reducing the loss were the financial 
equivalent of the 2 per cent leakage, no "wastett is Involved* This tern 
could be applied only if the expense were less than the financial 
equivalent of the loss checked. That sort of analysis would Indeed require 
evidence* led this kind of a decision is quite commonly considered a 
purely managerial decision*
2 The Commission might order the leakage loss reduced and permit 
the necessary costs to be included in the utility*s expense account* However, 
there are few Jurisdictions that will permit the inclusion of such highly 
conjectural costs*
3 This might be a reserve, a surplus, a padded expense elsewhere, 
or an upturn in general business fortunes* Hone of these, however, can be 
depended upon in a given situation. The first two probably could be used 
to better advantage elsewhere, or else should not exist; while the last two 
should not exist in any event*
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in which confiscation can be avoided only by the no at penetrating 
analysis and judicial decision. Frequently, In fact most commonly, 
the correction cannot be nade even with analysis and judgment, without 
confiscation. this will invariably be the case when the Commission
afinds a utility earning an excessive rate of return.
This situation presents a real parados for regulators to 
resolve. If they regulate for the future, the result is retroactive,
confiscating past expectations. But if regulation is not for the
3future then prior excesses must be made permanent. Tet one choice must 
be made. There is no possibility for compromise. Basically, this 
paradox accounts for the precarious position of legislation in the 
matter of regulation in past years. A corrective approach is bound to 
tread upon someone9s toes. Since the Supreme Court is the great "protector", 
it has been anyone9 s guess as to whose rights the court would choose to 
proteet in a given ease.
Even more interesting than the above paradox itself is the 
problem of how it developed.
1 See Be Black Biver Telephone Company, P.U.K. 131 C, 26.
2 The bulk of the litigated cases are of this nature.
3 It follows from what has gone before that the permanency of
past excesses cannot confiscate holders of claims. This is true because
they make their choices with previous facts in mind. But consumers, by
definition in a public utility, have no such elasticity of choice, and
can —  figuratively —  be confiscated.
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The most significant aspect of this development is the fact 
that when the consitution itself was written ” just compensation11 was 
principally intended to provide for the necessities of eminent domain*
In this type of property taking, note, there is an actual transfer of 
owner ship of a physical good* The government reaches an agreement with 
the private owner ( in or out of court ) and gives to such owners a 
quid pro q u o  in money* Beally nothing more is involved except a simple 
purchase and sale*
la public utility regulation the situation i« not so simple*
Bare the government receives no property and makes no payment* Full 
possession remains with the private owner* The effect of government 
action is sliqply to lower the rate of return actually earned to a ’fair* 
return*
The essential difference between these two types of government 
relation to business is the time factor* Eminent domain Is a relation­
ship without time dimension* If the private owner is realising $1000 
per year on his property the price paid by the government will be a 
capitalization of that annual income at the going rate of Interest* The 
owner is free then to do whatever he likes with the principal* If he 
chooses to reinvest in another property producing income at the rate of 
$1000 per year his financial situation has been unaltered by the transaction* 
The reason, of course, is that the action of the government carries with 
it no connotation of a wrong to be righted*
The situation is very different in public utility regulation*
















inseparable process in time —  any change in roles must come in the 
middle of the gam*. thus the change in the concept of property from use 
▼aloe te exchange value has resulted in a significant gap between just 
compensation and non-retroactivity .
It is in no else to be inferred that the writer is un­
equivocally opposed to confiscation as here interpreted. It is simply 
suggested that the regulators are in a difficult position with respect
1
to regulation* being forced to confiscate whether they wish to or not. 
This confiscation consists of decisions which determine* not whether
2
rights are to be protected or not* but whose rights are to be protected. 
In determining whose rights should be protected* regulators likewise 
determine whose rights are to be sacrificed.
Clearly the problem here is much deeper than approval or 
disapproval. Confiscation is an inevitable accompaniment of adjusting 
past relationships. Since police power Is principally exercised to 
prevent unjust enrichment of one section of society at the expense of 
another section* correction of prior maladjustments may frequently entail 
a taking from those who have been a party to the enrichment. This is* by
1 The traditional view of the function of the court is well expressed 
by Jerome Frank* most lawyers deny the reality of judge-
made law." Law and the Modern Mind. (Tudor Publishing Company, New Torfc* 
1935.) P. 33, footnote.
2 The view that judges do legislate is well presented by both 
Jerome Frank* 6p. cit.« and Norris R. Cohen, Law and the Social Order.
(Earcourt, Brace and Company, New York* 1933.) "
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very definition, confiscation* To oppose this kind of confiscation
is the equivalent ©f opposing regulation* It would take a hardy
individual indeed to seriously take such an entrees position*
Another important aspect of the police power seems pertinent
at this point* General police power the exercise of control over the
public health, safety, and morals of the citizenry does not depend
for Its potence or impotence upon a confiscatory clause* It la a well*
established principle of constitutional law that compensation need not
be paid in such cases even though damage Is done to the property through
the exercise of control* That is the way "necessary® confiscation is
handled under the general police power* But in public utility rate
eases it is widely assumed that there is no confiscation at all* "Necessary®
confiscation is just as important in the regulating of utilities as in
control under the general police power. And such confiscation is to be
justified upon the same grounds* This justification is the doctrine of
1
infirmity* which states that every social relationship 
entered into is subject to the law of the land, which law includes 
prospective regulation in the public interest, as well as past legislation*
1 The writer became acquainted with this term while sitting in 
class under Professor Eliot Jones at Stanford University* Although the 
term Itself is not often used by lawyers, yet "No rule in constitutional 
law is better settled than the principle that all property is held subject 
to the right of the state reasonably to regulate Its use under the police 
power mm*n 11 An. Jue* 100f*
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The thesis of sash doctrine is that whatever financial relationships
are destroyed, the action of the government does not obstruct choice
because the individual must be presumed to have understood the situation
at the time of entering into the contract* This thesis is the inspiration
of the very imposing name it bears congenital infirmity, meaning a
weakness at birth*
the clause in the Constitution forbidding retroactive
legislation has gone far to make and was no doubt intended for that
purpose — « that document a negative one. The only check to this
tendency has been the development of "infirmity in the general welfare*
as a working policy of control* This development is the basic positive
2
element in our Federal System. As such it is vitally significant. If 
businesses could not be declared subject to regulation after their 
inception, democracy would be at the mercy of a dynamic economy* To 
avoid confiscation it would be necessary to predict the trending 
shift of & business from a private category to a public category. This, 
on the basis of the complexity of the problems involved, is a manifest 
impc s s ifcility •
1 Article 1, Section 9* Paragraph 3*
2 The third category of utility suggested by Chief Justice Taft in 
1923 consists of businesses whose owner "by devoting his business to the 
public use, in effect grants the public an interest In that use, and 
subjects himself to public regulation to the extent of that interest .
Such businesses become public after their inception. Wolff Packing Co.
v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522.
xzz
Briefly ©unsnarl zing, then, regulation is not a single
necessity but two* the first i© that of correcting evils that have
arisen in the pastj the second is that of preventing evils from
arising in the future* fhe former necessitates confiscation, which
Is justified la our constitutional system by the doctrine of congenital
infirmity (police power), The latter does not involve confiscation,
following from the fact that, under our governmental organization, no
individual can be confiscated by an action he has knowledge of before
1
he enters into a contract. This situation would apply to all
application of "infirmity0 to utility regulation. Furthermore, as a
practical proposition, someone must decide, in each case coming up for
adjudication, whether the decisions shall reflect emphasis upon the2
future or upon the past.
Before embarking upon the next phase of this discussion it 
might prove helpful to emphasize the interrelationship between the two 
environmental developments presented in this and the preceding chapters, 
Kent arises from inelasticity. Capitalization is the institutional 
process by which business maintains a high degree of elasticity despite
1 Technically, of course, it must be. added that our philosophy 
of law also implies, as a necessary accompaniment, that government must 
accord Identical treatment to all persons similarly situated,
2 Note the extreme quantity of energy, time, and money spent 
and being spent on trying to establish a dollar value for the aid given 
to various transportation agencies by governments and others over the 
past 150 years. This problem is being given almost as much attention 
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The prime function of the two preceding chapters mas to 
deaonstrate the two principal ways to which the economic environment 
has altered in such a way as to make less precise and less useful the 
ideal regulatory adjustment outlined by the supreme Court* The growing 
qu&litetivaness of the environment caused by the inelasticities of 
productive factors* and by the necessity of recognising a time dimension 
In the exchange process Is the environmental development principally 
responsible*
It will be the purpose of this and the succeeding two chapters 
to demonstrate that this dynamic element in the environment need not 
have destroyed at all completely the earlier regulatory technique* thus 
the categories set forth by the courts have a considerable elasticity 
with vhich to meet changing circumstances, This elasticity is not* of 
course* unlimited* Beyond a certain point of stretch the categories 
themselves most give way* Furthermore* beyond a certain point in 
regulation it became the interest of the regulated themselves to break 
gown the framework of control* The farther regulation must go the 
stronger both of these strains become, % e  of the basic rassifloations 
of the following discussion is the indication of increasing strain from 
both of these sources*
As an introduction to the potential elasticity of regulation this 
chapter on the residual problem in control is essential* The principal
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residuality involved is fair return. Fair return &a here considered 
la not to be thought of as a percentage of some nebulous fair value, 
but as the concrete sum in dollars resulting from applying the percent­
age to the value. Students of utilities are more and more inclined to
. «
agree that it is this sum that is the important item rather than either
the percentage or the value to which it is applied* Simply stated fair
return is the fund out of which residual factors are paid, or the net-
ineome-fumd remaining to be distributed after contractual payments have
been made to other factors*
Economic rent, it mill be recalled, may be either contractual
or aon-contractual. If non-oontractual, Its relation to fair return Is
clear* the greater the residual, the greater the economic rent received
1
by the residual factors*
On the other hand a reward (rent) may be contractual* ho
contractual reward can contain an economic rent if it is bought and sold 2
in a market* Such a reward could be capitalised to the exclusion of 
rent* But, whether capitalised or not, the existence of rent Is predicated 
upon net income* or surplus* If any factor receives an economic surplus
1 This refers principally to common stock* The rent in a 
particular case, may be positive or negative* The meaning here is that a 
larger residual will minimize negative rent, and maximize positive rent*
2 This statement simply indicates why a contractual reward con­
taining rent is Impossible in the capital market, while possible in the 
labor markets* Either factor, however, receives a rent only under the 
conditions outlined below*
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it doss so by virtu* of the economic power It exerts over the business 
suit hiring it* Beoaoaic power 1* net income. lb feebur can contract 
for to m  amount capable of forcing & business to operate at a
b n *  Ihw uo business faotor oft* receive for any length of time a 
reward greater than opportunity cost while it* employer 1* receiving 
Uai tin* opportunity eoit. it folio** that if the total residual 
Income 1* made, tferough regulation# equivalent to opportunity costs 
me factor could contract to receive a rent.
The conclusion indicated from this analysis Is that economic 
rest does not appear originally in the hands of a factor* It appears 
first a# income to the business (accounting) unit* and is then a
distributed to the component factors on the basis of economic poser*
The significance of the process through which this is true will be the 
subject natter for the remainder of this chapter*
hot the least interesting phase of the subject of fair 
return# considered as a sore or less independent item in the rate~makli^ 
process# is the paucity of literature in the field* This fact is
1 Loss here means any act of elreumstanees less favorable than 
another available alternative* This explains the fixed variable expenses 
situation during depression years*
% The writer is net aware that any other writer has ea^haslsed the 
isportane* of fair return as residual income* Such m  analysis has been 
briefly approached# however# on at least one occasion* horgan# Charles S*# 
Pff” 1**4*" *"* "«• »»"*»« Bblltfcl**. (Houghtan-Kimin
Company# Boston# 1923*}
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particularly noteworthy in view of the plethora of expository
jnaterial centering around fair value* In the period since the “fair
return on fair value" mandate was first announced, there have been
only two standard | full-sized works purporting to consider fair return
1
aa a major item, the first, chronologically, is actually one of the
better contributions to the theory of valuation* the author uses the
book as an avenue for advancing quite convincingly the doctrine of
reproduction cost* Fair return is considered primarily through
statistical interpretation, although the author does advance a
suggestion for determining the return* the other book, that of Professor 
2
Vu, is devoted to fair return in railroad regulation, and again 
valuation is the principal esphasls, only a minimum of space being 
devoted to fair return as such* It is perhaps significant that 
Professor Wu also takes occasion to throw his influence with the eost-of- 
reproduction advocates* He, too, offers a brief statement as to a 
theoretical measurement of fair return*
Other writers have given attention to this matter, Seldom 
however, is fair return given an independent status} a non-parasitic 
raison d 2etrg> It could be argued, and vigorously, that fair return
1 Smith, Melson Lee, Fair Rate of Return jn Public Utility
(Houghton-Mlfflin Company, Mew fork, 19217)
2 Mu, Shao-Tseng, Railroad Valuation and Fair Return* (University 
of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1930.)
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was never meant tb stand alone as representative of any final fict
Xla regulation. Certainly the "rule of rate-making" would load
support to such a content Ion* But the same argument would deny to
valuation the^independemt existence it has universally enjoyed for
four decades. Tho general practice of deciding on the ajaount of
return and then converting this amount into a percentage to suit what-
3ever valuation meets the approval of the majority of the commission, 
is not carrying out the mandate of "fair return on fair value1* in a 
realistic manner. Pennsylvania has little cause to be proud of the 
universal n7% regardless of circumstances," which her Commission used as
4a rule through two booms and two depressions. Two of our strongest 
Comissions, likewise, have little cause to be proud of the fact that 
they have "gotten by" with original cost valuations, when they were
1 Smyth vs. Ames, 169 U.S. 466. In this landmark case the Supreme 
Court appeared to give parallel Importance to return and valuation. At 
no time since has the court repudiated this implication•
2 An observer could not but be increased by the extended treatment 
given fair value in court decisions (or public utility texts), as 
compared with the little attention given fair return. Thompson and Smith 
note two important cases In 1937 with more than 100 pages on the subject 
of value, and seven pages dealing with fair return. fiR. elt*. p. 349.
3; P«d*rgaet, Willia* A., Puhj^c Ptllltiee and P.^ . (D. 
Appleton-Century Company, Ha. Xork, 1933*)
4 Ho as, Joseph R., Pupil o gtiHty Regulation In Pennsylvania. 
(On!varsity of Pennsylvania Press, Philadlephla, 1939.)
m
i«bl* «  only by liberality la the return allowed. Xm sfcori*
whatever can he said against the rule of regulation* It cannot he 
accused of ixopartdality. It does not condemn either of the ooaspanloaacomponents to a permanent sateOlitic position. Here It la proposed 
to accord fair return Its "place in the eon" by considering It a* the 
basic reaIdeal in a situation In lahich residuals are of paramount 
significance.
The lack of analysis of return would he under st&ndable If it
sere not such an important part of the cost of utility services. It is
axiomatic that most utility services require large amounts of fixed
capital. But the exact relationship between this fact and fair return has
mot made as deep an Impression upon students of regulation as It must if
the significance of fair return is to he more widely recognised.
The specific studies that have been made on the subject of
capital turnover in the utility industries conclude that this rati© is
3approximately eight to one. Stated differently this means that annual 
gross revenues equal 12 1/2 percent of total investment; and that the
1 Thompson and Smith, olt.. p. 349*
2 This should not be interpreted as implying that fair value is not 
the most difficult element, interpreted from a technical viewpoint.
Certainly when a decision hinges upon an estimate of how much it would cost 
to build a similar plant over the next two years or so, and depreciate It to
a condition analogous to the present one, no Mnlml&ailon of the task Involved 
should be indulged.
3 Bureau of Business Research, University of Illinois, Standard 
vin&nelal Ratios for tfaq Public Utility Industry. (University of Illinois 
Urba^*Illia©la* 1929)
utility fewiwi in income the equivalent of its assets every eight
years • Let us assume now that such & composite utility is allowed
a fair return of 6 percent* We will further assume that fair value and
1
investment are equal. Sueh a utility would have to have an operating
ratio of 52 percent in order to make Its allowed return* Thus of
gross revenues would be necessary for the reward of investors, etc* And
in the above illustration 6 percent, historically, would not be a
liberal allowance at all*
In practice the modal operating ratio is not 52 percent* The2
actual figure is 72 percent* There are probably a number of reasons
for this discrepancy* First, many utilities fail to earn a fair return*
It might be added that many do not need to earn a fair return — - in the
legal sense —  to maintain excellent credit* Too, if is possible that
the above study has placed the capital turnover too high* bther
3writers hazard estimates considerably lower, and more in line with the 
calculated operating ratio* A superficial glance at a number of 
financial statements selected at random — * admittedly unscientific, but 
perhaps helpful for the project at hand *—  indicates that the operating
1 It should be noted that reproduction cost would not be used in any 
event if it were greatly in excess of investment* In the latter case the 
percentage necessary for fair return would be greater for the same reason.
% Business Research Bulletin, o p * cit*
"• ' - - ' * »
3 See Thompson and Smith* op, cit. * p. 83.
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ratios in the study cited are much more nearly representative than
the figures given for capital turnover.
But the point is not vital at the moment* Enough has been
said to indicate the importance of capital costs in measuring resource-
expenditures for utility services. Through a comparison with other costs
the significance of fair return becomes even more apparent* Depreciation
1
and maintenance amount to roughly 15 percent of gross income* This
figure would approximate that for a utility with a capital turnover of
5, with 90 percent of its assets depreciable, and assuming a composite
asset life of 25 years* Taxes represent another important cost for
utility customers. But they fail to even come close to capital costs in
magnitude* In 1939 the electric light and power Industry paid 16*3 percent
2
of Its gross revenues to various governmental units in taxes. The
2
comparable figure for the Bell interests for the same year was 14*1 percent*
A fourth item in utility costs is labor, running all. the way from 20 to
2
45 percent of gross. Thus, it is unnecessary to pursue the thought 
further. It is readily apparent that fair return Is a most Important 
cost, and that inaccuracy and misunderstanding may result from its neglect.
It would be grossly misleading to infer th-.t the Idea of cost 
minimization is a novelty In the regulatory process; or that the everyday
1 This is the percentage used by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission as a norm in its analysis of the financial structure of a 
utility.
2 These figures are given in Thompson and Smith, op. olt.* 
chapter V.
decisions of the various regulatory bodies take no cognisance of this 
principle* Quite the contrary would be more nearly accurate* But It 
dw*ld not be misleading to say that the cost aspect is often so camouflaged 
beneath precision detail that its sigaifieaiiee is not Immediately 
apparent* Sroa etudeata of public utility problems are sometimes vague 
in their emphasis upon costs*3' ihis fast is to be explained, no doubt* 
by the feet that this particular approach is taken for granted, rather 
ttsaa to any assignable ignorance of fundamentnls* However, regulation
of any single industry In a "competitive1* eooneny has two obligations__
both atanaslng froa and comparable to the individualistic system for which 
regulation has been selected as a «mh&tibUta§ fhe first obligation is to 
secure the oomnedity Involved for the ©ensuiaer at a price equivalent to 
costi the second is to take whatever steps have been authorised in the 
public interest to keep these eeste as low as possible* this dichotomy 
of problems has been treated more or less In detail earlier# as the 
Peebles of correlating rights and responsibilities in a society that 
considers equality an important concept* yyon this point forward the 
problem will be made acre specific* proceeding with discussion of fair 
return somewhat independent of the broader social philosophy of which it
1 Bryant end german* elements of Utility Rate Determination , 
(McGraw-Hill Book Company, Hew York* 19^0*) Chapters XV - XVII*
2 Bohling* Burton S., Competition. *a& Monopoly In Public Utility
(University of Illinois, Urban*, Illinois, 1938.) Chapter III.
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Is an Integral part*
The foregoing facts may at first seem commonplace and
irrelevant to an attempt to set forth the economic principles of
fair return* But they serve as an introduction to the real heart of
the regulatory problem—  the problem of securing a necessary service
in the most economical way, i.e., at lowest total r© source-expend!ture
1
consistent with the quality of commodity demanded by the public. In 
solving this problem it is highly important to note that It does not 
center upon the cheapness of any single item in the expense (cost) 
account. Rather it must involve giving to every item that attention and 
that care that will result in the lowest composite total costs.
In order to exemplify certain features of this relationship, we 
will refer to some of the typical Issues that come before commissions 
in actual cases. First, assume a utility, operated with average or 
above average efficiency, with operating expenses of $1,000,000. Some 
of the items included will be large, some small* Bany, probably the 
majority, of these items will be obviously in line with competitive 
prices, and thus will need little specific attention* But perhaps the 
President is receiving a $50,000 annual salary, and, due to estimates 
of efficiency by the Board of Directors (of which the President is 
probably a member) a $25,000 bonus has been voted —  and paid by the
1 Behling, loc.cit,
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company for the three years preceding the present hearing before the 
Ctasslsaleii on the reasonableness of rates. Katurally the utility will 
wish to include both the bonus and the salary as legitimate costs of 
operation, the Commission oust make a decision on the point. If it la an 
alert Commission with adequate authority, it will certainly refuse the 
Inclusion of the bonus, and probably would lop 10 or 20 thousand dollars 
off the salary itself.* After making the appropriate remarks about 
"protecting public interest", and "good faith on the part of the manage* 
■mat," the Commission will conclude the hearing by allowing the utility 
a 6jC return on its value.
Such decisions are quite common, and they are widely heralded
by public Interests as placing a firm hand upon soulless corporations,
while the Commissioners commonly point to such decisions as an example
of its savings for consumer. But it is quite proper to inquire if the
ease is really ended there* Hote, for example, that the President has
received an "illegitimate" wage for years previously, and he may receive
it again. The Commission has only refused to let it be included as an 
1expense* If he does receive this increment, and the fair return has 
been set at a point that either ten cents a share will have to be taken 
from the common dividend, or surplus accumulation cease, then the
1 This weakness In the armor of much of our current regulation 
has been treated by Barnes, op. cit.. chapter XVIII.
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Commission has a further reckoning ahead* For next year it nay happen 
that the utility will need to ref and a bond issue, or expand lie 
operation* through the sale of stock* Bfciea that time comes, it may be 
suggested, the Commission is not aliening the securing of expensive 
capital, but is merely agreeing that the President should have had his 
$25,000 after all* And precisely because those bonds or that stock east 
more on this particular occasion the fair return next time sill have to be 
higher to maintain credit standing* Bor much, then, was f* saved" for the 
public? A second excellent question would be this oust If the utility 
did pay, and continues to pay, an excessive salary to its executives 
without impairing its ability to secure capital, what is the probability 
that, either before or after the rate case, the rate of return was too 
high?
Another, more complex, situation suggests itself* Assume this
time a utility that desires to set aside 3 percent of the cost of its
physical plant for depredation* Assume further that that is the amount
1
needed to state operating expenses correctly* But the Commission, not
adequately schooled in economic matters, decides that the proper charge
should be 3 1/2 percent, and so orders* One-half of one per cent on2
physical plant does not appear to be a particularly large error* But
1 Depreciation expense is here considered solely as a device to 
accurately calculate operating expenses* For an elaborate justification of 
this approach see Mason, cit*
2 The assumptions here include a common stock issue amounting to 2 0  
of total e&pital, a six to one capit&l-turnovar ratio, and a 90% depreciable 
property ratio.
W6
it would amount to roughly %% annually on tho common stock. This 
would be paid out in dividends la sons jurisdiction* In other 
jurisdictions it would be forced into a top-heavy reserve and night 
tend to build up common stock equity (and general credit strength) 
in that way. Whichever happens, the public is obviously paying too 
much for its current services, for building up credit in this way is 
probably not the cheapest method possible.
let us suppose that five years after entering its original 
order the Commission notices the above error* Again, a decision must be 
reached on a method for rectifying the error, for certainly the 
continuation of such a condition would be an injustice to the public*
The wrong might be righted in one of two waysj to make a correction only 
for the future, or to attempt to adjust the past overcharges as well* If 
the former course is adopted the overcharge to the consumer can not be 
rectified at all —  and probably the exact amount of the damage cannot 
be calculated, though it would probably be somewhat less than the 
3 pereent of gross indicated by the exact arbitrary to operating expenses.
If the Commission decided to make the correction retroactive 
it might follow a coarse of "immediacy'1 or of "gradualness"t i.e., it
1 Lindheimer va. Illinois Bell telephone Company, 292 U.S. 151*
The Supreme Court here dealt with precisely this type of situation, 
illuminating rather forcefully the inadequacy of present-day regulation In 
specific instances.
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might order a single write-down entry for depreciation reserve| or it 
might extend the remaining net hook coot over the remaining service life 
of the property. If either course la followed, and fair return is not 
altered, the common stockholders are given an unearned increment through 
either dividends or surplus* thus, after the discovery of the error 
as well as before, the investor benefits at the expense of the consumer, 
unless adjustment is made in fair return* The thought occurs that perhaps 
the gain to capital will be given back to the consumer through lower 
demands the next time the utility asks for money* But if the capital 
market is at all competitive the exact opposite will be the result*
Because the gains were only incremental and unexpected, their very 
uncertainty (for the investor reasons they might have gone down as well 
as up —  which would certainly have been the case had the assumptions 
been different) causes them to be discounted against an issuing corporation* 
One more example will be noted* The charge has often been made 
that Commissions have been too liberal in the percentage they allow as a 
fair return* Let us assume that in a given case this Is true* (In using 
the term "liberal" the base is considered to be the amount necessary to 
overcome the resistance of investors, who could spend their money or 
inve&it elsewhere*) Investors, taken compositely, are willing to part 
with their money on a 6 percent basis, and the Commission In fact permits 
7 percent* But the investor has already contracted with (or purchased 
coiaaon stock from) the corporation on the basis of a 6 percent "resistance," 
which resistance cannot be altered by any declarations of a public body*
m
An alert investor who receive a such & windfall, or sees it placed
in a surplus as a protection he had not anticipated when he made
his purchase, and connecting this fortuitous circumstance with the
arbitrary action of public authority, is not apt to consider the
situation permanent* Far from lessening his future resistance, such
generosity could easily stiffen it, because it Is so easy to assume that
the same public authority could just as easily have taken an opposite
arbitrary stand* Thus the consumer is charged more not only because of
the generosity of the Commission, but because this same generosity leads
to aa uncertainty that is further held against the utility when it next
1
seeks out the investor to secure additional capital.
Xt is scai/eely an opposing argument to suggest that since 
commissions always lean in the direction of liberality, that the Investor 
will be more favorably disposed toward public utility securities for 
this reason. As a matter of fact liberality is a misnomer. A truer name 
is error. For the capitalisation prodess eats up increments and absorbs 
decrements without substantial regard for the benevolent attitude of 
public utility commissions. Actually benevolence is a regulatory 
impossibility. Both plus and minus deviations from truth are capitalized 
apainat the corporation. The only result of liberality is discrimination 
between present and future security holders.
These few illustrations, chosen from the dozens that might 
have been included, all point in one direction. Fair return can not be
1 See Morgan, cit.
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considered as a cost by Itself| neither can any other expense be
treated as a law unto itself, without considering the resultant
effect upon every other cost, the important fact is the total, the
composite picture of all resource-sacrifices. Nothing is to be gained
from a saving In one If a consequent burden is placed elsewhere • Indeed
it is probable that all such shifts create an unnaturalneas In the
operation of the regulatory process; an unnaturalness that stakes the
1
resultant burden greater than the earlier saving.
It Is not an accident that common stock has become the 
residual share in profit-taking. No more is It accidental that fair 
return has been given the residual position in the machinery of 
regulation. Obviously in the absence of guarantee, and given the presence 
of risk, there must be some "last* factor. In the American way of 
economic life, capital plays that role. But because it is in this 
somewhat inferior position it can not necessarily be neglected. For 
in the last analysis its very Inferiority of position makes its demands 
all the greater, and its retributions all the more severe.
In addition to the very close interrelationships between 
fair return and all other items that make up the expense account, it 
seems equally clear that the above statements make even more apparent the 
inherent fallacy of discharging a duty to the public by making extensive
1 Bauer, o£. cit.
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calculations as to value, while only paying lip-service to 
fair return* fhe valuation problem doee not even touch the delicate 
situations Involved in rate-making# Fair return as an amount, not as 
a percentage <— * is at the focus of every one of such situations* 
Technical valuations can be vastly altered without disturbing economic 
relationships* Fair return is extremely sensitive to the slightest 
touch* Only by the most careful attention to fair return as the 
element in the entire process of regulation can Commission control 
keep abreast of a dynamic situation.
This point can perhaps be mad© clearer with reference to 
an actual decision made by the Public Service Commission of Maryland, 
one of the older and better respected regulatory Commissions* The case 
in point is the very famous United Railways and Electric Co. y. West. 
Here was involved a street railway in a declining market situation*
It had survived the rising costs of *$orld Wat I with a five cent fare* 
But after the war, still an integral part of the transport system of 
Baltimore, it requested an increase in its fares to improve a serious 
financial situation* In 1924, it was awarded a six cent fare* The 
company had suffered so long, however, from an inadequate rate that by 
1924 even six cents was scarcely helpful* So the company requested and 
received commission approval of a seven cent fare* But by the time 
approval had been secured, the local market had become so saturated with 
rival transport facilities, both of a public and a private nature, that
1 P.U.B. 1926 C, 441 and 280 U.S* 234.
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the company was obliged to request a ten cent fare, as had many other
companies In the country under substantially similar conditions*
The Commission flatly refused to allow the increase* In its
1926 decision it promulgated two principles upon which its disapproval
was based* First, the street railway was an absolutely essential portion of
the community's transport facilities* This fact was emphasized over and
over in the decision* Second, the Supreme Court had ruled that the charge
for the services of a utility must never exceed the value of the service 
1
to the consumer* More than eight cents, the Commission felt, would
violate this principle* Therefore the fare allowed was an eight cent 2
marl mum*
So attempt will be made here to hazard a guess as to what the
Supreme Court meant in 1393 when it first began making reference to the
term "value of the service to the public.11 Suffice it to say that the
court, while never forthrightly denying the principle, has never applied
it (or permitted its application) in the manner proposed by the Maryland 
3Commission* In 1929* when the instant case reached the Supreme Court for
final adjudication, the court rendered its decision without making "value
4of service" an issue.
1 Smyth x* Ames, I69 U.S. 466, was cited as authority for this 
anomaly,
2 P.U.K. 1926 C, 441.
3 The present view of students of regulation on "value of service" 
as a rate-making criteria is excellently stated by Thompson and Smith, 
op* cit*, pp* 260—262*
4 280 U.S. 234*
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But the point that is to be considered here is the basic
principle of economics involved* In any system of price relationships
it Is universally agreed that the economic importance of any good or
service to a community can only be measured by the price it is willing
to pay to secure the benefits* Thus the correlation between price and
importance is always direct. The Maryland Commission, in the Street
Railway Case, was holding out for an inverse correlation. Actually,
if the railway services were completely indispensable in 1926, and in
all probability they were, no price could be too high, the charging of
which would result in no more than a 11 fair” return. An eight cent fare
would not have produced a return recognized as fair under any set of
supportable assumptions • Note, in this connection, that the Commission
acknowledged that the company could not make a fair return under the 
1
1926 order.
There are a number of pertinent conclusions that might be drawn 
from this land-mark decision. Those treated here will necessarily be 
limited. The Commission assumed that it was performing a valuable service 
for the public. In that the Commissioners were undoubtedly sincere. But 
it is almost incredible that the Commission could suppose that it was 
performing an economic service in such a non-economic manner.
In all fairness to the Maryland Commission, it should be stated 
that it had noted several times prior to 1926 that the capital structure 
of United Railways and Electric Company was In need of reorganization.
1 P.U.R., 1926 C, 441.
Perhaps rate order was intended to ferae the concern into bankruptcy.
Bat public interest would always be served more adequately by forcing
a reorganization before the credit of the company becomes irreparably
iapalred. It is probably to the point to note that even though the
Supreme Court did permit the full ten cent fare, the eoiqp&ny went into
i
bankruptcy shortly thereafter and was reorganised in 1935*
If, then, a regulatory Commission can and does render opinions 
and orders at variance with economic fundamentals, what are the 
consequences of its action? 5®a might assume a case where the concern 
involved was not thrown into bankruptcy proceedings. Obviously here 
would be a clear example of resultant credit impairment, and consequent 
difficulty in overcoming the resistance of investors the next time capital 
is needed. Thus fair return in such a case would necessarily be higher 
in the future, and rates correspondingly higher than would be necessitated 
otherwise.
But if the Commission can force rates low enough to 
precipitate foreclosure, the though arises that perhaps the above result 
can be avoided. (It goes without saying, of course, that such an order 
would be Illegal.) Bo Commission, however, or no series of Comaission 
decisions, can alter the fact that a failure in any industry is a token 
of risk to the investor. Bot only will such a failure be held against 
the particular company, but the whole Industry must partially share in the 
discreditxQsnt. And, as if that were not enough, such cases are discounted
1 Moody, SsmSi 1936.
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against all regulated Industry, for rightly or wrongly depending
on the individual case, such misfortune* are laid at the door of
regulatory bodies, It is very probable that in any reorganisation a
number of individuals lost money. But it is highly inprobable that
utility customers get their services even as eheaply beeause of those
feu losses. Whatever disagreements there are still among theorists on the
problem of interest, it is almost unanimously agreed that risk is a part 3L
of capital cost. to get a more general picture of the problem involved 
ue need only pose for ourselves the question of hou much cheaper capital 
might now be secured if no money had ever been lost in the stock market. 
Such influences are tiny when taken separately, but they loom large in 
the aggregate.
Thus far this chapter has been more illustrative than 
analytical. But the relationship to the theory of regulation la close.
The problem of regulation is not many problems* It is only one* A 
business unit is not a series of separate and Independent facts* It is 
one fact *—  with a series of Interdependent aspects* The one problem 
and the one fact can both be subsumed under the concept of fair return* 
Fair return, far from being a legitimate item to relegate to a minor 
position, is a basic point in regulation*
A brief glance at the textbook material in the field of 




missed this crucial point. Particularly is this true with reference 
to the question of valuation. It is seldom recognised that no concern
acan be confiscated through valuation alone* Equally true is the
statement that no concern can be confiscated by fair return calculations
3
in and of themselves. But after the concern has paid its bills for the
year, it either does or does not have enough to provide compensation
for the residual factors of production used by the enterprise* If it
4has too much or too little, the factors receive economic rent* If
there is just enough the factors receive no rent and regulation has been 
5successful.
Only part of this confusion, however, is caused by the fact 
that we have a tendency to view things as parts rather than as wholes. 
Another portion arises from the traditional understanding of corporation 
finance. We live in a dynamic society. That being the case, businesses 
make profits some of the time and losses some of the time. Capitalism
1 Thompson and Smith, o p . clt. This volume is merely typical. The 
authors simply treat fair return as one factor related to the rate-making 
problem.
2 Bauer, o p . £ & >
3 P>Ad.
4 Too little return, of course, is a negative rent made technically 
possible by the fixity of capital and the capitalization process.
*> The intimate relationship between fair return and valuation Is aptly 
discussed by Bauer, gg. elt.
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could not have survived the dynamic necessities of the past had not
some way boon devised *—  through legal categories to distribute
profits and losses equitably, this distribution necessarily took the
fora of priorities as to claim against the corporation* the relationship
agreed upon between priority and risk was the inverse relationship so
familar to students of corporation finance $ the higher the priority, the
1
lower the risk; and the lower the priority, the higher the risk* It is at 
once obvious how difficult it would have been to create a satisfactory 
money market if no claim-bolder knew from one fiscal period to the next 
how his risk would be rationed on the next dividend date*
If the parcelling out of risk had been left to private 
enterprise, furthermore, it would have represented a violation of one of 
our most sacred ideals —* that of non~arhitrariness —  in addition to 
resting capitalism upon an insecure foundation* The aim in capitalistic 
finance has been to distribute risks by classes, not by individuals* To 
have given the owner the privilege of deciding such an issue for himself 
would have been to pave the way for all manner of personal diacriicinations
a
not consistent with the fundamentals of social philosophy*
1 Edwards, G*W., The Evolution of Finance Capitalism* (Longmans,
Green and Company, Hew fork, 19387)
Z This is not to say that certain discriminations do not persist
even under a system of legal classification* See ̂ avis, Jerome, Capital*
Ism and jta Culture. (Farrar and Rhinehart, New fork, 1933*)
Bisk in enterprise eight have been rationed in either of two
ways. First, it sight have been distributed in such a way that each
X
class of d&isMiolders would proportionately gain or lose as dynamics
altered operating conditions* Second, classes might have been given
absolute superiorities and absolute inferiorities in distinct and
certain ways* Basically, the second alternative describes the choice
actually made* Bondholders are not paid proportionately with stock**
holders* They have an absolute claim on earnings up to the amount of
their intersst-daim* Bondholders do, however, share proportionately
£
with bondholders, if earnings are less than intersst-claims*
The phenomenon of profit and loss makes clear at the outset 
the inevitability, however risk is parcelled out to elaim-holders, of 
the existence of a residual risk* A residual risk is to be defined as 
that risk born by a elalm-holder for the reason that no one else is In 
a legal position to bear the risk for him* Concentrating for the moment 
only upon earnings —  to avoid unnecessary complications — ■ each class 
of claimholders bears the risk of the corporation not having a net r»*renuc 
sufficient for paying dividends* A low-risk class of holders —  bondholders—  
bear no risk up to earnings equivalent to their own interest payments*
1 A claim is defined as a certificate of ownership, unaccompanied 
by physical control of the assets represented. Types of claims are 
differentiated according to distance from physical control under certain 
circumstances«
2 The process of apportionment within a single class is an 
intricate one, still In a stage of evolution*
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tom tamings is not a risk up to this point for tfa* bondholdiog 
company group because there exists a class which is legally compelled 
to boar this rlsik for thorn* The same thing can bo said of tho 
low-risk el&ss of stocky if tho stock has boon divided into several 
classes.
tho strategy of the system followed by American corporations
1
was dictated by financial expediency. Saving, under capitalism, is a
planned activity* Thus it represents a definitely considered view
of the future as a condition precedent* Before making a commitment an
investor must make calculations that would be impossible unless the 
2
relative risks were known in advance. Thus the business expediency
involved is that of overcoming as much resistance on the part of investors
as possible* Some savers want only a little risk* Others will assume
3larger quantities* The job of those in charge of the corporate financial 
policy is to sell to each potential investor the type of claim that most 
appeals to him* The over-all result of meeting this expediency is “cost
1 Davis, John P., Corporationsi Their Origin and Development*
(G.L. Putnams* Sons, Sew York, 1905.)
2 Absolute risk, of course, can never be known* Relative risk 
refers to the knowledge of how much risk Is to be born by high-risk classes 
of holders —  how much worse conditions can get before payments will cease 
to the investor making the calculations* Absolute risk Is the fact of 
residuality*
3 It need not be emphasized that the money market provides compensation 
in the form of higher yields for greater risks*
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of capital.11 The batter pleased every investor is the cheaper the 
capital factor can be acquired by enterprise*
if total risk were a known quantity year by year, risk
would still need to be parcelled out, although every type of risk could
Ibe aade perfectly definite, rather than being partially residual. But 
total potential gain is virtually infinite. Total potential lose, no 
flatter what the law may say, amounts to the quantity of capital invested. 
Actual gain or lose will always be between these two extremes in any 
fiscal period. Legal rules promulgated in advance of operations, therefore, 
could never parcel out risks in any precise manner. Law has thus been 
forced to compromise between the necessity of formulating rules for the 
future and the impossibility of assessing risks accurately. The 
inevitable result has been the residual risk. If the pro-parcelling 
process is over-conservative —  figuratively speaking —  the residual 
risk is highly paid; if under-eonaervative, the residual risk is poorly 
paid.
Historically common atock has been the residual risk. Fair 
return in public utility regulation includes payments to all groups of 
clalm-holders. Herein lies a fundamental confusion of thought. Since 
common dividends represent the residual legal claim it is difficult to
1 Professor Knight has popularised the view that a sharp distinction 
can and should be drawn between calculable unknowns (risk) and non-calculable
unknowns (uncertainty). Thus corporations must parcel out uncertainty and 
risk. Op. elt.
150
Im p  elserly in mind the feet that In & regulated industry the
entire fair return take® on the qualities of e residual sum* If
ether expenses increase# total revenue remaining the sas*# fair
return aust shrink* the opposite must result if other expenses
decrease* Obviously such a regulatory catch-all 1® as necessary as
the legal residual* the two need® arose from the sane source the
impossibility of aeourate prediction*
Sot only do these two residual® have a common origin# hut
they have an identical function* Each in a somewhat special field ha®
the delicate duty of distributing profits and losses# within the Hadis
set by the total operating conditions* The equity of the legal residual
depends upon the distribution of risks between classes of eX&lsHholdsrs#
the equity of the economic residual depends upon the distribution of the
product of industry to the factors contributing to this product* Equity
here# as always# contemplates the distribution of rights as compared with
responsibilities throughout society* Equity In assessing residuals thus
has virtually the same content as the concept of regulation*
The legal residual refers to distributing income m  between
parts of the capital factor* The economic residual refers to distribution
as between the factors in general* Interpreted broadly no distinction
2
need be made between the two* If understood each in the context of the
1 Capital leverage makes this particular error loom larger at 
times* Fair return# as a residual# rewards both creditors and owners* But 
owners have a residual claim# while creditors do not* Thus the fixity of 
the claims of creditors makes the (entire residuality of fair return impinge 
upon only one reward*
2 Actually the law does provide that labor shall be paid before 
bond interest# thus contemplating much more than the capital factor itself*
other, regulation can be mad© more nearer eom»sttsttraie with actual 
economic society*
Economists have been most insistent upon their classifications
of the factor a ©f production, the traditional grouping ©alia for four
factorst land, labor, capital, and management. The l&sbHaamed is
1
considered to be the residual factor, according to theorists* It is 
tele factor that is principally reimbursed through fair return* the 
function of regulation is to eliminate economic rente from this return* 
Since rents legally belong to whoever is In a position to claim them, 
since they always appear first as income of the business unit, and 
since they are capable of being capitalised fully the moment they are 
distributed, the regulatory problem Is seen to be a difficult one.
Economic rents do not always appear as residuals, and, of 
course, residuals do not always represent economic rents* Typically, 
however, rents are contained in the business residual. I’he specific 
problem of regulation insofar as these rents are concerned is to dearly 
separate factor opportunity costs from economic rent and keep the latter 
from arising* fur once they arise regulation can not redistribute them 
without confiscation, sometimes confiscation of a third party having no 
connection with the collection of the original rents being Involved. For 
rents that do sot arise as residuals the regulatory problem Is still to 
keep them from arising, for if care Is not taken regulation may have the
1 Froman, git*, chapter XXFIX. This reward for management
is the traditional "profit11 of the orthodox economist*
% n
result either of falling to eliminate a rent at its source only 
to hare it appear later in the re8idualy or of causing a negative 
rent at the souree only to have it reappear later in the form of 
higher opportunity cost for the residual factor*
Every decision of a commission, particularly if an 
important one, produces some impact upon the operating structure of 
the business involved* If this impact clearly (and only) reflects 
circumstances outside the control of either the commission or the 
company, regulation has done all that it can do* It some times happens, 
however, as witness the typical examples delineated above, that the 
action of the eeamlssloa serves merely to shift the impact upon an 
operating area less well fitted to absorb it, but a different area than 
would have been affected In the normal course of operation* Such a case 
creates a "regulatory residual1* * different from the operating residual 
heretofore considered, and usually undesirable in actual practice*
This chapter has been concerned with showing fair return as 
a residual of residuals* Any control designed to destroy an economic 
rent, unless it takes into consideration the total effect of a decision, 
makes fair return a regulatory residual consistent neither with logic nor 
operating efficiency* The two chapters immediately following will have 
as their purpose the task of demonstrating how fair return could be 
converted into a regulatory tool consistent with the dynamic developments 
within the economy, namely capitalization of economic inelasticities*
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CHAPTER VI 
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF REGULATION
Thus far this dissertation has been frankly theoretical 
in that general principles rather than specific cases have been the 
emphasis* However, in order to complete the integration intended in 
this work, it is now necessary to consider sons of the practical 
ramifications of the theoretical analysis* The purpose of this and 
the succeeding chapter will he to suggest a few shortcomings of present 
regulation in terms of the preceding chapter, and to outline the changes 
in regulatory technique required to implement the ideal implicit in 
American social philosophy in the light of the environmental developments 
discussed earlier*
It must be emphasized at the outset that criticism of regulation 
is only partially Justified* If by merely altering somewhat the approach 
of regulation to the larger problem of philosophy regulators could 
actually make the ideal realizable then studied criticism would be the 
logical end of a work such as this* It is characteristic, however, of 
dynamics in society that the original ideal becomes less desirable as it 
becomes more difficult* Stated in terms of regulation this statement 
means that a more realistic approach to the problem by regulators can 
result only in a more complete control of businesses regulated* Hot only 
is this prospect an undesirable one for those regulated, but it has some 
appearance of illogicality to regulators In the Ught of the decreasing 
significance of the industry dlasaificatlon originally promulgated by the 
courts* For the present, attention will be focused away from these latter
m
considerations, and criticism of regulation wtll be predicated upon
the degree to which tho ideal pattern of regulation la still desirable.
Boat students of public utilities reeognti&e certain defects
Xin the methods presently used in determining fair return* Moat of 
than* criticisms center about the problem of valuation, even though 
many writers candidly admit that too much emphasis in given valuation
a
and too llttla given fair return* Nonetheless there have been notable 
attempts, among academicians at least, to outline an objective basis for
return determinantion; thus making fair return more realistic by today’s
3standards. Unfortunately, however, these writers typically begin their 
analyses with a peculiar type of assumption! one probably made necessary 
by their rigid observance of dose relationship between value and return, 
but which can redly only serve to oast sharp doubt upon the ultimate 
results obtained* The assumption referred to is the use of the concept 
’average9 as a practical approach to the problems of control.
k representative example of the use of averages and the possible 
error to be derived therefrom, can be had by further reference to
X for one of the most studied criticisms of present-day methods see 
the results of a study by the Hate and Research Department of the federal 
Communications Commission in 193d with reference to the proper return for 
the bong lines Department of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. 
These reports can be had only through the Commission in plaaographed form. 
Other works of criticism are too numerous to warrant any attempt at a 
complete list.
Z Both Nelson lee Smith, &&» sit*, and Wu, gg. cit*. bemoan the neglect 
of fair return and yet devote the bulk of their books to valuation technique and valuation theories. These two authors are selected as examples, because 
their works are the only ones purporting to deal comprehensively with fair 
return.
3 For the fullest account of m  objective alternative to current 
regulatory technique see & Bill J& Inset ££& Prudent Investment gajift. s£
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1Professor Smith** analysis of return. So suggests dividing tho
valuation into too equal porta; o m  represents bonds, tho other
stock. to tho ofl»unt representing bonds shell be applied the goirg
rote demanded by bondholders; to that representing stock shall be
applied a rate one half of one per cent higher, ee the average relation*
2•hip between bond and stock yields.
the significant errors permitted by this type of analysis 
hinge upon the feet that it implicitly necessitates a number of allied 
assumptions shich are really untenable in effective regulation. The 
first of these assumptions is that always present when averages are used 
for jure than description* Certainly few if any utilities correspond 
precisely to the average as to capital structure* To regulate all 
utilities as though the same capital-cost conditions prevail universally
permits a preliminary injustice to all speeulatlvely financed utilities**
3
with no distinction between cases of laxity and economic necessity; and
& &*ts Regulation* Report of Commission on Revision of the Public Service 
Commissiona Law, Sew fork. Legislative Document No. 75 of 1930, pp.411-422, 
prepared by James C« Bonright os a part of the Minority Report of 
Ceosdssioners Walsh, Bonright ,and Adle. This document Is particularly 
worthy of careful study as a comprehensive attempt to give return an 
independent status in the regulatory process*
1 fig* clt*« chapter VII.
2 Professor Wu begins his analysis with a similar assumption and 
decides upon a similar technique.
3 To penalise a utility with high fixed charges, and whose bonds 
and stock mast both offer investors a high y eld to induce them to assume 
the risks involved, after permitting (in a sense) the incurring of the 
tophsavy indebtedness, is to punish the child after laughing at its 
misbehavior. And certainly capital costs will be forced up for the future 
by inflicting the penalty, but regardless of the wisdom of this method
of regulation as a general principle, adjustment must assuredly be made In 
favor of those utilities which have high fixed charges because economic 
conditions forced them to issue bonds, and those whose managers were 
interested merely in financial leverage.
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permits unwarranted cxtravaganes to conservatively financed corporations---
without distinction between more good judgment in financing and excessive
pact mornings* Furthir, the tendency under such a syaim  of regulation
would probably bo to gradually force the arbitrary capitalisation upon
the utilities* regardless of the economic wisdom of such financing i»
particular eases* And not only would this method violate the canons of
economy* but It would in addition be contrary to the legal injunctions
of the courts* the final arbiter in regulatory matters* Repeatedly the
Supreme Court of the halted States has insisted that each case be
1
considered on its own merits*
A second untenable assumption to be found in an arbitrary 
etock-bond ratio* is the assumption that the time of the inquiry can be 
disregarded* An average prevailing: ratio pertaining to utilities over 
the years is not helpful in arriving at a proper return for a given 
utility* Historically* for example* the Hew England Telephone and 
Telegraph Company has financed Itself with funded debt amounting to 
30 per cent of total capital at a cost of 3*19 per cent* Southern 
California Edison* with 45 per cent of its capital represented by bond s,
1 Willcox x* Consolidated Gas Co«* 212 U.S. 19$ Lincoln Gas Co*
X* Lincoln* 230 C«S« 256$ Galveston Electric Co. X* Galveston* 258 0*3*388} 
Bluefleld Electric Co* x* Commission* 262 U.S. 679} United Railways 
X* West* 280 U.S. 234* The following Is a typical statement from the fourth 
of tts cases above cited at page 693* “...this Court**.held that the 
question idiether a rate yields such a return as not to be confiscatory 
depends upon circumstances* locality and risk* and that no proper rate can 
be established for all cas0s***n
3.57
secured that particular capital at a cost of 4*95 pear cent. At the 
extreme end in conservative finance stands Pacific telephone and 
telegraph with only 15 per cent of total capitalisation funded* this 
company secures Its debt capital at a cost substantially lees than the 
parent company, the figure for P*t. and T. being 3.56 per cent* let 
Boston Edison, with more than tides the proportion of its capitalisation
funded, has secured its debt capital at a ccst of 3.52 per cent, or .04
1
per cent cheaper than P.T. & f. thus there would seem to be no 
necessary close correlation between the else of the bond ratio and the 
cost of funded capital* Obviously there is a correlation but the 
variations from the mold so set will, in specific instances, vary so 
significantly as to completely vitiate the use of an arbitrary ratio 
both as to actual ratios and their corresponding costs to say nothing 
of the widely different effects of particular bond ratios upon the cost 
of common stock.
A third misconception implicit in the arbitrary stock-bond 
ratio technique of utility regulation is a misunderstanding of the 
purpose of regulation* If our only Interest in placing public service 
companies under state supervision were to accept and reflect whatever 
course utility managements wished to follow, arbitrariness tempered
1 The percentages quoted were computed by the Rate and Research 
Department of the Federal Communications Commission. For the method of 
computation used see The Problem of "Rate of Return.*1 June 15, 1936, 
pp. 159 ff*
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with generosity sight be as adequate an approach as any* But in
such a case regulation would have but little raison dHtrc. Such
seams to be the result of the policy followed by tbt Pennsylvania
Commission for 21 years, a policy allowing the same identical rate
of return to all utilities regardless of local conditions and without
1consideration of the state of the business cycle.
the aim of regulation however, runs much deeper. We desire 
our utilities to operate, not under whatever conditions may occur to 
managements regardless of purpose, but the most economical conditions 
possible toward the end of producing the public utility service. Any 
regulation with a justified existence has always in the foreground the 
view of economical service, and is constantly considering the problem of 
economising still further. Any regulation that neglects this aspect, 
is not functioning to the fullest of which it is capable. This aim of 
economy should' be m t  first by managerial initiative, second by 
Commission guidance. Thus the Public Utility Commission should be In a 
position to observe, suggest, urge , demand —  in that order -- with 
reference to economy of service.
1 Rose, Joseph R., Public Utility Regulation in Pennsylvania. 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1939.) Bote the follow­
ing pp. 62-3. "The Commission had occasion to fix a return in approxi­
mately 148 cases during this time. Every type of utility was involved in 
these eases, electric, water, street railway, natural gas, sewerage and 
others, but in every case with little or no discussion the Commission 
found that 7 per cent was a fair return."
The facts about capital economy are sketchy and hard t®
obtain. But enough are available to fully demonstrate the inaccuracy
of a frosen, artificial, regulatory mold. In March, 1932, the moat
economical form of capitalisation consisted of 45 per cent bonds and
55 per cent stock. In March, 1935, the most economical form consisted
of 55 per cent bonds. %  March, 1937, the most desirable bond ratio
X
had fallen to 45 per cent, while in 1940 it had again risen to 55 per 2
cent. The comparable figure for October, 1935, was 0 per cent j and fcr
3
October, 1936, 30 per cent. Surely no single ratio could be acceptable 
even for six months; and a "standard1 that must be subjected to a send-* 
annual change is illusory indeed; tfiile if unchanged it could only be 
positively injurious• Either the standard would become the actual, to 
the detriment of the consumer; or the standard would exceed the actual 
(in bonds), to the detriment of the consumer; or the standard would be 
less than the ectual, also to the detriment of the consumer. The ohly 
possibility of non-injury to the consumer would be the extremely rare 
instance where economic conditions caused the actual ratio in a particular 
case to coincide with the standard as adjusted at the time of
1 Federal Cossnunicationa Commission, og> clt.. p. 151 * For 
method of computation see pp.105 ff*
2 Rational Association of Railroads and Public Utility Commissioners, 
Proceedings, 1940, Report of Committee on Corporation Finance.
3 Federal Common!cations Commission, pp. cifc.
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1ill* Inquiry.
the abort criticism, though prompted by and adapt ad to 
tho suggestions offered by Professor Smith, la not to be understood
a
at containing any but a genera1 connotation* Dr* Smith** mark it
ealy typical ©f the approach most ®&amriX& encountered} an approach
peculiar to thoee who endeavor to treat fair return somewhat apart from 
3
valuation —  with the exception of thoee indlvidnale Vho seek to guarantee 
1 5stock dividends, and those who seek a more scientific basis*
1 It la not meant here to create the impression that fair return 
in a particular ease should conform to the Ideal situation of tbs moment} 
but to actual conditions that have, through regulation, been made to 
conform as nearly to the ideal condition as economically feasible*
2 Se* fit. It is only fair to recognise that the author would 
permit deviations from the norm* the following statement appears at p*X?$« 
”?o suggest that the current yield basis cm which the securities of a 
given utility sell be used in determining its fair rate of return is not 
to argue that each utility be permitted to set standards for its own 
regulation, nor Is it to abandon the concept of a long-run norm* The current 
yield indicates merely the necessity of short-run deviations from that norm 
in particular: cases if the credit of the utility is net to suffer*1 It 
would seem that any fcrm of regulation that adds to the multitudinous adjust­
ments necessary In any case, is not the most desirable system to adopt*
3 In addition to those jveviously mentioned see Raymond, W.Q., 
ghat is Fair * (John Utley and Sons, Mew fork, 1913.)
4 Bauer, £&» d t .
5 donee and Bigham, gg* d t *. and Bernstein, E.M., Publie 
polity Sfeta Making aqd the Price level. (University of North Carolina 
Press, ChapelHm, 1937V)Pp. 153 ff.
1 &
In faot the technique under discussion is but a refinement of the
Xprocedure adopted by Public Service Commissions almost universally,
2
even though lip-service is paid to scientific methods* It is said
that a Chairman of the Pee fork Commission was once asked how he
arrived at a ‘'rate* of return* He replied that he merely listened
to the testimony of experts hired by the parties concerned, went home
and had a good night's rest, end came back the next morning with the
proper percentage in mind* The Eats and Be search Department of the
Federal Comainications Commission has tersely summarised the situation 
3similarly.
The errors enumerated as consequent from the assumptions 
illicit In 11 aver age1* regulation, stem from a common source} the 
paramount necessity for adopting some definite point of departure. All 
activity predicated upon the future must consider as certain sons 
fundamental concepts that have not been precisely proved. This element 
of uncertainty is characteristic, not of public utility regulation as 
such, but of any normative approach to social problems. But the 
working—certainty that must supplant actual uncertainty for purposes of
1 With the possible exception of Massachusetts, Her technique 
is a bit difficult to describe, and there is so ms dispute about its 
actual working in practice. But basically the Commission endeavors to 
keep the price of securities at par. For details see Barnes, Irston R,, 
Public Utility Control in Massachusetts, (lale University Press, New 
Haven, 1930.)
2 For a further statement on this point see Pegrum, D.F., Rate 
Theories of the California Railroad Commission- (University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 1932.)
3 <&• cit-# P* 7
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decision la tha assumption or assumptions that represent tha paint
of departure tor regulators*
If it ho granted th&t aasai^tlon (uncertainty) la necessary
in regulation, the question of what constitute* a proper assumption
becomes of paramount significance* The objections voiced here to ifee
typical assumptions of writers on regulation canter around the thought
1
that the assumptions are illicit. They are illicit because they largely
fail to relate closely to tho underlying philosophy of regulation*
It seems obvious that the only type of assumption that could be
justified in regulation would be an assumption concerning the prevailing
social philosophy* All manifest ©utworkiogs of social control must be2
supplemental or Qomplement&l to social philosophy* Really no assumption 
is necessary, save the original one applying the pertinent parts of social 
philosophy to the specific problems at hand*
The pertinent part of social philosophy here involved Is free 
will, or the right of choice. Unless regulation theory uses choice as 
a starting point, the results are apt to be vague and confusing, if net
1 This statement is, of course, a serious indictment. Most 
past treatment of regulation has focused upon the average concept in some 
fo»*
2 Social philosophy will be taken to mean the equation of rights 
and responsibilities within the social structure* Social control is the 
enfor cement of this equality*
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contradictory• For with any other starting point regulation theory
loses sight of who is being confiscated or what of vqlu* is the object
1
of regulation controversy* Free enterprise in our society comprehends 
above all the right to devote self and property t© particular enterprises,
2
subject to certain limitations, which limitations must be known in advance* 
The confiscated personality is not a business concern, but 
an individual* The object of value that regulation theory decides (on 
the basis of social philosophy) to either protect or not protect, Is an 
expectation of income* Ho assumption not essentially Individualised —  
apart, thus, from the individual status of the corporation in courts of 
law —  can fail to contradict prevailing philosophy*
Most Innovations in the field of fair return— ' notably 3
in the instances cited in the preceding pages — « fail in this regard*
Xt can be stated rather optimistically, however that the current trend
1 Eegulation through averages, for example, makes the problem 
of confiscation completely impersonal, a result wholly incongruous with 
our ideas of social justice* Just as law may never coerce an individual 
except non-arbitrarily, so may it never coerce without regard to individual 
rights and responsibilities* See Jones, and Blgham, £&* ©it**pp.278 ff* 
for a frank recognition of this factor as it relates to fair return*
2 This is a reference to the constitutional prohibition against 
retroactive legislation* Thus once more the extreme importance of this 
clause in the Constitution becomes evident*
3 Kota how wide of the mark some suggestions do dome* dee
Jesting, Joseph, "Public Utility Hates on Heproductlon -*• A Cost of Service
Principle,9 Journal of Land and Public Utility Economic a» Volume 17,
pp* 138 ff., May, 1941.
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1is toward a batter understanding at this point. One outstanding 
aacaog}!* of improved technique came very close to bels^ Incorporated 
1st© basic legislation in' Haw York. This latter exaiqplc will serve 
somewhat as a guide to further examination of specific possibilities in 
the direction of individualising fair return in harmony with social 
philosophy.
It is the purpose of the remainder of this and the following 
chapter to outline three steps leading toward more realistic regulation.
To a degree these steps depend only upon a limited amount of rethinking 
on the part of commissions. To some extent, however, these steps hinge 
upon a further extension of jurisdiction* As fundamental as have been
4seme of the legislative additions to commission powers in the past decade, 
this latter prospect should not be an alarming one.
Before outlining specific proposals a few summary observations 
m&j be helpful to the reader. Fair return is considered here in terms 
of economic cost, or rights equal to responsibilities. Furthermore It is 
taken for granted that the principal element in fair return must inevitably
1 The most recent is Coffman, Paul B., “The Direct Approach to 
the Fair Return Question,« Public Utilities Fortnightly. Folums 30,
Number 5, pp. 277 ff; Number 6, pp.35 ff*
2 Report of Commission on Revision of the Public Service 
Commissions Law, New York, Legislative Document 75 of 1939* PP* 411*422.
3 See Bonbright, James C«, Public Utilities .and the Rational Power 
Policies. (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1940.)
4 Fear a rather complete analysis of changes in regulatory authority 
during the depression see Proceedings, National Association of Railroads
and Utilities Commissioners, 1936, pp.360-402.
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Xbe the attraction of capital, cat opportunity cost* Difficulty 
frequently arises from a not unusual attempt to sake fair return 
tbs entire problen of regulation, instead of holding it to its more 
United (residual) sphere* The fact that fair return is an accounting 
residual makes it almost logical to consider it in terms of every aspect 
of regulation not otherwise handled* But the attest is not helpful* 
Fair return is residual because of its technical nature, not because 
commissions consider other factors first* Thus every factor considered 
at its incidence leaves less of a problem at the residual level and 
re wits in a much more equitable and convincing process*
In the actual operations of a business, economic rentals 
may be one of two kinds* They may be either contractual or residual* 
Contractual rents result from a factor * a ability to take advantage of 
a discontinuity in opportunities, enabling it to reap a surplus reward 
above opportunity costs. Residual rents are those rents that are 
technically correlated with capital costs and accrue to individuals 
unexpectedly as the future unravels itself into the present*
Contractual rewards form an element In individual expectations* 
That is, they are subject to advance capitalization* Residual rewards do 
not form an element in expectations in the same way* These latter rents
1 Although the Hate and He search Department of the Federal 
Communications Commission enumerates various considerations, it doss give 
principal emphasis throughout to the problem of securing capital*
Op * cit*
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are subject only to speculation in advance* the consequences of this
distinction are important. Contractual rents are opposed to the
assertions of pure competition, but not to the philosophy Of choice*
Residual rents in a regulated industry are opposed to both the assumptions
of competition and social philosophy* Contractual rents can be controlled
by the establishment of certain specific checks* Residual fants can toe
controlled only by the general check known in utility regulation as
1
control of fair return*
If residual rents, or profits, served in any way to lower
cost of utility service to consumers, It would be loss imperative to
minimize them* But these rents may toe either positive or negative and are
just about as likely to be one as another. Since either result causes a
change la the over-all expectation surrounding the particular Income
involved, its effeet must be to alter the cost of capital, and thus becomes
of vital significance to regulation* Whether positive or negative (since
in either case the opposite would have been just as possible) the effeet
will be to engender a more speculative capitalization than without the2
particular instability*
1 Residual rents and fair return are not synonoraouo terms* Rents 
are simply an element found in return under certain circumstances* See 
Morgan, Charles S., op, d t *
2 The term speculative capitalization is not used here in its 
orthodoat sense* Graham and Dodd, $£, cit* * Fart II* Here it means that 
the expectations surrounding a given Issue of claims in the market has 
become more uncertain* This usage is related to that of Graham and Dodd, 
although not identical*
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A positive residual m a m  an tmder~«apitallccd probability,
A negative residual Mens an ovsr-eepitelised probability* tiibsr, 
separately or collectively, means that a probability has besom less 
probable, less certain. Sine# only the certainty contained in a 
probability can be capitalised, the result ©f over * or under-capitall- 
aatlon east be to loner the pries of the security and raise the capital 
cost to the utility.
The first step necessary to make regulation c&nform to these 
principles of modern economy is to make return the test of reasonableness* 
this Is already a basic canon of regulation, although rarely recognised under 
present technique. The cotarts are willing to stake return the test of 
reasonableness on the side of confiscation; it is equally important to 
ham seas such gauge on the side of extortion. Within Halts, meaning 
when rates become so high that even the housewife knows she is being 
robbed, return is reduebd when it reaches a certain absolute celling*
Bui In the large number of cases where fair return is 1 or 2 per oent 
lower than the actual return, no om takes the trouble to make complaint.
On the other side, however, when actual return falls below fair return, 
utilities iB»diately petition for higher rates*
It is probably within the power of the average commission to adopt the
suggested standard, if ever and whenever the utility begins to receive
3b
wore then a fair return, but in actual practice attention is only rarely
1 Re toe Angeles Gas and Electric Corporation, F.tl.E. 1731 A, p.132. 
Here the Railroad Commission originated m  investigation on its own motion 
because it felt the Coopery was realising returns in excess of those 
considered reasonable. By silence at least the feder&l courts seemed to 
approve this technique • 289 0.8. 287*
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1given to slightly excessive returns. In fact, there m y  be
significant examples where exactly the reverse is the case, California
and Massachusetts have long been considered courageous in that they
have dared decide rate eases by using historical cost or a slight
variation thereof as the rate base, let it is commonplace to hear it
said that these commissions have been successful in keeping themselves2
out of the courts by being generous as regards fair return, California
gains additional favor with her utilities by adopting an undepreciated
rate base for purposes of valuation. Other commissions have similarly
loaned over backwards in trying to avoid unfavorable (or merely
troublesome) litigation. At present there is no consistent check upon
this prejudice to consumer interests. Some states have experimented
3with a Peonies1 Counsel to prosecute in the interest of the public. If, 
however, sow system were inaugurated to make the return actually 
received prime evidence of rate reasonableness, this legal tool would
1 hew Xork and Pennsylvania, through the accounting divisions 
of their Public Serviee Commissions, in 1930 undertook an investigation 
of the actual returns currently received by the electrical utilities 
under their Jurisdiction, The great majority were receiving returns in 
excess of 10 per cent, at a time when 8 per cent was the return most 
commonly allowed by commissions in actual rate cases,
2 See Pegrum, o&, clt.. and Thompson and Smith, o&. oit.
3 For a brief description of the Peoples1 Counsel and its 
work see Thompson and Smith, o p , clt,, pp* 210-211* See also Prendergast, 
o p , clt,» PP* 297-300,
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be unnecessary ̂  even granting It a certain usefulness under present 
conditions •
It has been argued, arti convincingly, that the consumer is
protected against the above type of encroachflwnt. Chairman Prenderg&at,
1of the Mew York Commission takes this view as indicated by the following*
As a matter of fact, the interests of the users of public 
utility services are competently defended. In bringing 
rate eases before the commissions, cities are represented 
by their corporation counsels and by special counsel 
if such are deemed necessary. If a case Is worth the 
bribing, certainly a city is justified in engaging 
competent counsel and competent experts, and certainly 
It can provide funds to do so.
In part the above is a strong argument, In answer to that part it will
only be stated here that in those eases where consumer rights are in
no danger of violation, no change in this regard need be enforced.
But on the other hand the above argument seems to partially miss the
entire point at issue. The crucial question is really not whether there
are theoretical avenues of protection for consumers, but whether in fact
regulation does operate so as to best fulfill its prime function— as suring
the economical performance by private concerns of public functions j not
whether present methods are good, but whether they could be improved.
On this latter point, the evidence seems dearly in favor of 
seam form e€ the technique here suggested. The experience of the 
Pennsylvania Commission cited above should be sufficiently revealing as 
supporting evidence. Consumers have no protection through regulation 
■ectly. Chairman Prendergast unequivocally states that he conceives
1 Ibid.
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of & regulatory commission as a quasi-judicial body, as distinct 
tvcm a "prosecuting agency.n
In addition to the fact that regulation tends to be one-sided
In practice, public utility control needs an automatic check for yet
another reason. Eate cases are but spasmodic at best* Oemnlssions are
supposed to set rates for a reasonable time in the future by using
for data the faots of the period just ended. Chairman Prouder gast feds
that this period may well be five or six years, but only if prices remain 2
unchanged. Howard Dozier has expressed this difficulty quite well as 
3follewss
A rate schedule desigened to produce an average 
reasonable rate of return at a time when earnings can 
be expected to be high is unreasonably lew and vice versa* 
Failure to give sufficient recognition to this funda­
mental fact is responsible in no small degree for our ever- 
recurring rate cases. In the absence of a working agreement 
between the public and the utility, the duty of a rate- 
making body is to fix a schedule of rates and keep it 
fairly stationary, not to fix a rate of return and keep it 
fixed.
Hr. Dozier cites a significant example of the results of present policy 
in this regard* In 1922 a commission adopted 7 per cent as the fair 
rate of return for a certain utility. As is the custom in such cases 
the Conaission analyzed probable operating expenses, added 7 per cent
1 oit. * p. 29d*
2 Ibid.
3 "Present Reasonable Hate of Return for Public Utilities,1 
Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics. Vol. IV, pp. 235-236.
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on fair value to the figure thus obtained, and fixed the rate schedule
to produce that gross revenue. During the next three years the rate
schedule produced a return of 10 per cent, 1$J per cent, and 11 per cent*
Apparently "if 7 per cent in 1922 was reasonable, then 17i per cent was
X
reasonable in 1921..." and the "...rate of return applied in 1922 should
have been about 3 per cent In order to have resulted in the schedule of
rates at which the regulatory body evidently was aiming...11
There is little to be gained by multiplying instances. Examples
are legion* If return is to be used only in fixing rates, then consumers
oust resign themselves to expect rates to be "correct" only once over a
period of years, aid that as taxpayers they will be involved in expensive
litigation whenever the utility feels that return Is too leer* if on the
other hand fair return could be used as a mure dynamic tool of regulation,
as a test of reasonableness as well as a proof of unreasonableness, utility
regulation could be much enhanced in the direction of our over-all philosophy*
The foregoing considerations have been primarily concerned
with the economic aspects of the problem posed. However, legal aspects will
also repay analysis* In the first place, on what grounds can a consumer, or
a municipality as representing consumers in the aggregate, enter a prayer
for l»«*r rat.a exc.pt £n the tfaat the. utility A& ffikljqg excel.*
profits? The answer that will first occur to a thoughtful reader is
"value of servlde." This principle of rate control is as old as Judicial
2
review of utility regulation, althotgh for forty years it was scarcely
1 Ibid*
2 Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co* y. Sanfiford, 164 U.S. 573*
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mentioned by consumer-conscious commissions. Than in 1929 and the
years immediately following '•value of service14 was eagerly sought as
so avenue toward lower rates* the Maryland Commission used this
concept as an argument to keep street railway fares low in Baltimore,
1only to be reversed by the Supremt Court* In 1932 the Wisconsin
Co—ni frsion endeavored to substitute ”value of serviceN for ”cost of
service*4 as the proper rule of reasonableness, and set with the sane2
result in the courts, except more emphatically. At present it is
genuinely doubtful that the ••value of service” principle could stand
another court test as a legal injunction in regulation. Its only
usefulness is concisely summarized by two authors as fellows#
...Tala* of service is n& help, a t i ^ a i i  Prt-aary standard 
SL reasonableness j&£ pricing o£ utility servlcaa...value of 
service plays an important part in the setting of specific 
rates. • .Thus, value of service is distinctly subordinate and 
supplementary to cost of service as a theory of particular 
rates and is never acceptable as a general theory of reason- 
ableness of rates?
The obvious conclusion is that avalue of service,” despite Its hopeful
origin and ambitious revival, is no legitimate ground for consumer
coflg>laint*
The next thought that interposes itself Is that of consumer 
confiscation. It would seem ttut if one party to a bargain is subject
1 United Hallways & Electric Co. v» West, 200 U.S. 23̂ *
2 Wisconsin Telephone Company v. Public Service Commission, 
287 W.W. 122*
3 Thompson and Smith, g&* clt. * p. 262*
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to confiscation, the ea» principles should apply to the otter, 2h 
the earliest eases, indeed, the wry wording ©F Supreme Court decisions 
w « w  to imply that the pt&lle ie la felly ae aeute danger of 
confiscation ae the t&lllty cea$&$f* For example, consider the following
*
taken fro* Justice Harlan'» opinion in Beagan $. Earners1 loan and Trust Co.* 
"The equal protection of the laws.. .forbids legislation, in whatever fora 
It any be enacted, by which the property of one individual Is, without 
compensation, wrested fnsm bin for tie benefit of another, or of the public. **
Or consider the majority opinion in Covington & Lexington Turnpike head Co.2
v« dandfords °A state enaetiaent.. .that will not admit of the carrier
earning «ueh s m m m a m  m  *&&& sU Mi® < & m m itonaiw. 4& iast l& j&
to the therefore be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment
3of the Constitution of the United States.* Even in the Heforaska
4Maxietnm hate ease the sane idea runs as a thread throughout the entire
opinion* The following Is typical of the language used;
It ean&ot be assumed that any railroad corporation.. .ever 
supposed that it acquired.. .the power to construct and 
maintain a public highway simply for its benefit, without 
regard to the rights of the public. But it Is equally 
true that the corporation performing such public services. *• 
have rights that may not be invaded by legislative enact­
ment In disregard of the fundamental guarantees for the 
protection of property*
1 154 U.S. 362.
2 164 U.S. 578.
3 Emphasis added.
4 169 U.S. 466.
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These paragraphs ware written many years ago# By now it la well
known that, whatever other significance these statements may have
pertaining to regulation, the Fourteenth Amendment Is not the correct
explanation* In short, a public utility consumer cannot be confiscated#
Brutal as it may seem, and though apparently inconsistent with the basic
premises of regulation, the courts and commissions have decreed that
since the customer is not forced to buy (in the way that the utility
X
is foreed to sell) he has no constitutional protection# The latest
available decision on the point was handed down in 1937 by the Alabama 2
Supreme Courts
It would follow, as a logical result of the theory ad­
vanced by the city, that a subscriber who has no invested 
capital at stake, but only a desire for a lower rate, and 
dissatisfied by the schedule fixed in the law by his rep­
resentatives in the legislature, could appeal to the courts 
to have the law nullified, and a new schedule of rates 
established by the Judicial branch of our government, and thus 
have the courts9 judgment in a purely legislative matter sub­
stituted for that of the law-making body.
The position as here presented seems sound# let, if utility 
regulation is predicated upon the public nature of the business, consumers 
must have some recourse# If they cannot claim confiscation, and if 
“value of service4 is lost to them as a defense, then the suggestion 
that return be used as evidence of rate reasonableness is even more in need 
of adoption#
1 Bauer and Gold, Public Utility Valuation# (The Macmillan Company, 
Hew fork, 1934*) Bryant and Hermann, Elements of Utility Rate Determination. 
(The McGraw-Hill Book Company, Hew York, 1940.) Spurr, Henry 0#, Guiding 
Principles of Public Service Regulation# (Public Utilities Reports, Inc#, 
Washington, 1926#)
2 Birmingham V# Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Go#,
176 So# 301.
in
Am early ** 1876# in Mum* V. Illinois, Chief «testie* Wait*
1set the standard for such & procedure*
la countries where the eomaoxt lee presells# It has 
been customary from time Immemorial for the legislators to 
declare shat shall be a reasonable compensation under such 
circumstances# or# perhaps sore properly speaking# to fix 
a maximum beyond which any charge made would be unreasonable,
finis It is not for the courts to point the way. It has been their
custom la the past to leave the state legislatures to their a m  devices
as far as innovation is concerned. Possibly legislatures and commissions
have been too much concerned about the confusion that the Supreme Court
has allegedly made of valuation# and too little concerned over other
possible remedies.
However# an opening wedge has been driven. In 1940 the Federal
Power Commission ordered the Natural Gas Pipe line Company of America to
reduce its rates# not by a certain amount# but to yield a certain amount
of revenue. In 1941 an appeal reached the federal district courts where
2
the Commission was upheld. The court dwelt Img on the fact that the
return actually received has always been the Indicia! test of rate 
3reasonableness. A few more decisions by commissions similar to this 
decision of the Federal Power Commission will go far in the direction of 
more objective regulatory technique.
1 94 U.S. 113
2 Natural Gas Pipe line Company of America et.al. £, Federal 
Power Comaiseion et. el.# 38 F.U.K. (U.S.) 2$?.
3 For similar though less positive statements see Los Angeles 
Gas & Electric Corp. g. California Kailroad Commission, 289 U.S. 287# 
and Lindheimer y> Illinois 8*11 Telephone Cospany# 292 U.S. 1$1*
a m  rat
mmxQM* &sma:s or b io tu tio b  (mmmwm)
The one suggestion thus far advanced would & M  little to the
effectiveness of regulation taken alone* true, control would tend to be
more smooth and continuous* But rate changes would be more frequent,
forcing the cost of regulation yet higher. The triangular relation
between utilities, the public, and coaasiosions could tend to become more
strained* Actually this proposal savors strongly of the service^t-cost
X
and slldlng-soale techniques, thoi^h savoring much more strongly of the
a $
disadvantages thereof, than of the advantages* To add stability to th»
rate structure it is necessary to go further and consider a more cosiprehensive
approach* Thus the second step to be offered here is that the ownership
of assess earnings —  defined as earnings over and above those considered
4fair under existing technique —  be made to reside in the consumer $ not
1 Service-at-oost and slldlng-scale methods can be defined in common 
as any system of regulation that endeavors to establish close correlation 
between managerial efficiency and the level of utility rates (or profits 
depending on the viewpoint)*
2 The most vital disadvantage is centering attention upon return, rather 
than allowing full recognition of the significant interrelationships Inherent 
in the utility industry*
3 These can be summarised in brief as insuring that consumers shall
pay no more than coat In the accounting sense, not necessarily in the economic 
sense*
U A third step, to be outlined later, deals with the specific problem 
of determining fair return and relates that problem to the two preceding steps* 
But it is important to emphasise that these two, if Inaugurated, could 
vastly Improve utility regulation under any system of return determination*
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to bo regularly withdrawn necessarily, but to perform an Important
function as the clastic element in regulation —  a function now being1
inadequately and erroneously performed by commission generosity.
This second suggestion might at first seem revolutionary.
But logic, at least, will support the view her® taken —  although the 
innovation does seem to be somewhat more dependent upon legislation than 
the first proposal. At all events two examples should serve to illustrate 
both the economic and legal principles involved.
The first of these examples is the Black River Telephone2
Company, In 1929 this Company filed new tariff schedules with the New York 
Department of Public Service, effecting a general increase in rates. Certain 
of the towns affected by the new schedule filed complaints with the 
Department. After considering the pertinent facts the New York Commission 
allowed, in part, the increase asked by the Company. However, several 
significant facts were brought to light in the minority opinion of 
Chairman llaltbie and Commissioner Burritt. In 1924 the Company had paid 
a stock dividend of 50 per cent. In 1925, 1926, 1927, 1920, and 1929 
respectively it paid 10 per cent, 16 per cent, 18 per cent, 18 per cent,
18 per cent cash dividends on its common stock. In addition, in 1929, 
it added more than 434,000 to surplus after the payment of dividends and
1 The significance of this elasticity element can be demonstrated 
more convincingly later in conjunction with step three.
2 Re Black River Telephone Company, P.R.R., 1931 C 26, Mew York 
Department of Public Service*
17$
a H  charges upon revenues, At the time of the inquiry the Company 
had a corporate surplus equivalent to 20 par cent of Its entire 
capital, the minority also found that If the revenues actually 
received under the m m  schedule as approved by the majority should be 
#11,000 less than anticipated, the Company could meet all charges, pay 
IS per cent dividends on outstanding stock, m d  add #15,000 to corporate 
surplus.
The situation above described is not a wholesome one, at least
if it be granted that utility service should reach the consumer as
economically as possible. At the time the Black Elver Telephone Coc^any
first began to plow back Its earnings the Kew York Commission had ample
authority to initiate action on its own motion to reduce rates to the 2
proper level. Had the Commission done so year by year the net result
would have been the same as though the ownership of excessive earniigs
3had rested with the public over the same period, and the legal outlook 
could thus be no different. As worked out in this particular case, both 
of the principles of regulation thus far mentioned were violated} not
1 Ibid,* pp, 51-5^•
2 As early as 1914 Hew York was a pioneer in the modernisation 
of her regulatory authority. Of course, once the ,fvalue” of the 
property is enhanced by reinvestment, the present rate-making rule 
demands Its recognition.
3 If rates were to be set —  as one possibility —  on the basis 
of value minus reinvestment, it is probably not desirable to have too 
large a surplus accumulated. Such a process would penalise one genera­
tion of consumers for the benefit of another. The proper criterion as 
regards slsse of surplus might be that necessary for equalisation.
m
only was the rate of return given no significance In determining rate 
reasonableness* but past overcharges were permitted to become a permanent 
"value*.
The second example is perhaps the more significant of the
two* although less spectacular. The amounts involved are larger* and the
STommission involved is one that many years ago laid down the general
principle that consumers should not be charged high rates because of
reinvested earnings* where such earnings were not the result of withheld 
2
dividends. The company involved was made the object of a complaint in 
31931. Later the Commission instituted proceedings on its own motion as
4to rates and practices of the utility. This case was the final disposition 
of the motion of the Commission.
The San Diego Company had had a virtually unbroken dividend 
record. Its bonds had a Triple A Moody rating* Its financial position had
1 If surplus is reinvested in necessary utility property* only 
the consumer who paid the original excess is injured* But If any of the 
reinvestment finds its way into valuation without being reinvested in useful 
property* all future consumers will be injured as well. The proposed 
technique would be principally useful in obviating the necessity of making 
such costly determinations at the expense of the taxpayer.
2 The California Railroad Commission, See Fegrura* o&. eit.
3 City of San Diego v* San Diego Consolidated Gas & Electric Co.*
7 P.U.R. (S.S.) 443.
4 Ibid.
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never been questioned• And, particularly, it had been adding to its
earned surplus account by upward of $100,000 annually for well over a
dosen years, the total account amounting to roughly $ per cent of total
assets* In the proceeding under discussion the commission allowed an
undepreciated rate-base, as is its custom, depredation reserve amounting
at this tins to about $7#500,000, or about 15 per cent of total assets*
2
Thus, approximately 20 per cent of the total valuation consisted of
3depredation reserve and surplus* If, under such circumstances, a
eonaissiom concentrates rigidly upon cost requirement a in deciding upon
the amount of return required (as the California Railroad Commission
A
claims frequently to do) no serious error could result* But in view of 
the fact that preceding and during the depression the company found it 
possible to make annual and substantial additions to its surplus, the
1 Although the earned surplus account is often only an omnibus 
term for all surplus and many reserves, the Ban Diego Company keeps its 
accounts in accordance with rules laid down by the California Commission*
2 Like all valuations of the California Railroad Commission this one 
closely approximated original cost*
3 It is not necessary here to give a detailed account of the theory 
behind an undepreciated rate-base coupled with the sinking-fund method of 
accruing depreciation* Suffice it to say that the method assumes that
a close enot^h adjustment has been made in rates to give consumers annually 
the benefit of the lower depreciation charge* If such an adjustment has in 
fact not been made, the consumer is doubly the loser* The advantages of the 
method are clear in theory, but It doss place upon regulatory bodies a 
precarious responsibility*
4 Pegrum, gg,. cit*
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facts of th» case seam to indicate that th© attempt was ill-adapted
to the deaired end. this fact is driven home even more sharply to the
observer when it is recalled that the company in 1934 had been under the
direct^surveillance of the commission six times in the preceding eight
years. Thus, again* both of the regulatory canons have been imperfectly
observed at best.
If these two items were merely isolated instances they would
cause no legitimate concern. But analogous situations are common*-
place. In the telephone industry 8 per cent of total assets is represented
2
by "unappropriated11 surplus. In the traction industry almost 8 per cent
3of total equities consisted of surplus and reserves. While in the
electric light and power and gas industries about 5 per cent of total
4equities represent surplus and reserves. These figures may seem immaterial
when taken as bare percentages. But rememberiig that these same equities
are the data of public utility valuations* 5 per cent can add substantially
5to utility service bills* In addition* the above figures are averages*
1 7 P.U.R. <K.S.) 443.
2 Woody’s* Public Utilities* 1940. The Federal Communications 
Commission alone among the Federal regulatory agencies* under whose 
supervision most of the telephone industry keeps its accounts* permits a 
generalized surplus account. But It is well known that earned surplus is 
an important item in this industry. See 292 U.S. 15*
3 The Sources of Public Utility Capital. Bulletin Ho. 20 Bureau of 
Business Beseareh* University of Illinois Press* Urbana, 1928.
4 Unfortunately these figures are not broken down for close scrutiny. 
It is not even stated whether or not the "reserve1 item includes depreciation 
reserve. Logie would say not. The percentages are given with that 
assumption.
5 Bureau of Business Beseareh* gg. clt.
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taken from a group of utilities at random, many of them having deficit a 
which ware deducted. Recognizing these as somewhat unnatural situations, 
the true picture might be drawn more strongly. In addition many
1
valuations have been tempered by considerations of reproduction cost, and
in view of the fact that reproduction cost (when used for valuation
purposes) is always higher than original cost, the percentages quoted
appear even more conservative.
In this, as before, the legal perspective is a prominent
consider at! on • In all the annals of corporation law in general it has
been assumed that ifeatever found its way legitimately into the hands of the
corporation could legally be used for any proper purpose. In the public
service corporation, however, there arises an initial doubt as to the
propriety of the automatic relinquishment of funds as soon as they are
clutched in corporate fingers. This doubt has occasionally found its way2
into courts as the "doctrine of implied trust." As such it has had an 
Interesting and confusing history.
It must be recognized at the outset that there are many 
different kinds of surplus, or stated more accurately, surpluses from 
many different sources* Some of the major sources of surplus are as
1 This factor for the past fifteen years has been much less of a 
factor than commonly supposed* The typical method, revealed by an 
examination of decisions of commissions, is to use some previous valuation 
with subsequent additions at cost*
2 For a comp1st© discussion of implied trust from the standpoint 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, see Locklin, D.P. Regulation of 
Security Issues t^e Interstate Commerce Commission. (University of 
Illinois, Orbana, 1926.)
u$
follows* together with the attitude of tie Interstate Commerce 
Commission toward their capitalisation as reported by Professor 
Locklins
(1) the writing up of aesete to correspond to a higher 
reproduction cost* the Commission properly* although not 
invariably* allows such surplus to be capitalised if 
capitalisation doee not thereby become greater than fair value •
(2) the inclusion among fixed assets of intangible values* 
such as good will or going value, the X.C.C. apparently 
disapproves the capitalisation of this surplus.
(3) the writing up of the accounts due to appreciation 
in land values, the Commission emphatically frowns upon 
the capitalisation of such a surplus.
(4) the inclusion of depreciation or other reserves in the 
surplus account. Obviously such a surplus should not exist* 
let alone be subject to capitalization.
(5) the reinvestment of earnings, the Commission has given 
little attention to this problem* and has never commented at 
length. In general the capitalization of such stttplus is 
permitted.
While important questions of policy hinge about each of the 
above possibilities* the legal doctrine of implied trust applies only 
to the last* and then only in the case of public utilities. At best 
it is a delicate situation* for reinvested earnings may be the result 
of excessive rates or nonpayment of dividends. Certainly there is no 
legal or ethical Justification for denying to the corporation owner­
ship of the latter. In fact utility services could be rendered much 
more cheaply if there were no such thing as non-payment of dividends.
1 £&* git., pp. 145 ff.
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But with reference to the surpluses created by excessive rates, as
noted previously, doubt arises. Regulation seems to be In the anomalous
position of being legally able to prevent such a surplus from arising,
but with no power over it once formed.
Very early in the history of regulation in Massachusetts, the
Board^of Gas and Electric Light Comaission endeavored to insert implied
trust into its scheme of control. But the Board was promptly short-*
circuited by the Massachusetts Supreme Court which held that the Company
sight capitalise the cost of all additions to plant without regard to2
the source of the funds used. the general policy of regulation in
Massachusetts at presort is to maintain equivalence between capitalization 
3and investment, which would imply permission to capitalize reinvested 
earnings.
Pennsylvania has had a similar experience. At present the 
only pertinent stipulation regarding stock dividends contained in the
4Pennsylvania laws is that a part of the surplus must remain capitalized*
1 By way of definition implied trust may be said to be the 
principle that all revenues in excess of a fair return on fair value are 
held by the utility only in trust for rightful owners— in this case the 
consuming public.
2 Fall River Gas Works v. Board of Gas and Electric Light 
Commission, 211 Mass.529.
3 Barnes, pp. clt.. p. 127. However, see Re Lowell Gas and Light 
Company, P.U.R. 1933 A, 4©0.
4 Rose, Joseph R., Public Utility Regulation 4a Pennsylvania., 
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1939, p. HI*
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In New York the issuance of a stock dividend by a public
service corporation under the jurisdiction of the state commission 
X
is not legal, but apparently this rule is not directly related to
the doctrine of Implied trust* And it appears that the doctrine does2 3
not figure in the regulatory laws of Illinois or Maryland, Thus only
4California, among the stronger of the utility commissions, has made an
effort to follow an implied trust policy* This rule was laid down by
the California Railroad Cosmission in the first published volume of 
5
its reports to the effect that no return was to be allowed on property
1 Baldwin, Donald C*, Capital Control in Hew fork* George 
Banta Publishing Company, Uenasha, Wisconsin, 1920, pp. 135-134*
2 Kneier, Charles M*, State Regulation of Public Utilities ip 
niittttifl- University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1927*
3 Burke, Henry G*, The Public Service Commission of Maryland* 
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1932*
4 Wisconsin can of course not be omitted in any discussion of 
the stronger utility commissions* The Wisconsin rule as to the purposes 
of security issues, as in many states, is that stocks or bonds may be 
Issued to reimburse the corporate treasury for improvements secured from 
earnings*
5 Geo. A Legg v. the Nevada County Narrow Gauge Railroad and 
the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 1 C.R.C, 11* See also
3 C.R.C. 1212, and 4 C.R.C* 570*
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1
built by revenues from excessive rates • It has bean noted earlier
that the policy of the California Commission may not be so sound in
practice as it appears in theory. However, this policy has never been
overruled by the courts*
the entire legal question of implied trust must be
2
considered unsatisfactorily settled at best* But the economic question
is certainly not so simply disposed of as the following statement implies*
“The regulatory commissions are justified in refusing permission to issue
stock dividends to capitalise an earned surplus only if the property
3acquired therewith does not increase the Company1 s earning power*“
Indeed, as long as such a treatment is accepted as true, the problems of
4regulation will remain just that far from solution*
1 This policy does not exactly vest in consumers ownership of such 
property, but it does have the same general effect*
2 The lower federal courts have made the specific decisions 
unanimous in the negative* See Garden City v* Garden $ity Telephone, light 
& manufacturing Company, 236 Fed* Rep, 693* The Supreme Court has never 
ruled on the point*
3 Wilson, Herring, and Eutsler, Public Utility Regulation* McGraw-Hill 
Book Gos^any, Hew York, 1938, p. 246*
4 Note the following statement by Joseph B* Eastman of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission 67 X*C*C* 1$6t “It is not a sufficient answer to this 
doctrine to say that the property acquired from surplus Is owned by the 
carrier, for the rights of ownership are not absolute, but limited by the 
dedication of the property to public use and the circumstances of such 
dedications* Nor is it enough to say that the surplus might have been 
distributed to the stockholders at the time it was earned, for the public 
might well have declined to acquiesce in rates producing excess income if 
that income had not been used for the improvement of the property* “
R,H.Whitten in his Valuation of Public Service Corporations 
(as enlarged and revised by D*F* Wilcox, 2nd Edition, Banks law Publishing 
Company, 1928) takes the view that it is impossible to return excess
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The, preceding analysis has not been predicated upon the 
assumption that consumer ownership of surplus (over and above a 
fair return) is an innovation impossible of achievement. What has 
been predicated is that whatever steps are taken in this direction 
probably must come through legislation, rather than from a more firm 
and definite stand on the part of commissions.
Actually there is a quite conclusive precedent for legislation 
of this nature. The most significant body of this precedent is to be 
found in relation, to the recapture clause of the Transportation Acti aof 1920# and the Supreme Court opinion pertaining thereto. The
recapture clause, it will be recalled, permitted the Interstate Commerce
Commission to fix a proper fair return for carriers as a whole. Whatever
3any one carrier received above this fair return was to be divided one-half 
to the carrier and one-half to a commission revolving fund, to be available 
for loans to other carriers. That part of the excess retained by the
earnings to those who actually paid them. Such an argument begs the
entire question. To permit a small injury to stand in the way of
correcting a large one is certainly not objective. The built-Ap surplus, 
regardless of ownership, would benefit all consumers —  past and present. 
The only other way such a surplus could be accumulated (other than by 
consumer contributions) would be by assessment of stockholders. Such a 
policy has its points but it is an entirely different question.
1 Section 15 A, 41 Stat. La. 4881.
2 Dayton and Goose Creek R.E. Co. United States, 263 U.S. 456.
3 Originally 6 per cent —  later 3 3/4 per cent.
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carrier was to be kept in a reserve until it should amount to
5 per cent of the value of the carrier’s property, after which the
1carrier was authorized to use its share for any lawful purpose* But
most significant of all its provisions Is the declaration by the act,
Z
even as approved by the Supreme Court, that the carriers only acted as
3trustees for the public as regards all revenues exceeding fair return#
The Court reserved the right to decide when a specific prayer could be
brought as to whether the shipper or the general public should be the
beneficiary of the trust* The full implication of this decision
probably lies in the fact that if the ruling authority may legally take
one-half of excess earnings, if —  in truth —  excess is a public trust,
there can be no constitutional bar to the declaration of a 100 per cent 
5trust*
Such a step was in fact taken by the city of Laredo, Texas* 
On December 15, 1931, this city enacted an ordinance fixing gas rates for 
the city, and provided as a condition of the bond posted by the company
1 Paragraph 18 of Section 15A*
2 262 U.S. 458*
3 Loc. d t *
4 Ibid*
5 This is not a defense of the particular aptitude of the re­capture clause for carrying out its purposes. Details of regulation 
will naturally be altered as experience points new ways*
m
i
involved* that the Company should refund to th© city for the benefit of 
consumers any excess of rate# collected “over and above the rates and 
©hargee that shall be finally determined to be a fair and reasonable return 
epee the value of its property used and useful in supplying natural gas and 
natural gee service to the City of laredo," When the company later appealed
aits case to the courts* the issue of recapture was not raised.
It could appear that the real problem is not one of forcing 
courts to recognise the validity of an implied trust* but to urge 
legislatures to recognise the advantages of creating a statutory truat 
to serve the seas purpose. It nay at first seem strange that the court 
system stands ready to approve legislation on this subject but sill not 
tolerate direct action by a commission* In theory* however* the position 
of the Judiciary is perfectly sound.
It is a basic fact In capitalistic organisation that m  
investor cannot be confiscated if he knows the rules of the gams before
1 For details of the franchise see United (las Public Service Co.
£• Texas* 303 U.S. 123.
2 1M&.
3 Thompson and Smith* o p . clt,. pp. 377-37®* cite Board of Public 
Utility Commissioners g, Sew fork Telephone Company* 271 U.S. 23* as
an effective bar to the “streamlined” regulation here suggested. Perhaps 
they are right in concluding that the Sew Jersey body was urging & more 
defensible economic position than the court* But there Is a great deal of 
difference between “confiscatory1* rates to absorb an excessive depreciation 
reserve* and the recapture of excess earnings* Economically the latter 
offers a much more basic (economic) approach, although the former is an 
important problem.
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he makes a commitment • These rules apply to the specific facts 
surrounding particular investments, XT one of those facts Is a 
maximum return of 2 per cent on original cost of plant, the over-all 
expectation will simply dictate a lower value for the investment* If 
one fact is a statutory trust imposed by a legislature, that fact will 
be incorporated into the general expectations of investors, and 
investment value will be affected accordingly*
The situation is otherwise if a trust Is created by
Commission action* Such an act confronts an investor with a circumstance
he had no reason to anticipate* It la productive of a situation In
which an individual finds himself possessed of an investment value
procured according to terms that would not have been satisfactory had
all the facts been known* Briefly, such action taken by a commission
directly abrogates choice by obstructing the operation of free will. Such
a result is confiscation in our society* Thus the courts have reason
to distinguish between legislation and administrative decision in this 
2
regard*
The third and final step to be suggested here, by way of 
conforming commission procedure to the necessities dictated by the modern
1 Bote that both the recapture clause and the Laredo case represented 
specific legislative action* Of course a consistent commission policy can 
be anticipated by an investor, but there is always the initial confiscation 
when the policy is first Inaugurated*
2 See Schechter Poultry Co* x* United States, 295 U.S, 195*
xn
economy is the asst extreme of all* mat is more to the point, perhaps,
this suggestion is the most isqportant. Xt involves a "formula" for the
automatic determination of return*
Ifflaodiately it will be urged that a "formula” for calculating
fair return is prlaa facia unconstitutional* As authority for such an
objection, Vest x* Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company will be cited*
There is, however, a vast difference between a rate-fixing formula, as a
general proposition, and the use of a peculiarly weighted group of index
numbers for calculating valuation. In the first place, the theory behind
the Maryland Commission's system was quite dubious, and, what is most
pertinent for our study, the court did not object to the formula as such,
but only to its results in the particular case* In fact the court
considered the greatest defect in the method of valuation used to be the
fact that it permitted the utility "to claim to the last dollar an increased
value consequent upon a sudden and precipitate rise in spot prices of2
materials and labor? Xn that connection the court pointed out that the
owner of public utility property may not "pass on to the public the risk
3involved in a general decline in values." Xn short, the judiciary did
1 295 9*3. 662* Xn this litigation the Supreme Court disapproved 
a valuation based on a series of index numbers • Most of the remarks of 
the court were directed against the use of these index numbers as a 
"rate-making formula*"
2 Loo- cit.
3 hoc, clt* The court obviously recognized that this rate de­
termination would have to do for a number of years, and therefore must 
be better than a guess.
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that this method had neglected certain important factor a* It thus 
can not he conclusively stated that the court will reject formulas on
aprinciple, even though it did reject a formula in 1933*
The reasoning of the Maryland Commission in reducing valuation 
to a weighting of price indices is so important to our general topic 
that it must be further analyzed* The aim of the Commission was Ho give 
to investors an investment dollar of constant purchasing power; that is,
3exchangeable dollars invested in place of present exchangeable dollars*1 
To thus assume that valuation, or any other single factor in 
rate regulation, can or should be held responsible for the basic problem 
of pries fluctuations in regulated industries is to miss the point of 
regulation theory* Control has an over-all purpose to minimize the cost 
of utility service to consumers* Any policy contributory to this end has 
an initial justification* Any policy not contributory to this end has no
1 In a strong dissent Justice Stone Interprets the decision as 
not facing the substantive problem of confiscation, but concentrating 
on the procedural problem of method* The Commission had allowed a set 
of rates that would have produced somewhat more than 5 per cent on the 
valuation of the district court* The court had specified 6 per cent as 
the ■rtnirniia return that would avoid confiscation* Clearly, then, the 
majority had faced the substantive issue even though the point was not 
stressed* Whether 5 per cent was or was not confiscatory is not to be 
determined here*
2 See Virginia Law Review* November, 1935, PP* 73-83; and Harvard 
Law Review* March, 1938, pp. 835-893* Perhaps the controversy on this 
point can only be dissolved by another case* It is unfortunate that the 
Supreme Court is frequently ambiguous on some really important points*
3 295 C*S* 862.
m
such Initial justification* This fact the Court wisely recognized
la outlining the defects of the Commission*s procedure*
It could probably he demonstrated that a rate-making formula
is both desirable and inevitable* Obviously rate-fixing must follow a
set of principles if it is to be accurate and just* Principles, by very
nature, set forth the reasons for making one type of determination as
against another type* These reasons are by definition formulae, though
they may not be embellished with all the precision of mathematical
calculation* Almost by definition a formula means the application of
2
reason, while no formula means arbitrary regulation*
Xn addition to being inevitable a formula for purposes of 
fixing rates in regulated industries is also desirable* Definiteness 
of approach not only gives regulators a staff to lean upon, but it furnishes 
the public utility investor with a basis for his calculations* ^conony 
as to fair return necessitates securing capital on as favorable terms as 
possible* Thus the investor must be approached with terms he is in a 
position to appreciate* The most basic of these terms is knowledge of the
1 Loc. cit* All this is further explanation of the substantive 
nature of the approach of the majority* The fact of confiscation is not 
without time dimension, although the immediate result is an important Item*
2 "In fact, it is quite impossible for those concerned with so 
difficult a problem as rate making to avoid the use of a more or less 
definite formula*H Bernstein, £2* cit,* p* 121*
x %
rules of the game* With these clearly stated, capital can be obtained
1
such more easily than otherwise. In fact there is very little more,
•loner lines involving fair return* that a commission can do to assure the 
economical acquisition of capital.
The element of uncertainty surrounding a public utility 
security has two sourcest first* the normal uncertainty that troubles 
every economic organization in a dynamic society; second* the uncertainty 
that accompanies the possibility of adverse commission decisions lowering 
net returns* From whichever cause* uncertainty is the basic fact that
a
raises the cost of capital to a utility enterprise* It is a long-
recognised fact* by commissions and courts alike* that the second type
of uncertainty should be avoided by prohibiting what is known as "arbitrary*
3action by commissions* But it has not been universally agreed as to the
1 "One of the prime requisites of a flourishing economic develop­
ment is that those who take initiative and assume responsible leader­
ship shall know what to expect * and shall be able to count on the con­
sequence of their own acts and those of other persons with whom they 
have dealings.1* Clark* og* cit.» p. 143*
Z Unexpected high returns and unexpected low returns affect 
the capitalised worth of an investment by making it speculative* Speculative 
capital invariably is more expensive to the utility than non-speculatIve 
capital.
3 This follows from the legal principle that no individual is to be 
treated except as a member of a class* If regulation follows a pattern* 
thus* the investor (theoretically) can apply the principles involved to 
his own ease*
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role regulation should play in avoiding (or permitting) natural
uncertainties that tend to disrupt investor calculations. It is in
this sphere that it is thought a formula ©an be of greatest value.
It has been urged of late with increasing frequency that the
basic investment uncertainty resides in the residuality of net income
1
particularly common stock income, thus the common stock contract would 
be a logical beginning for an attempt to minimize uncertainty*
The conmon stock contract customarily carries neither maxi­
mum nor minimum return. Thus almost all uncertainty Inherent in the 
enterprise rests with the commcr* stock investment as residual. This 
uncertainty is present within the limits of sero per cent and infinity 
in the abstract situation, and between zero per cent and, say, 30 per cent 
in the concrete utility world. If this uncertainty could be concentrated
into & smaller range, utility capital could be secured for less over-all 
2
cost.
The specific regulatory innovation to complete the list 
of three offered is that all contracts for capital be made to carry a
1 Jones and Bigham, op. clt.i Morgan, ojd. cit.8 Prudent 
Investment Bill, op. cit.
2 "...But this factor of uncertainty must be eliminated for 
the future if we are to exercise workable rate regulation. The rate of 
return must be equally definite with the rate base for effective public 
control,*1 Bauer, o£. cit.. p. 255*
X9&
X
maximum rata of return, It la probably unnecessary to outline the
mechanical detalla of such a proposition, Aa to euch details the
writer will accept the procedure suggested in New York* a Prudent2
Investment Bill of 1930.
Xn equating rights and responsibilities, cost and prices
■net be matched* Ultimately this requirement means that economic rents
are not to be collected by the factors of production* In the capital
market investment valuation is a process of equating expectations to
changing market conditions. The problem of fair return centers on
preventing this process from bringing to persons economic advantages
apart from legitimate expectations* flIn the issuance of all such
securities, there are always fairly certain assumptions on the basis of
which investors contribute capital to public service. The natural basis
of determining the return would be according to the expectations of the
3investors at the tl—  they bought the securitiesg In no other way can 
factor sacrifice be equitably adjusted to consumer sacrifice*
X Of course, a minimum rate of return could not be fixed unless 
accompanied by an outright guarantee* The residual claims must have some 
element of residuality, with which to buffer altered circumstances. 
Guarantee of common stock dividends is not Contemplated here,
2 For convenience the reader may refer to Barnes, 1,B*, gases, 
on Public Utility Regulation. (F,S, Grofts k Go,, New York, 193®*) Pp•4&7 
ff*, for a reproduction of the pertinent portions of this document*
3 Bau*r Gold, PubUa Utility Valuation & £  PfflEPftfM St Sa&& SSBliai* (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934*)P* 16. Emphasis supplied.
Present procedure 1argely follows th® above outline only
as to bonds and preferred stock, Xn the e©mmon stock field, however, a
new Issue requires, not only that the expectations ©f new investors be
satisfied to meet the requirements of a con5>etitive capital market, but
that eadLsting^holders must also be allowed to participate in existing
expectations* In terms of return requirement the present proposal of a
maximum return to common stock would operate in favor of consumers in
time of rising expectations, and against consumers in times of falling
expectations• But in terms of reducing uncertainty, the plan would operate
2
in favor of consumers at all times*
The consequence of current technique m y  be summarily 
illustrated* Consider a utility corporation with $1,000,000 common 
stoek outstanding, issued at a time when investment value was calculated 
at ten times average annual dividends (yield of 10 per cent)* How the 
company finds it necessary to raise more capital and discovers that, all 
things considered, the eonBon stock medium is the most efficient method 
of raising additional capital* However, the management finds that the 
general level of expectations is now 11 per cent rather than the 10 per cent
1 Jones and Bigham, o£. cit* pp. 27& ff. This selection also 
m  & criticism of the Bauer proposal, which is not fundamentally
different*
2 See Braudels1 separate opinion in Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Company v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, 262 0*3, 276, for
an excellent critical background for these statements*
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Xaccompanying the original issue.
Here this an issue of bonds, or even preferred stock, no 
concession would be necessary with reference to original holders. But 
with cooBon stock the usual practice is to simply reduce the amount 
of "unissued capital stock,14 and increase the amount of Mcapital stock 
outstanding*11 Xn all stxch eases the old participates on exactly the 
sane basis as the new*
3The proposed plan would operate differently. The original 
holder would be left with his original expectations (in so far as earnings 
were adequate). The new holder would participate in the new expectations, 
Heither would be confiscated. Neither would receive any factor rentals 
(positive or negative) as a part of return*
It is clear that the above is not passive regulation. However, 
today* s capitalism is beyond the point where we can be assured that charges 
to consumers can be reduced by determining a per cent as fair return. It 
would be necessary to regularize and cumulate dividends on common stock. 
Reinvestment of earnings would probably have to take the form of stock 
dividends, and made never to exceed the accumulated dividend coming to 
stockholders ,
1 "For the future, we should be perfectly clear that we cannot escape 
the amrket requirements in obtaining capital, We must pay the interest or 
rate of return that will be required. But, let it be equally clear that 
this does not require, at any point, a readjustment of return on past invest*- 
merits* It applies only at the time the funde are obtained," Bauer, Op .cit., 
p. 250.
2 Xn many cases, of course, the old holder and the new are Identical 
persons. The current technique, however, Is no more defensible because of 
this faet*
3 Jones and Bighorn, g&* cit* Bee also Prudent Investment Bill* op.cit.
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The ©uilias of fair return here set forth does not provide
an incentive for better entrepreneurship* But that does not mean that
there ©an be no incentive. To let return be flexible to the extent of
rewarding good management is to take the position that common stock
dividends are wages rather than a return to capital, Suppose, for
example, that the president of a utility owns 5 per cent of the common
stock of his company* % y  should the other 95 per cent of the stock
receive 1 per cent higher dividends merely because the company wishes
to express appreciation for good entrepreneurship? A company that has a
1good president should pay him extra, not the common stockholders*
Actually regulation is endeavoring to get away from executive
control over the stock of corporations. It has been found that executive2
manipulations of capital structure have been a frequent result. Regulators 
should examine very carefully any technique that divorces the executive 
from capital structure. There is no good reason why an executive should 
look upon dividends as his remuneration for efficiency.
There are other and more legitimate incentives for good 
management. There is, for example, the incentive of comparative workmanship*
1 Incentives are excellently treated in Morgan, op. cit. The 
view here presented is similar to the one outlined by the above author.
Above all Morgan feels that profit should not be the criteria of 
efficiency in a public utility industry,
2 Part of the task of the S.£#C, in regulating security issuance is the 
elimination of these eases.
An executive knows, and he knows that c or tain other people know, whether 
or not he is doing a good job* %bh a set of coâ parative statistics 
regulatory commissions themselves can determine this within fairly definite 
Unite. There are many entrepreneur a who take a genuine pride In their 
accompli ehaents * 1® fa*1 to© narrow a view of entrepreneurs in
general and one warranted only in part «■— that they are motivated only
a
by monetary rewards.
In addition to the above, executives move within a highly 
competitive environment, and stand in a very favorable competitive 
position* The more clear-out the competitive position,the more obvious 
are opportunity costs in a given case* And the more obvious are opportunity 
costs, the more clearly visible are economic rents when they appear*
If an entrepreneur feels himself to be abused, he may offer 
himself to another group of stockholders* In many cases it will be to 
the interest of utility customers to prevent this transfer of employment*
Xn such a ease his salary will need to be raised to remove the temptation 
to quit present employment * If he feels he should be allowed to
1 This is a comparatively new field of regulation* The Federal 
Power Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Interstate Commerce 
CoHilssion, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission are all actively interested in this phase of social 
control*
2 Thor stein Veblen, o£. cit** did much to popularise this 
point of view* Bore recently, however, the struggle for power has been 
given greater weight as entrepreneurial incentive* Burnham, lames, The
Revolution* (The John Day Go*, Inc., Bew fork, 1941.)
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participate in profit*, he may am* to a non-regul&ted Industry* Here 
again hie salary can be raised to rernove testation* the feet that 
rents occur in other industries is no argument for their a H m m m  in 
publie service industries* This is not, of course, the sane as saying 
that other-industrjMrents do not affect "necessary* costs in regulated 
industries*
In short, there is no cost coining under the heading of
necessary that cannot be provided for better than by a deliberated flexible
retuns* fair return is residual as the legal equivalent of an economic
fact and is therefore not a "catchall*1. A direct charge is always to be
preferred to an indirect one*
The idea of an average return is not m w  in regulation theory*
1MoCb writers of repute recognize this need*
There is an Important relationship between average return 
and the present suggestion of limiting dividends on common (and preferred 
if necessary) stock* Under present technique, an excess revenue above 
fair return can be paid out of dividends* These surplus dividends have 
the effect of causing speculative flurries in capitalised expectations* 
These flurries, as indicated earlier, cannot result in lower capital costs, 
but always in higher capital costs*
It should be clear, then, that expoctational-tlme-disaension 
can only be enforced through dividend controls* It Is scarcely an
1 The best presentation can be found in the JPg udmk Xwr9f)tm)t& 
mil cited above*
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argument that many concerns do make a more op lass consistent effort 
to regularise dividend payments. Such concerns would not be injured 
by the contemplated regulations, while consumers and investors of other 
concerns would be positively aided* In this way a final step could be 
taken in the direction of waking regulation conform more nearly to the 
regulatory ideal despite the environmental changes making precise control 
more difficult*
The legal aspects of this third and last suggestion for
"streamlining" regulation are both interesting and instructive* Casual
thought would seem to dictate that a maximum dividend on common stock
would be contrary to the governing rules of the day* Two factors
contribute to this thought* First, the present opposite practice is
widespread and firmly entrenched* Second, it Is manifest nonsense that
a law would punish & corporation for not making a profit, which would
follow if maxi mum dividends were treated in the same way as bond interest*
However, the legality of a certain activity must begin
with an examination of the sovereign power that sponsors the particular
activity under consideration* "It is universally recognised in this
country that legislative authority is essential to the creation of a 
1
corporation* * Thus we must look to the law of the land to discover
1 Frost, Thomas 0*, Incorporation and Organisation o£ Corporations* 
(little, Brown,and Company, Boston, 1906*) Second Edition, p* 10*
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the details of this creation. For If a corporation must look to a
law for its very right to be, it must assuredly look to this same law
^ _  1 for its subsidiary right to be one thing as contrasted with another*
Perhaps the best approach to the indicated analysis would be
the analogy of the preferred stock* Although a legal distinction can be
made between bonds and stocks In this regard, the case for a distinction
between two stocks is much less clear. A bond is the collection of legal
rights and duties, likewise a stock is a collection of legal rights and
duties. But the two sets of rights and duties are sufficiently different
2
to justify distinction.
The next question is not so easily settled* It has reference 
to the distinction between preferred stock and common stock* True, each of 
these is a collection of legal rights and duties. These rights and duties 
have a source car sources from which they spring# If the source Is the 
same in the two eases, there is no reason why legislation could not legally 
fuse the two in the way indicated.
Stocks reeeive their basic sanction from common law. Bonds 
do likewise* But the common law does not make a stock a preferred or a
1 Chief Justice Marshall, Dartmouth College Case. "Being the mere 
creature of law, it (the corporation) possesses only those properties 
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as 
incidental to its very existence." U Wheat. 51S*
2 A bond stems from the old common law of debtor-creditor 
relationships. A stock has origin in the common law of ownership. That is 
why present legal-residual technique is rooted much too deeply to be 
caeually altered. It is most significant to note, however, that the above 
distinction has nothing to do with incorporation as such.
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eosmon stock* It makes these sliqply stocks* *̂at, then, makes a stock
* preferred or e seamen east The answer to this question 1® given most
dearly by William ?» Granges *lt should be emphasised that the
preferred stockholder will ret no special right or privilege unless It is
written Into the charter, and, on the other hand, he will not be excluded
from any of the rights enjoyed by a common stockholder, unless It Is so 
1
provided.n
Sow If a stock becomes a preferred stock only through a
charter, and if charters are obtained only through the exercise of the
Z
sovereignty of the state, it must follow that a common stock Is turned 
into a preferred stock by a grant of the state. If, then, a state can
3turn some stock into preferred stock, it can do the same with all stock.
Our question has now basically delimited Itself* $e began 
by asking if the prevailing legal system could enforce maximum dividends 
upon common stock* It now seems that this could result from legislation 
differing only slightly from that now in operation*
X Corporation Î JL tSSL %TA°S£g SM  &i£2S&£££« (®»« Ronald Praaa Company, lew fork, 1935V) P* 215*
2 A cession stock is a common law certificate of ownership* A 
preferred stock is similarly a certificate of ownership but dressed in a 
modern garb*
3 A corollary of this Is that, obviously, by merely changing the 
n**# of a circulating claim, one cannot alter its substantive content* All 
of the stock of the Great northern Railway Company Is preferred stock* Yet 
It has ail the residuality that normally accompanies common stock*
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Fundamentally and realistically th© corporation© themselves
JBSE&& ®«t. "Where corporations are not restrained by their ©barter©
they may adopt all reasonable modes in the execution of their business
1
which a natural person might adopt in the exercise of similar powers1*, 
it does not follow that legislation may enforce any arrangement that may 
be entered into voluntarily fey the parties concerned. In this ease, 
however, the arrangement coniejspl&ted lies wholly within the sovereign 
authority. Such a situation is m  open door to legislation if and when 
a legislature decides to act. Thus the law need not depend upon voluntary 
action.
The author is under no illusions about destroying residuality 
by the simple expedient of changing the law. Residuality is an economic 
phenomenon that has no connection with legal technicalities. The thought 
Imre is, and this thought can well be re~emph&sic©d, that the three 
suggestions offered here, taken in conjunction with each other, can serve 
to reduce the effects of the inevitable residuality of modern business 
organization, and minimize the confiscation Inevitable in regulation of 
this organization.
It seems pertinent at this point to draw together the thread 
of discussion of which the past three chapters are only a part. This 
analysis of ways in v&lch regulation could be modernized Is, after all, 
only intended as a point of departure for a contrast to the actual
X Supremo Court of Missouri, 47 Mo. 425*
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technique of modernising control to bo presented in the following chapter*
Regulation of return ia the residual regulatory act* It is 
rebidual for precisely the same reason that fair return itself (capital cost) 
is residual,The control problem is to make the legal facts cons!stent with 
the pertinent ecoaosdc facts* This Is the focal point of regulation*
The choice that a government makes in deciding the extent of 
regulations to impose upon a utility is not Mto confiscatat or "not to 
confiscate"; but how to confiscate* Any correction of a past injustice 
(failure to equate rights and responsibilities) can be made only through 
the process of taking away that which was gained unjustly. This type of 
control is confiscation because it cuts across the lines of choice* or 
violates the free will upon which the society is predicated. This is an 
important problem of regulation* although it is not the problem of fair 
return*
The problem of fair return grows out of the necessity of 
confiscation in the regulatory process* Starting with the assumption that 
confiscation is undesirable* fair return control is principally dedicated 
to the minimization of confiscation* making it as little necessary as 
possible* and making its Incidence as little felt as possible* Minor 
confiscations* ill-chosen* can be as violative of philosophy as major 
Confiscations * carefully selected* Unnecessary confiscations (in the 
sense thvt a similar result could be obtained otherwise) are still worse*
Thus the problem of fair return is to keep confiscation to a bare minimum 
(necessary)* and to apportion necessary confiscation in an equitable manner*
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The present technique of regulation is to utilise an 
arbitrary percentage of value as fair return, without relating it in 
absolute amount to investor expectations• Such an approach would not 
be serious but for the fact that if the return allowed is greater or 
less than an economic fair return, the difference is capitalised as 
negative or positive rent against the consumer* This Is precisely 
shat regulation alms to avoid*
To better the over-all approach to fair return, suggestions 
were made* The first involved making fair return the test of reasonable­
ness* Standing alone this technique would serve only to keep rates 
fluctuating up or down according to whether the utility was earning less 
or more than a fair return* It would, however, prevent over - and under- 
returns from being capitalized against the consumer*
The second suggestion is intended to make the first more 
concrete and practicable* Specifically it is to provide that all excess 
earnings be held in trust for consumers* Carrying out this suggestion 
would provide a basic autoaaaticity in rate regulation* The net result 
of this automaticity would be to provide for the operation of the first 
suggestion over a longer period of time* Xn short, it would allow the 
advantages of making fair return a test of reasonableness, but would 
operate against rate instability*
The third suggestion strikes much more at the heart of 
private enterprise than either of the first two* It provides for a 
limitation of capital return through maximum dividends* From this point 
regulation would permit a very wide executive discretion in fixing rates
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on the basis of actual economic condition, while at the same time 
predicating control upon the exacting time-dimension business sphere 





















































o^ oC *He %
>
8 | •H H
& 8
































It was somewhat arbitrary in actual cases which group would be so 
da signaled, the degree of arbitrariness that developed provided a 
rough measure of the degree to which rights and responsibilities 
eould not be equated through the simple technique first enunciated 
by the courts*
Xn regard to the scope of regulation as well* inelasticity 
made the sharp line of demarcation.less clear* Inelasticity is a 
phenomenon attaching to a greater or lesser extent to all business rather 
than being limited in effect to a few industries* Fixed cost and 
tendency to monopoly — - the two principal inelasticities —  and a 
consequent •unequal1 relationship to the public is characteristic of the 
steel industry or the automobile industry in the same way (if not to the 
same-extent) as of the utility industries* Even within the utility 
category itself the influence of this fact has been felt in that today 
there is much less homogeneity than fifty years ago* there is very 
little, for example, that is comaon between the distribution of milk and 
the distribution of electric light and power* Tet both industries are 
classified as utilities before the law*
The development of capitalisation, too, contributed its 
share to both the lllogic and the impossibility of the original adjustment* 
With respect to the extent of regulation the Intention behind the concept 
of confiscation was thct whereas utilities could legitimately be regulated 
intensively yet a limit was to be imposed* Hence a certain operating 
result was postulated as representing an exact equation of rights and
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responsibilities* As an economic formulation predicated upon a somewhat 
outdated conception of property, the regulatory tool fashioned to produce 
the required result —  fair return on a fair value *—» was reasonable*
With a high degree of development in capital markets and a redefinition of 
property, the strictures against confiscation lost much of their effect­
iveness in protecting regulated industries from an excess of control* A» 
a consequence regulation was found in need of modification*
As regards the scope of regulation, capitalisation had wide­
spread effects* With the realization that once intensive regulation was 
legitimized business organization was to a degree at the mercy of society 
the classification of an Industry as a public utility became a matter of 
grave concern* Yo longer could confiscation be defined as a given level 
of inflow* Bather it became a reduction in the level of inflow to a 
person or a concern* Since one of the primary purposes of regulation was 
to correct for the future an undesirable situation that had arisen from 
the past, extreme hesitancy necessarily characterized the actual designation 
of an industry as a utility* At the same time, interpreted in terms of the 
entire pattern of change involved here, nuch of the significance of the 
utility category in regulation disappeared*
This summary of the Impossibilities and illoglcr introduced 
into the social control picture by two basic environmental developments has 
not endeavored to Isolate the ramifications contributing to impossibility 
from those contributing to illogiw* This has been deliberate* It could 
not be too strongly emphasised that these are two Interrelated ways of
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viewing the 9a m  thing. Social philosophy Is built within a framework 
bounded by both the undesirable and the impossible* Thus society as a 
i W *  and individuals in particular are oriented to the desirable as 
partially defined by the possible, end to the possible as partially defined 
by the desirable* This suggests and again emphasises the very significant 
fact that social philosophy is both oause and effect* In the present 
context philosophy as cause dictated an adjustment that was possible and 
desirable. As effect philosophy developed into a somewhat different ssold 
as various social changes made the indicated adjustment loss possible and 
less desirable*
To tills point attention has been focused upon philosophy 
as cause, and upon modifications of the economic environment* Equally 
important non is the problem of translating these modifications into 
philosophy as effect*
Basically philosophy as effect has been altered in two 
says* First, modifications have been instituted in shat may be called 
negative regulation, both as to scope and extent; while at the same time 
there has developed what may be termed positive regulation. In the 
following discussion of these modifications in philosophy the greatest 
detail dll be reserved for treatment of changes in negative extent of 
regulation, since it is at this point that utilities as such are principally 
involved* The development of positive control will be discussed in outline 
only*
It will be remembered that the function intended for the 
public utility concept was to separate through use of a reasonable 
principle those businesses that could be intensively regulated and those 
that could not. The principle used in making this determination was the 
p*ablie interest. Industries in such a position with respect to the 
public that they could substantially alter consumer alternatives (monopoly 
price and discrimination) are to be regulated* Others are not.
After a certain amount of experience with this adjustment* 
however* it became evident that the symptoms contributing to the need for 
regulation were possessed by utilities to the exclusion of other Industries 
only in degree, taay industries to some extent began to show a tendency 
to monopoly and joint cost very similar to that shown by the utilities.
Since it was unthinkable that the utility category be materially 
broadened in the face of an underlying bias against regulation* some way 
had to be found to dose this growing gap between the intended results 
and the actual results.
the search for e compromise approach was* of course* 
directed in large part by social philosophy. The ideal economic 
organisation contemplated by philosophy was free competition precisely 
equating rights and responsibilities. The problem posed* thus* was that 
of fostering the competitive norm for non-utilities without intensive 
regulation. The solution decided upon was the enforcement of competition throdj* 
legislation such as the Sherman and Clayton acts* and through numerous 
lass' comprehensive controls imposed by both the Federal Government and by 
the several States.
2U
Bnforcement of competition, although reducible to a single 
pattern as to purpose and method, taken three distinct forms* £ach 
foapa is designed for a specific type of violation of the competitive 
norm* and endeavors to restore the norm in a manner commensurate with 
the departure from the norm*
The first type of violation is that of expansion by a single 
concern until it is sufficiently large to control significantly the 
output of an entire industry and hence to control prices to the public* 
Such a concern is able to exert a larger degree of power over its 
environment than can be reciprocated by the environment* Ihe resultant 
inequality society endeavors to formally correct by the expediency of 
9breaking up9 the concern into several operating units and thus increasing 
the degree of coe$>etltion»
So obvious Is this type of violation that business men normally 
sought to organize with a greater degree of subterfuge* Thus a more 
typical case is the concentration of power through agreement rather than 
through outright monopoly by a single firm* This procedure Is commonly 
referred to as 9combination in restraint of trade9, and the defense by 
formal society is to be alert to simultaneous action by ostensible 
competitors and to prevent a recurrence of such action by appropriate 
measures*
While philosophy does act to limit activities in the above 
two directions, it at the same time recognizes that such limitations 
can be carried too far* A large part of individualism, for example, has 
come to be concretely associated with high production and low cost* To a
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certain extent largeness in industry assures this result. Too much 
breaking up of large concerns, therefore, would be in Itself a violation 
©f the mass-production principle* And, as can be readily perceived, 
achievement of a golden mean in this case must be extremely difficult* A larg 
part of individualism has likewise come to be associated with stability in 
industry, for poverty and inequities occur from economic fluctuations* It is 
quite generally agreed that to a certain extent combination, by avoiding 
destructive competition and consequent bankruptcy, may help to prevent 
the extreme degrees of fluctuations* Here too an excess of control is 
itself a violation, and the entire situation is too complex to permit of 
the easy establishment of a mean*
The third type of violation of the competive norm is through 
& technique commonly referred to as unfair competition* Here unreciprocated 
power develops not by too little competition but through the use of a variety , 
of competition that is deemed by the philosophy to be ’unfair** Thug an 
individual may not tell exaggerated falsehoods about his competitors1 
product, although he may refer to his own product as superior to the entire 
class of competing products* Likewise an individual may not make 
preposterous claims for his own product, although he is permitted a certain 
amount of ’puffing* of his product* Finally, an individual may not use 
violence or coercion In any way to destroy a competitor’s business or 
build up his own.
It la clear from the above that in extending regulation 
to the noẑ -ut ill ties both the direction taken and the restraint exercised
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by control were carefully dictated by social philosophy* This double 
action by philosophy is essential to the creation of a reasonably 
Integrated adjustment. Unless integration is achieved in large part 
disturbing contradictions arise that gradually near away the substance 
of community*
Despite this obvious struggle for integration, the extension 
of the scope of regulation does result in a large element of inconsistency*
As control is expanded the freedom dimension of social philosophy is 
correspondingly sacrificed. It is true, of course, that the sacrifice of 
freedom is rather directly in the interest of the equality dimension of 
individualism. However, the existence of inconsistency is an important fact, 
further reference to which will be made in greater detail at a later point*
It follows from the above analysis that the principal 
modification of the scope of regulation had to do with the extension of 
control to non-utilities. This development would itself have destroyed 
much of the significance of the utility category. Another development 
parallelled this one, however, and contributed to the same result. As the 
consequences of control —  confiscation —  became more apparent there 
appeared a greater reluctance on the part of society to thus classify 
an industry* This reluctance stemmed in part from the logic of the situation, 
and in part from the resistance of vested interests to the extremes of 
control* Due to this reluctance semi-utility controls were placed upon 
certain industries as a substitute for placing them in the utility category* 
As a consequence this category tended to lose even more real social meaning.
Utility regulation as such m s much mere directly affected 
by modifications in the extent of regulation than by modifications in 
the scope of regulation. These industries were, after all, the industries 
which had folt regulatory restraint In the greatest degree* therefore 
ehangee haring to do with extending the scope of regulation could not 
but affect such industries only slightly. Adjustments haring to do with 
the extent of regulation, on the other hand, necessarily had to be in 
the nature of retreat* For this reason the utilities themselves sere 
most intimately concerned with these adjustments*
Modifications In the extent of regulation took tee primary 
directions* In the first place, the precise approach contemplated for 
controlling the rate level m m  modified} and In the second place, the 
equally precise approach contea$>lated for controlling the rate structure 
see modified*
To properly equate rights and responsibilities In terms of the 
rate level It is essential that* (1) the total entity representing the 
business be capable of precise definition} (2) that the flow of rights to 
the business regulated be capable of precise Comparison with the competitive 
norm} and (3) that only conditions Identical with those defined be actually 
allowed* The principal tool developed to accomplish these three interlocking 
ends was ’fair return on a fair value1*
Of the two sides to this concept the fair value side has 
received by far the greatest amount of attention. Had it been the universal 
disposition of regulators to follow regulation through to its ultimate
2X8
conclusions* this diproportionate emphasis might have contributed 
serious result#* Actually* of course* granting the above disposition* 
a disproportionate emphasis could have been Impossible* however* 
since the disposition of regulators was not to universally pursue the 
ultimate consequences of control the result can not be said to be serious* 
Assuming rather a disposition to compromise* as is the basic thesis of 
this dissertation* and the emphasis upon fair value simply stems from 
that fact* The same general compromise results could have been attained 
through elasticity of either fair return or fair value* It happens that 
the one selected as the primary source of elasticity was fair value* A 
reasonable hypothesis as to why this is so would seem to be that fair value 
is the more vague of the two terms and hence the one most strenuously 
called into question by interests opposing regulation*
Throughout the history of modification of regulation fair 
value has represented some value between polar approaches — * reproduction 
cost and historical cost* The academic defense of reproduction cost largely 
hinges around what has been called the competitive analogy* Thus it is 
argued that in good times if business in general is earning a high return 
so also should utilities* and vice versa* The academic defense of 
historical cost maintains on the other hand that consistency and continuity 
in regulation demand that a fixed value be adopted* and that the only 
proper fixed base is historical cost*
It is interesting and significant to note that no large group 
in our society has been consistent in its interpretation of fair value*
m
Property interects defend historical cost when value* are low and 
reproduction coat when values are high* Consumer interests# on the other 
hand# defend historical cost when values are high and reproduction cost 
shea values are low* Even the Supreme Court# which fact should really cause 
surprise# has vacillated considerably# giving more weight to reproduction 
cost in times of high values and more weight to historical cost in times 
of low values* the only conclusion# it would seem# that could validly be 
drawn from this pattern of inconsistency is that fair value is a fulcrum 
for use in adjusting social philosophy to conform with existing conditions* 
the means by which it Is so used is through polar definitions by 
opposing parties# within a sphere wherein philosophy as currently applied 
is producing a basic inconsistency, the resultant compromise being in lieu 
of open conflict*
Fair return# although never as important a factor in 
regulation aa fair value# has had a similar history* Xt# too# has been 
used much store to furnish an elasticity to regulation (with a pretense in the 
direction of objectivity) than to add precision*
The forces operating to produce flexibility and compromise 
in the treatment of fair return are again the property owner on the one 
hand and the consumer on the other* Fyoperty owners plead for a high rate 
in prosperous years# while consumers plead for a low rate in prosperous 
years* Property owners advance the thesis that fair return should 
fluctuate# idiile consumers believe it should be stable* $ith these two 
forces in operation it is not at all surprising that actual practice is
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somewhere between the variability that would characterize the utility 
without regulation and the inflexibility that would be characteristic 
of regulation if the earlier adjustment had been rigidly adhered to*
In that original formulation by the courts, it will be 
remembered, there was eontesqplated a single degree of economic power 
over others and a situation in which rights were known in advance. On both 
of these counts and disregarding the operation of the business cycle 
the philosophy probably demanded a fixed rate of return as well as a fixed 
valuation. That this was a reasonable demand is more or less attested to 
by the fact that prior to 1900 the business cycle was much less of an 
all-pervasive feature of our economy than today.
However, with the development of cyclical fluctuation as an 
economic problem of the first magnitude, the fair return adjustment became 
isoediately more complex, and the forces on both sides became eommensurately 
more insistent. The situation for regulation was a difficult one. On the 
one hand technical adherence to the philosophy would have still demanded 
an inflexible return. This is true since the capitalization process had 
developed to a point where it was quite capable of adjusting actual dollar 
returns to the state of the market. On the other hand, regulation could 
not place Itself in the position of seeming to confiscate by denying the 
existence of the business cycle phenomenon.
Stated in terms of previous analysis, the crux of the 
development of the cycle as a major factor in economic life was the growth 
of a much greater degree of dynamism than assumed by the philosophy, coupled
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with a leaser degree of business adaptability to dynamic conditions*
It follows that & degree of inelasticity developed that the philosophy 
could not cope with except by itself giving away somewhat in the process* 
This the philosophy did do through compromise and through a lesser degree 
of control than was originally contemplated.
It perhaps needs r©emphasis at this point that the principal 
compromise in rate level was fair value rather than fair return# Despite 
this fact, however, control of fair return does exhibit interesting and 
revealing usee in the interest of elasticity in regulation# Pennsylvania, 
through her regulatory commission, adopted 7 per cent aa a fair return for 
all classes of utilities under all types of circumstances for a period of 
more than twenty years following the first World War* During this period 
there were numbers of cases of Pennsylvania utilities earning far more than 
7 per cent# The California Commission, long recognized as one of the 
stronger of the State Commissions, has been upheld In historical cost 
valuations because of a deliberate policy of liberality in fair return 
allowances# Many other regulatory bodies through sheer Inactivity implicitly 
provide for returns amounting virtually to whatever a utility can earn for 
long period of time#
The Supreme Court has contributed to this tendency in 
regulation by frequently referring to a ’zone of reasonableness * * Thus a 








ha* la mind la adhering to this ‘aoae* la that the real problem of 
defining return la legislative* Following from this- %he courts will not 
substitute their judgment within the Halts indicated* However, regulator®, 
confronted by a complex situation and conflicting forces they can resolve 
in no other way, have tended to seise upon this device as justification for 
a policy that is not at all precisely worked out in terms of the earlier 
applications of philosophy.
A final way In which control over the rate level has been 
modified is in the direction of what has been called ‘paternalism* in 
regulation, or the demand for special consideration by the utilities in 
times of economic depression, this demand began with a sisals endeavor to 
solve the problem of an average return for regulated industries In the 
face of violent ups and downs in business fortunes* is regulation expanded 
in extent, the need for an average return was intensified, and the claim 
became virtually one for a guaranteed return* this last, of course, was 
never contemplated by the ideal, and compromise on this score evolved because 
of the seme general changes in the environment that resulted in the various 
other modifications of the earlier approach*
This semi-paternalism —  typified In railroad regulation 
by specific legislation requesting the Interstate Commerce Commission to 
consider the revenue needs of the carriers in determining rate levels 
indicates a somewhat new emphasis in control* From a pattern of restricting 
property in the Interest of the public, the environment has evolved until 
the obverse technique Is required in some instances of protecting property 
in the public interest, this technique is dictated by the equality
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dimension of philosophy Just as is property restriction#
It has been emphasised that return can not be actually 
guaranteed through regulation as long as the competitive norm is used 
as a guide. But if the utilities are by definition so important to the 
public that they must be controlled, it follows that they are important 
enough to be kept operative even under adverse economic circumstances*
At this point negative control begins to merge into positive regulation* 
this merger and some of its major consequences will be discussed at a 
later point in this chapter*
Attention is frequently called to the fact that in the prowess 
of adjusting regulation to the facts of the environment compromise has 
typically operated in favor of property* Technically, of course, this 
result, would not be compromise. However, this appearance of greater 
power In the hands of property is the result of the technical organization 
of society in America in greater degree than from a substantive difference 
in power. The original bias of social philosophy in America in favor of 
property dictated that property interests would become the status quo* or 
the vested interests* Emphasis upon equality —  as the growth of 
property inelasticities produced inequality — * resulted primarily in taking 
away a portion of the freedom dimension of philosophy interpreted in terms 
of property rights* Thus it happens that the forces of equality endeavor 
to restrain the forces of freedom, while the forces of freedom resist 
restraint* The power of the forces of equality is demonstrated by the fact 
of regulation and measured by the degree of regulation* The power of the 
forces of freedom is demonstrated by the fact of compromise and measured
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by the degree of compromise. Therefore the fact that Compromise favors 
property ie no more significant in assessing the forces operating than the 
faet that regulation ie typically in the interest of non-property 
interests.
it was emphasised earlier that in the process of adjusting 
to the demands of the present environment alterations in the s c o p s of 
regulation resulted in & loss of freedom through bringing Into the sphere 
of control certain (aspects of) non-utility Industries. It is now clear 
that this loss of freedom is paralleled by the attainment of a lesser 
degree of equality than might have occurred through a process of altering 
the extent of regulation. These two developments are doubly parallel in that 
both stem from the same necessity of modifying the application of social 
philosophy and both types of modification are equally consistent with both 
the older ideal philosophy and the current philosophy as modified. In short 
both are caused by a change in philosophy and result in further changes in 
philosophy.
Ho specific mention has been made to this point of the 
concrete nature of modifications in the rate structure. Before doing so it 
might be helpful to emphasize once more that the issue here is not nearly so 
fundamental as in the case of the rate level. It is of much less 
significance to a utility whether or not it is allowed to practice a degree 
of favoritism among its customers than whether or not Its total return is 
equal to eonpetitive returns. Contrariwise, although the matter of
22$
favorttism ie of isportanee to consumers, they haw never organised them** 
selves to the took of pressing any precise demands* In addition, if 
favoritism is hold to narrow limits the difference that a #$» cents a month 
more os* loss sill make to the average consumer is relatively slight* thus 
the lack of precision in rate structure, although not contemplated by the 
original adjustment, Is of lesser importance to society at largo*
the principal modification of the ideal in so far as rate 
structure is concerned stems directly from the technical difficulty of 
accurately separating indivisible asset infloss into particular outflows and 
the consequent larger expenditures for regulation that would be required to 
do so* Sines fired cost is by definition such an important characteristic 
of public utilities it was thought rest appropriate to set forth a few 
relatively simple rules of consumer classification rather than to attempt an 
elaborate assessment of rights and responsibilities for each customer*
the rest typical tool, through the use of which this failure 
to measure inflow and outflow with all accuracy was Justified, was the 
* value of service’ concept* thus value of service and cost of service 
provided supplementary approaches to the problem of fixing a scale of rates* 
This technique can be exemplified by reference to the structure of taxi fares 
in Washington, &«€• A single person riding from point A to point B will pay, 
say, 30 cents* Two persons riding between the m m  two points will pay 
20 cents each, or 10 cents* For all practical purposes the cost Is Identical 
in the case of both tripe* let if receipts for both trips erectly equal 
the total coat of both the single passenger has been charged less than cost 
while the two passengers have been charged more than cost* Bven so the system 
does provide the elementary Justice that, on the one hand, a single individual 
should pay less than two, and, on the other hand, it does not coat twice
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as much to ewiy tbi too* In utility regulation 09 long as {figuratively 
speaking) w r y  single pasasofsr Is charged the same assount sod every 
group of iso passengers la charged the same amount greater precision Is 
not required* Indeed, in many eases, a far lesser degree of accuracy is 
deemed satisfactory*
Apart from the technical difficulty of actually tracing 
costs to consumers, however, the value of service codification plus 
cossaisalott Inactivity does contribute to m  additional understanding of 
the current eeaprosiise. In the first place in the regulatosy activity 
required for real precision in rate structure there could be entailed # 
degree of interference with private enterprise that it has been in the 
interest of property interests to resist* Since the facts of the case 
sere such that the interference might very possibly be di ̂proportionately 
great in view of the results, this resistance has been effective* As a 
consequence regulation simply shrugs its shoulders if some few, on the 
basis of value of service, pay more than cost for service received.
In the second place, public policy sometimes uses the 
value of service principle to further lie own ends* For certain groups 
of the underprivileged society frequently requires the furnishing of essential 
service at lees than cost. If, in other words, this group would forego 
purchasing an item if cost ie charged, society will charge less than cost, 
if it is in the public interest ( as determined by social philosophy) 
that the service be furnished, thus water supply is frequently city-owned 
in order that health in the community may be protected* This type of 
activity, of course, merges quickly into positive regulation, which subject 
will be presented in come detail shortly.
This concludes discussion of the two phases of modification of the 
negative type of community action restraint or formal control, the scopa 
of regulation was modified to permit control of non-utility activities, 
Simultaneously the extant ©f regulation was modified to demand a lesser 
intensity of control* The first of these developments resulted in lesser 
freedom in the interest of greater equality, while the second resulted in 
lesser equality in the interest of greater freedom* Thus, contrary to the 
earlier philosophy which assumed identity between these two dimensions of 
individual! am, a newer philosophy developed from the first in terms of which 
these two dimensions were assumed to be in the main consistent —  although 
no longer identical* Formal control was altered to conform with this new 
philosophy, the direction of the control and Its specific content taking the 
form of a compromise between the two dimensions at their periphery. In 
consequence the norms used for control purposes continued to be basically 
the pre-eompromise norms of free competition*
In addition to modification of negative control, however, a second 
great development followed close behind* This was the growth of positive 
control, or the exereise of positive responsibility through the instrumentalities 
of social control*
°ne of the most important ramifications of social organisation Is that, 
under circumstances, the predicates of the organization are such that
the power of the group need be exercised only against a peripheral few who seem 
to develop anti-community tendencies* Within the framework set and with this 
degree of protection it is presumed that the individual can live his own life
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i& %he community. In a society such as ours, where great emphasis is 
placed upon free choice, spontaneous social organisation mould implicitly 
assume that the individual can and mill make proper choices if the 
peripheral few that would restrain choice are controlled by the organised 
sight of the group*
The basic prerequisite to spontaneous free choice is the 
existence of good, available alternatives from which to choose. Thus for 
free choice to operate in the direction assumed it would have required an 
essentially neutral environment for each individual —  an environment in 
terms of i&ich every individual would have equal opportunity. It is not 
necessary for the working out of this principle that every individual have 
equal capacity, only that virtually every individual have sufficient 
capacity to make favorable choices in a non-coereed (nettral) situation.
In terms of modern capitalism a neutral environment would be one in which, 
to state only a few of the more obvious requirements, no individual would 
be involuntarily employed at less than a living wage, one in which no 
individual would be undhly under the economic influence of another due to 
concentration of wealth in the hands of the latter, and one in which the 
social situation would permit a ‘full* life for every individual. Under 
these circumstances, of course, the individual could make choices consistent 
with the ideal.
John E. Commons had discussed this aspect of individualism 
and developed what he has termed fthe empty concept of the will formulated 
by John loeke.* Thus when the Supreme Court was insisting that the will of 
a corporation and the will of an individual were equivalent Professor Commons
explain* that the empty concept of the will has been carried to its 
extreme point* In one sense this analysis is incisive and revealing. *t 
would probably be more practical for present purposes* however* to think 
of the will aceordiztg to locks as a quantitative will in a quantitative 
or neutral environment* and the will according to earlier dourt decisions 
as a quantitative will in a qualitative (non-neutral) environment. thus 
what Professor Commons calls an empty concept is really the failure to 
adept the older usage to the newer situation. Such adaptations take time. 
By 1900 the United States had made only a beginning toward this end.
The extreme to which the older usage was carried can best 
be illustrated by reference to employer#s liability oases. The courts 
insisted that ®n< individual decided for himself whether or not to work 
in a dangerous occupation. Therefore if he were injured it was as a result 
of exercising his free will. As a consequence the corporation could not be 
held responsible for damages. It made no difference* of course* if the 
individual eould find employment nowhere else.
Hot only does reference to this situation illustrate the 
use of a quantitative concept of the will in a qualitative situation* it 
illustrates also how qualitative the environment had become. With the 
development of the huge corporation and the branding of it as an 
individual* with the increasing concentration of wealth and power in fewer 
hands* and with the growth in scale and intensity of business depressions* 
the economic environment in the United States ceased to be neutral and the 
concept of the will in use was necessarily modified.





















































































































the social philosophy lot* some of their significance in tors* of the 
total group. Instead of norms typically predicated upon tbs broad baa* of tha 
entire society, norms toad to bs predicated upon th* narrow baa* of th© alas* 
in power, and as such ar* vary possibly unsatisfactory to th* groip not 
in power. this Is not, of course, to rule out completely th* element of 
eenpromiae in control* Eathar it is only to superimpose another element 
th* element of ee^romls* to assist In an understanding of certain 
conditions in current society.
this shift from society-wide norms to single group norms 
©an easily be illustrated. The norm for utility regulation has always been 
'fair return on a fair value* defined in the average ©as* a* the competitive 
return, or th* socially approved return, how when regulation by government 
extends beyond the periphsra of industry, the return under competition as 
a norm —  is much less helpful* In the extreme case the government could so 
act that the non in use would be far different from the cos^etitlve none.
For example, as a part of the program to guarantee basic 
conditions of life, the government has entered the capital market* A 
prospective owner of a home may borrow from the government at a rate of, for 
example, 3 per cent rather than from a private company at a mah higher 
rate. This entrance of the government naturally affects the private capital 
market directly. In addition, however, there is s6m* reason behind the 
selection of 3 per cent as the government rate. *f that reason is a belief 
on the part t the group in power that 3 per cent 1* the socially acceptable 
rate of return (and it will no doubt have some such basis) there is nothing
232
to prevent this rote from being made the ’fair return* for regulated 
enterprise —  nothing, that is, except whatever spirit of compromise 
exists, and the resistance of the opposition.
The second significant ramification of the tendency for 
norms to shift where power is the rule is that these shifting norms are 
the concrete framework of social change* This framework may be the 
framework of either evolutionary or revolutionary change, depending upon 
numerous internal, external, and historical factors affecting a particular 
society*
Korins may quite conveniently be termed conservative norms 
(status quo) and liberal norms* The line-up behind these norms will be, 
obviously enough, the vested Interests favoring conservative norms and 
those dissatisfied with the status quo favoring liberal norms* The 
dissatisfied seek to educate the group in terms of the new norms while the 
vested interests endeavor to educate the group in terms of retention of old 
norms* In addition, both groups exert as much pressure on the side of their 
respective norms as can be justified by the current state of compromise. In 
this contest situation the vested interest;; has the advantage of inertia, 
while the dissatisfied have the advantage of dynamism.
Any such struggle as this between two basic factions within 
a group will normally proceed through a giving way in part of the jgta&ug&ug. 
If this giving away proceeds with nearly as great a rapidity as the pressure 
of dissatisfaction grows peaceful eh&nge results* ^ost social change is of 
this variety. Particularly does this result seem to characterise social 
change in America*
In the American scene conservative norms are the protection 
of property, property rights, free enterprise, freedom* Liberal norms, on
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th* other hand are the guarantee of good alternative®, economic security.
Since approximately 1900, and especially since 1930, conservative norms 
have been giving away before the increasing pressure of liberal norms*
If this trend continues without too extensive a complication from ̂ rld affairs, 
peaceful change based upon (although not wholly characterized by) compromise 
sill continue to be the rule* External pressure in the present him world1 
environment can have serious internal manifestations.
It is important to emphasize here that social change is not a 
smoothly continuous process. Thus development will be characterized by 
spurts and reactions on the one hand and a sort of secular trend on the 
other • At any given moment of time the status of change can be roughly 
determined by a compromise of current norms with historic norms and with 
the trend in norm evolution, Utilising this tool for analysis of the status 
of change in America it seems likely that the immediate future will witness 
a slight reaction from the spurt of liberal norms between 1930 and 1910, and 
that the trend toward security will continue*
One final ramification of th© development of positive 
control will be briefly discussed, this type of evolution is an important 
syapton of the disappearance of basic community. And, what is most 
significant, as community begins to break down the stage is set for still 
further disintegration.
In a society fundamentally characterized by common values, 
individual and group acts are universally comprehonsible and universally 
approved. In a society, however, where there exist side by side so to 
speak two sets of vhlues, individual and group acts hose a large measure
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both of comprehensibility and approval* Even compromise adjustments are 
*©re readily understood than when two struggling factions produce a power 
adjustment that satisfies no one. In eases where acts are not understood 
they are interpreted as merely vicious by a large segment of society# thus 
at tines antagonism nay be aroused even where there is no real issue involved. 
In this way conflict breeds conflict, and power tends to result in a still 
further exercise of power*
It is in this kind of a situation that politics is elevated to 
a position of increasing prominence. With only, say, half of the population 
to choose from group leaders have a greater difficulty selecting assistants 
on the basis of both ability and value orientation. Where stakes are high, 
of course, it frequently is necessary to forego the ability standards to a 
large extent. Obversely, too, the group not in power interprets acts of 
officials as acts of incompetence even when the difference of opinion is 
basically one of values* In this way the illusion of politics proceeds 
equally with the practice of polities, and community is correspondingly 
weakened*
With this discussion the presentation of the structure of 
regulation modification can be considered complete. In the next and concluding 
chapter an outline of the entire history of control in America will be 
presented together with a brief statement of the consequences for community 







































































































found to contain no specific provision for regulation* A number of 
provisions were found, on the other hand, that limited auch activities 
by government* One of these —  the no-r et roact ive-legi slation 
provision —  was designed to protect choice* Another — * the due-process 
clause —  was designed to prevent inequality resulting from action by 
government* However, since at this early date there could be said to 
be no real distinction between the two components of individualism. It 
would perhaps be most proper to say that both of these provisions had 
originally an identical connotation in the direction of rigidly protecting 
the individual citizen from the government and preserving the status quo.
But regulation necessitates ohanges in the status quo and 
restraint for individual citizens* For this purpose it was necessary to 
go outside the Constitution itself and bring in the extraneous principle 
of the police power, or the common law right of a government to control 
individual action in the interest of the public health, safety, and 
morals*
The primary responsibility for steering the proper course 
between due process and police power —  between protection and restraint —  
rested with the Supreme Court* In developing a cojqpromiee the court was 
guided, not by specific standards already existing and in use, but rather 
only by its application of the prevailing community spirit. This does 
not mean, of course, that the Supreme Court in any sense dictated the 
regulatory adjustment* The court do doubt represented the prevailing
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spirit quits accurately* The emphasis intended is simply that the 
adjustment was made without objective standards and that it was made 
In large part by the Supreme Court,
the proeess of charting this eourse seems sinple in 
retrospect, A description of it takes two directions that we will here 
call the horizontal and the vertical. Horizontally* the permissible scope 
of regulation was defined by dividing the police power into two parts and 
by classifying businesses into two categories* General police power was 
developed as an incidental restraint of non-utility businesses violating 
community values only in widely separated instances* Fries control police 
power* however* was developed as an over-all restraint of utility businesses 
the totality of whose relationship to the public was considered to be a 
potential threat to the community*
Vertically* the permissible extent of regulation was defined 
in terms of the same classifications* In the ease of incidental control 
of isolated activity the Supreme Court provided no protection from the 
restraint of law* The classification itself was presumed to be adequate 
protection* In the case of price control for public utilities* however* 
doe process (fair return on fair value) was instituted as a definition of the 
limitations of government regulation*
These two dimensions of regulation —  scope and extent —  fit 
into the dlmu&sions of American social philosophy as follows* Freedom of 
choice was assured by classifying Industries in such a way that only 
a small percentage could actually be regulated as public utilities* The
m
basis of the classification in turn was the actual or potential relation- 
bbip batman th* business and tha freedom of ©hole* of eonsuowrs. Thu* 
tha government undertook to interfere with tha b&ala choices of industry 
when and only whan industry was in a position to Intarfara with tha 
basic choices of individuals.
Tha regulatory adjustment similarly operated to assure 
equality of opportunity* Tha restraint of government by itself in tha 
interest of equality was demanded at an early date, the process through 
*iieh the government restrains is called just compensation and is based 
upon 'fair return on a fair value* * Here the government a&ys in offset 
that if a business is placed under strict control it is entitled to earn the 
return it would have earned if it had been faced with a reasonable amount 
of eospetltion. Sines most business was presumed by the philosophy to be 
competitive the norm used by regulation was naturally the rest of the 
eeonoagr. The result of this aspect of the adjustment was & situation in 
whieh regulated businesses were allowed residual income (rights) equal to 
that currently being received by ether businesses*
In all of this it is important to recall that the entire
adjustment represented a eoopremlse between the common law and the 
Constitution* The conflict between these two sources of control principles 
was resolved primarily in the minds of Supreme <*ourt justices over a period
of one hundred years* The fact that a succession of justices drawn from every
comer of American life outlined a substantially consistent approach to this 
problem in the face of the opposing concepts of police power and due process 
without the aid of objective standards is strong evidence that the real
source of decisions could only have been the social philosophy of 
the day.
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It will be recalled from the analysis In Chapter 1 that In 
the philosophy of individualism equality and freedom wire treated as 
identical in eonnotatien and meaning. However, as can be seen from 
the above discussion, with the first application of these two dimensions 
of philosophy —* this application will here be referred to as phase one 
in the history of regulation —  this identity began to disappear* In 
consequence equality and freedom became merely consistent with one another 
rather than identical*
neither principles nor the application of principles is ever 
static. After a principle has been adopted it immediately begins to evolve 
in a manner commensurate with the problems that arise In actual application* 
Out of this evolution arises a new principle and so on ad infinitum. In 
this way principles and their applications merge Into and become one 
another, while at the same time evolving into something else*
After phase one in the history of regulation was well along 
in development—  after, in short, the above categories of control had been 
rather completely and precisely set forth —  America had to do & consid­
erable amount of "living with*' the principles thus outlined* During this 
period these principles had to undergo a rigid application that resulted 
in what will here be called phase two of the regulatory adjustment and 
which will be described later.
The principal direction taken in the process of evolution was 
a gradual dilution of the categories of regulation* Thus the line of 
demarcation between a public utility and a private business on the one
hand, and the line ©f demarcation between confiscation and non­
confiscation on the other hand tended to break down under the pressures 
to t&lch they were submitted. It is these pressures and the resultant 
breakdown of the precise pattern of regulation originally outlined that 
provide background for understanding the current compromises in regulation.
In the first place it should be noted that broad social principles 
are always vulnerable to attack. In any attempt to set up pure—type 
categories there must always be a territory between that may be conveniently 
called a penumbra ©f uncertain classification. When eases come up for 
application of principles there are always ramifications of decisions not 
wholly Integrated into basic philosophy. Frequently one or more of these 
ramifications has the effect of moving a part of the penumbra into the area 
of solid classification. The result of this is a shifting of the area of 
doubt. The typical evolution of this kind, thus, Is the enlargement of one 
category at the expense of the others.
The penumbra itself would not be as certain to lead to 
evolution were it not for a large amount of supplementation by a second 
factor. Unless men in society have all values in common and in hierarchies 
of equal proportionate intensity there will exist in some degree conflicting 
interests. Since social principles provide an outline of the conditions 
of Individual action, interests attach to every phase of a classification made 
by a social principle. Some of this attachment of Interest Is positive in the 
sense that it depends upon a continuation of the classification. On the other 
hand some of it is negative in the sense that the Interest is in the breakdown
of the classification. The negative interest toward group principles 
is a measure of the lack of integration in the ooxesnntby*
It xiood scarcely bo added, of course, that a negative Interest 
win fix Its attention upon the penumbra rather than the solid classification* 
The latter would be a direct attack upon the eoimmmity Itself and would 
be dealt with accordingly. Once the attention of a negative interest is 
focused upon the penumbra it is only a natter of tfias until the lines 
begin to give a little* Particularly will this be the result if a 
Supreme Court Judge has a bias in the direction of breakdown.
The above two factors can be simply summarised* Principles 
of social action exist primarily as emotions and only secondarily as 
rational purposes. Whenever a classification begins to lose the support 
of the emotions, rational minds will begin to find & way to destroy it*
And the process la cumulative. As lines of demarcation shift the delicate 
balance between interests is further disrupted and negative interest 
tends to grow. Thus, simultaneously, the classification became more 
vulnerable and interest in its breakdown became more powerful*
However, these factors are only structural, ^he regulatory 
adjustment here under discussion became vulnerable for specific reasons as 
well* These reasons are intimately related to the maturation of the 
business process. The first resulted from in increased inelasticity in 
economic society, while a second resulted from the development of claims 
as a basic property type. Both of these consequences of maturing 
capitalism helped to make modifications in regulation logical and necessary*
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Among the basic accompaniments of the development of capitalist 
institutions has bean the accumulation of large aggregetleiitt of fixed 
■and specialised capital, and the increasing specialisation of human 
beings. Both of these together have contributed not only to a more 
dynamic economic situation hut even more to m  inability on the pert of 
economic units to effectively meet dynamics* the resulting inelasticities 
produce economic Inequalities, or economic rents* And, although regulation 
was first extended to the utility Industries because Inelasticities became 
flagrant at that point in the economy before they did at other points, this 
inelasticity has extended itself in greater or lesser degree to all 
businesses. Thus the 100 percent ext,reuse to which the courts originally 
took the industry classification process was necessarily weakened* Thus 
the utility category itself became less homogeneous, and semi-utility 
controls were exercised in connection with non-utilities*
A aeeond environmental change has contributed to the specific 
vulnerability of the early adjustment outlined in phase one in the history 
of regulation* As long as private property wae defined as holding for use, 
it was logical to define confiscation In terms of the negative of just 
compensation. In such a case, if an individual used property for non** 
community purposes the government could discharge its obligations to the 
individual in taking the property by paying the monetary equivalent therefor* 
But when private property came to be defined as withholding for exchange, and 
value earns to be determined through a process of capitalisation, it became
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*ueh less logical to define confiscation in terms of the negative of 
•fair return** Application of this definition frequently results in taking value 
(property) from individuals nest involved In the aoiMoramunlby activity at 
all, while those really involved are not touched by the preventive or retribu­
tive measures taken.
The above discussion furnishes a background for an understanding 
of the evolution of the categories of regulation and also suggests the 
generalised outline of the directions taken by that evolution. Before 
attempting to describe specific directions, however, it would perhaps be 
desirable to present the adjustments in regulation that could have been 
made in Conforming to environmental change without disturbing greatly the 
original pattern* In this way a basis for comparison with the actual adjust** 
jasAt will be available*
First and foremost, we would have retained the rather rigid 
classification of industry into public utilities and non-public utilities*
In this way the coverage of regulation would have been minimised and a 
mtim 0f spontaneous freedom allowed* At the same time we would have 
maintained the difficult distinction between priee control and incidental 
control to implement the industry classification*
Second, we would have faced squarely the implications of compet­
itive return in regulation despite an evolving set of capital relationships*
This could have been done through the steps outlined in Chapters 6 and 7 
consisting oft (1) ng fair return the test of reasonableness of rates 
rather than adjusting the two only at a given moment of tiiaaj (2) establish­
ing a statutory trust for consumers and owners to avoid the payment of
dividends out of excess earnings and to help pay dividends in years 
when earnings were too low; and (3) providing a m x l m m return for each 
eleiasnt of the capital contract.
The effect of these steps* with the Industry classification* 
would have been a rather complete limitation of spontaneous freedom 
in public utility industries. Had the classification itself been 
abstractly accurate there would have resulted a situation of r equal 
residual rights throughout the entire structure with informal control for 
non~utilities just equaling formal control for utilities. But as has been 
emphasized, the classification was In part artificial rather than abstractly 
accurate* In addition spontaneous freedom was believed preferable to the 
extreme of formal control* With this last providing the motive and the 
former providing the logic property interests began to organize a concerted 
attack upon the penumbra of the framework of control*
As a result of this battle the actual regulatory adjustment 
was substantially different from the adjustment just outlined* In the 
first place, the classification Itself In part broke down* This breakdown 
is particularly evident in regulation by the federal government* which 
regulation has taken a more and more important role In the regulatory 
scheme of things* To an ever greater extent regulation extension is being 
justified by general reference to specific evils of the status guo rather 
than by a painstaking decision on whether a particular business is or is 
not a public utility. It Is precisely this breakdown in regulatory 
classification that makes it increasingly difficult to selectively define 
a public utility*
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The result of this breakdown In the classification woo that 
general police power norod up In the control scale, while price control 
moved down the scale, Thus regulation in the former instance became 
aore pronounced than incidental} while in the latter Instance price 
control became less rigid than it would Justifiably hare been made.
In the second place, the application of the confiscation concept 
was substantially modified. One process through which this modification 
took place was that of defining fair value. Although the content of fair 
return has not substantially altered in the period in which it has been 
in use, fair value has been given alternative definitions by means of 
which Justice in regulation has become quit© elastic. Thus even if the 
implications of competitive return as such were rigidly applied there 
would still exist a large modification of th© pattern of control 
originally promulgated to carry out th© mandate of equal residual rights,
A second process through #ilch th© confiscation concept was 
modified in application was the us© of a * zone of reasonableness9 that 
effectively assisted in whittling down the extreme result of the rigid 
maintenance of the original categories. In fostering the ’zone* concept, 
regulators have accoiqplished two related purposes. By permitting a leeway 
they have avoided much of the responsibility to which they would have 
fallen heir had inelastic classifications been maintained. Also, however, 
by deliberately allowing a penumbra in the categories they have made It 
easier for negative interests to stop the regulatory adjustment somewhat 
short of its most extreme consequences.
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All of the Above modifications took place with reference to the 
rate level of regulated business. A similar development is in evidence 
with respect to the rate structure. The theory of regulation demand© cost- 
of-aervice pricing- If interpreted consistently in terms of residual 
rights cost-of-service pricing would leave the regulated business little 
or no room for free bargaining. At the same time the industry classification—  
if followed —  would exempt non-utilities from price structure control* the 
modification of such extreme applications took place in two directions.
First, by a set of rather extensive regulations aimed to foster fair 
competition th© price structure of non-utilities was in part brought under 
control. Second, the concept ’value of service1 was introduced, tolerated, 
and even furthered by the courts, providing a means by which utilities were 
saved from the consequences of the original categories* It should be added, 
of course, that this last was very easy to justify since the fixed coat 
structure of modern capitalism —  particularly and significantly public 
utilities —  makes cost-of-service largely indeterminate.
Furthermore, as an additional variable in the direction of 
bargaining rather than rigid price structure, the Supreme Court very 
early introduced the principle that a regulated industry was entitled to 
a fair return on its entire operations although not necessarily on each 
phase of its operations. This modification operated in two directions* 
first, It provided for adjustments In cases where the public interest 
seemed to dictate service at less than full cost; and second, it enabled
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th* regulated business to store successfully meet the challenge of capital­
istic enterprise* Both directions represented a clear compromise with 
earlier principles*
The thesis advanced here with respect to the above 
■edifications of phase one in the history of regulation is that in part 
they represent a normal reconciliation of a principle to the technical 
factors encountered by the principle, and that in part they represent the 
use of technical facts by interest groups to effect a substantial realignment 
of the forces behind the development of formal control in this country*
This realignment of forces provides the setting for an understanding of 
phase two in this history* To a brief discussion of this phase we will now 
turn our attention*
Individualism, it will be recalled, is built around equality 
and freedom as the natural state of man* It followed that a condition of 
government — - spontaneous freedom —  was the ideal social adjustment* But 
spontaneous freedom in the environment It produced tipped the scales against 
equality* This development aroused the forces favoring equality —  forces 
that could not but have remained merely latent if spontaneous equality had 
remained coincident with spontaneous freedom*
At first the assault upon freedom in favor of equality aroused 
few opposing forces* Gradually, however, as the threat grew larger the 
forces favoring freedom were actively aroused in defense* Eventually a 
point was reached wherein the forces of equality and the forces of freedom 
seem to have attained an equivalent strength —  each striving hard against 
the other* It is this point in the history of regulation that we will call 
phase two, or the current phase*
If the sum total of human relationships in American economic 
life can be diagramatieally represented by a rectangular area the original
2JW
coincidence between equality and freedom can be pictured as follows:
Freedom Equality
INDIVIDUALISM
On the same general basis 
the current conflict between the two can also be pictured:
Freedom Equality
INDIVIDUALISM
The intended ©aphasia, of course, is not that the groups 
involved are constantly &t each others throats* the conflict — • If 
it can really be called conflict —  is still largely peripheral rather 
than basic* Thus there is no serious disapproval of the fact of 
regulation, only of the degree of regulation in some instances* like­
wise there is no dispute as to the underlying reasons for regulation, 
only as to the application of those reasons in certain specific cases*
There has grown up in America over the years a very sharp 
line of demarcation in popular parlance between public interest (consumer) 
and private interest* It may bo that such a dichotomy is helpful for 
some purposes. In other cases, however, it is very apt to be misleading* 
True the consumer group is the largest* Very properly the basic orientation 
Is toward the consumer* But industry itself is likewise a part of the 
public* And in a democratic nation where every individual is considered 
important and where citizens have rights against the government It would 
be arbitrary to define the consumer as the total public*
Speaking in general terms business organizations are the forces 
favoring freedom, while the unorganized consumer and the only-recently 
organized laborer are the forces favoring equality* This alignment Is 
almost obvious on its face* The strong (organized) would logically favor 
freedom* The weak (unorganized) would logically favor restraint of the 
strong* The ancient quip •only he is conservative who has something to 
conserve* is a more striking way of expressing the same fact*
In essence, then, what we are currently witnessing in the 
relationships between government and business is the consumer and the
2 »
laborer arrayed against the business man in certain marginal bat 
potentially far-reaching issues. And| considering that the ultimate 
stakes can only be stated in terms of equality and freedom* It can not 
but be concluded that the contest stems logically from basic philosophy* 
Through the instrument of (fair) competition* businesses in America have 
always been allowed to fight for profits. Thus it would be quite illogical 
if these same businesses were estopped from evincing interest in their fate 
when competition is supplanted to an important degree by regulation*
This sounds* perhaps* much like pressure politics and a 
justification thereof * In part that is a correct interpretation* For 
the most part* however* it is not. For the real fact of the matter is 
that the compromises now a part of the regulatory adjustment were written 
there* not by pressure as such* but quite logically* and this as a result 
of what might popularly be called the action of pressure groups*
The common understanding of the passage of & regulatory 
measure Is that the affected parties merely fight restrictive segments 
of the measure* Mo thought is ordinarily given to how such a fight is 
conducted* or to the fact that "fighting11* as such* is only a small part 
of the procedure*
Xt is to be expected that a pressure group composed of 
reasonably intelligent men would adopt first those tactics that meet with 
the fullest approval of the public as a whole. This invariably takes the 
for* of arguing that &g. lnt.r.at jyh. firaagug. 8E3M IS £ M  
of the people at large* Xt may at first be thought by the reader that this
m
is said facetiously at b#«t. It is not* There are eases where the 
public interest is argued more effectively by a pressure group than 
hy ths public itself* It is true, of course, that public interest 
arguments by pressure groups arc frequently extremely unconvincing 
because ill-founded* Ths important fact to note hers is that a public 
interest argument Is not to be automatically discarded bf cause advanced by 
a pressure group, and that a pressure group does not ordinarily resort 
to 9lower9 methods to supplement the public interest approach ££ at til* 
This last is added to the writer’s belief that there are many in high 
pieces in America who prefer an honest compromise to victory through 
trickery. This view Is strengthened by the fact that there Is really 
little evidence that current public policy —  involving the numerous 
powerful interests that it does —  contains major instances of pressure 
unsupported by a convincing logic of public interest*
All of this is not to suggest that there is no conflict 
between the interests of pressure groups and the public at large* It is 
only to emphasise that arguments for legislation —  particularly in a 
democracy —  ere not spurious and false merely because they are advanced 
by a person or a group who has an interest in the outcome* The minority, 
in the first place, has a right to try to convince the majority} and in the 
second place, the minority argues frequently the majority viewpoint, or at 
least a portion of it*
A specific *xmpl* may be helpful at this point* The railroads 
ere a large vested interest in the United States* When regulatory measures 
are under consideration their emphasis will be upon that part of the 
declaration of policy calling for avoidance of destructive competition, mad 
the part demanding a strong transportation system in the interest of 
national defense* Motor trucks, on the other hand, will stress ’inherent
m
advantage*, which policy largely calls for coat pricii^. The characte­
ristics of rail transportation are such that capacity operation is 
necessary* Swjr source of freight tapped by motor trucks and thus 
taken from rail carriers tends to reduce the 'inherent advantage9 of the 
railroad in carrying every ton of freight retained through increasing 
average unit costs, thus every ton taken from the rails by motor trucks 
(or by air, for that setter) increases by that amount the susceptibility 
of all other rail freight to loss to another agency.
In short, the railroad industry consists of such a high 
percentage of fixed costs that a small margin of traffic means the 
difference between profit and lose, or whether the railroad system —  or 
oertala important segments of it ~~ can continue operating or not* If It 
be granted that the railway system is necessary on soy abstract basis public 
policy can Justify leaning over a bit to keep the rail plant operating at 
capacity. In this case inherent advantage seems strongly in conflict 
with other parts of our transportation policy.
The significance of the above example la that when policy 
is belxdr debated the railroad "lobby” and the motor truck "lobby" will 
both be present. Both will emphasise their side of the case. The decision 
will be a compromise. But cognisance will be taken of the position of the 
railroads and the motofe trucks not because of the power these pressure 
groups can bring to bear but because of the reasonableneas of the logic 
on both sides•
Zt may be helpful at this point to distinguish between 
•particular* logic and 'universal* logic* Universal logic is that 
situation in which the arguments advanced are such that all reasonable
men with th* earn* baste values (for example, belief to equality*
*£&•} Hill reach th* saw* conclusion* Particular logic* on th* 
other hand* is thct situation in which th* arguments advanced ar* 
such that reasonable men with th* same baaic values (although not 
mth th* same peripheral values) will reach different conclusion* 
equally well supported* The logic of regulation of transportation* a* 
such* is universal to all men who believe in the American way of llf«*
Th* difference in opinion is not whether to regulate or not# but how 
far to go in regulating* On many points relative to this latter problem# 
students can only produce particular logic for those with Vested interests 
to advance in the process of evolution of regulation*
Where peripheral aspects of a large problem can be defined 
only • particularly* rather than ’universally* it is characteristic of men 
with eoanon basic values to compromise the peripheral problems. The 
spirit of compromise is no more than placing community harmony higher 
in one’s scale of values than victory by resort to means ’lower’ than 
the use of logic# particular though this latter may be* Transportation 
regulation is compromise on a tremendous scale* Xt Is no wonder our 
declaration of policy is said by many to be inconsistent*
To summarise the argument immediately preceding# the logic 
upon whieh regulation is predicated stems from the valu*~ori*ntatlon of 
interested parties* A common value produces a universal logic# since 
the value is the premise and the method is contained within the premise* 
Variations of values produces conflicting (particular) logics# each
m
oriented to one special enqphasis at the periphera of value-scales*
The spirit of harmony that prevails where the basis values are held 
in common produces a compromise between peripheral interests* la 
transportation regulation in America these forces have produced an 
adjustment consisting of element a that have to be carefully proportioned 
in the process of control. Stated differently, to be very certain that 
the point is not missed, our current public policy Is not integrated for 
the reason that there does not exist a unanimity of opinion on the 
proposition that one particular objective must be held above all others 
under all circumstances.
If this discussion were concluded at this point the result 
would be an unwarranted emphasis upon complete harmony in the process of 
government and an exaggerated denial of ’politics” as distinct from 
healthy argument* Briefly, now, the problem of polities in regulation 
will be explored.
What is normally called politics in government arises 
from interest —  group or individual. But it has been noted earlier 
that not all activities of an interested group or individual can be 
classified as political in the * unde sir able* sense* In the first place 
interested parties do argue as much of the public interest as it is to their 
advantage to argue* And in the second place such parties are —  in terms 
of the larger issues of regulation —  a part of the public Itself* Our 
task here is to seek out the practices of interested groups that can be 
classified as political in the sense of being contrary to public interest*
For this purpose we will define a non-political decision
one made under the conditions that every interested ifonp 
participates in the decision, and that each group participates in 
proportion to th® extent of it® inter® at| that every argument pre-*
®«nt®d 1® & tru® argument* oven though not wholly oonoiotont with 
other "true11 arguments; that every vote east 1® oriented toward th® 
lose® itself rather than eon® irrelevant matter} and that the area 
of fundamental disagreement is compromised.
th® problem of participation by the interested groups 1® 
a problem of publicity and organisation. Any gap in either organisation 
or publicity results In an incomplete representation end thus ignore® 
a portion of the total argument, this result can be termed political 
in the present sense* whether or not the failure in organisation or 
publicity 1® the result of the deliberate efforts of other groups. It 
becomes political in a much more extreme degree If opposing interest® 
block representation.
The stipulation that every argument be a true one is perhaps 
the most usually violated in practice. It 1® extremely difficult to 
prove many contentions* until after the passage of considerable time* and 
the proof i® often not clear cut even then* On the other hand* however* 
argument® that are too fantastically unreal are a dangerous tool because 
other group® are always anxious to point up such thing®. What is really 
Important here is that political elements are not involved as such unless 
an interested group attempts to establish coincidence between the interest 
and pvfelie advantage where in fact no such coincidence exist®.
The requirement that every vote cast be oriented toward the 
issue Itself introduces the most insidious element in political activity.
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Violations ©f this requirement may take any one of several forms.
First, it may take the form of bribery, or a vote oriented to the 
reeeipt of extraneous reward unrelated to the issue involved. Second, 
it may take the form of charisma, or a vote oriented to faith in 
another person rather than the problem at hand. Third, it may take the 
form of coercion, or a vote oriented to a fear of an artificially produced 
misfortune rather than the immediate issue. All of these represent a 
situation in which maneuvering is substituted for debate* In such a 
situation a decision will be made placing too great an emphasis upon one 
or a few segments of the public interest and largely ignoring other 
segments.
The final requisite for non-political decision-making —  that 
fundamental disagreement be actually compromised —  is an outgrowth of the 
others. If the other conditions are fulfilled this last follows as a 
logical result. This will not be true, of course, if every vote is cast 
by a member of one out of two actively Interested parties* In that case, 
compromise would be minimized by the technical fact that one group must 
win the vote. Necessity for more than simple majority will increase the 
degree of compromise, as will the existence of more than two groups.
A quite normal situation, however, is one in which the 
active interests are a relatively small part of the total group voting.
This will be the case except in connection with the largest issues. Here 
the larger group that has no ulterior interests will compel a compromise 
of the conflicting issues. The obverse of this is the case in which the 
larger group having no personal interest does not vote at all*
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1f this outline of conditions leading to political 
decision-making seems to de-emph&size this type of ’legislation1 
unre&listically in favor of its opposite, the writer will plead as 
a defense the fact that non-political decision-making is so frequently 
de-emphasized in popular discussion# Whereas a typical approach has 
been to throw all decisions of uncertain classification into the 
political class, the present procedure is rather deliberately to throw 
the uncertain category into the non-political class# The result is a 
more extreme position than the writer would take if the scales were not 
already tipped so pessimistically in th© other direction.
Relating, now, the discussion of the last few pages to the 
general problem of social integration, it seems desirable to present 
the evolution of the regulatory adjustment in yet another way# Where 
values are had in common —  where, in short, a solid community exists —  
the area of non-community interests (to be distinguished from anti-community 
interests) is small, the sphere of government is correspondingly small, 
while spontaneous freedom is large# On the other hand where the area of 
non-comnunity interests is larger, the sphere of arbitration of interests 
is larger, while spontaneous freedom is reduced accordingly. Thus, whereas 
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minimum compromises and a more solid foundation for community is thus 
built, this foundation one# mors sinks to ths unconscious level and 
relationships become more spontaneous.
She pertinence of all this to our discussion is that 
the real threat potential in our present community rift is not the rift 
itself bit the possibility that it sill become much deeper. Blagrammat- 
ically speaking it is the following situation that endangers a societyi
Out of that kind of a 
situation totalitarianism may arise. When action is necessary, but 
impossible under existing organization, when the rift is so wide and deep that
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essentially nothing can bo accomplished* an upheaval Is inevitable.
If society can not be Integrated on a community basis it will 
be integrated {as best it can) on a dictatorship basis. Otherwise* 
of course* civil war will ensue.
There will be attempted here n© prediction as to the 
ultimate extent of the rift in the American economic community. This 
meh* however* should be said. When a community Is effectively Isolated 
a rift may proceed further without resulting in either civil war or 
totalitarianism than is the case in a period of internationalism and 
national insecurity. The threat of outside domination makes a situation 
intolerable sooner than it would otherwise be.
The second important implication of the conflict between 
freedom and equality here delineated is that it is clearly a conflict 
between property rights and human rights —  property rights on the side of 
freedom} human rights on the side of equality. In saying this it must 
hastily be emphasised again that the line of demarcation is by no means 
absolute* The average proponent of freedom will readily grant much of 
the premise of the proponent of equality* and yley versa. But both groups 
argue in terms of the overlapping interests of the other* and no doubt 
a great deal of such overlapping does exist. Thus it is argued that 
economic rents (profits) are necessary to assure the progress that results 
in material betterment. Likewise* and In opposition* It la argued that 
the inequities resulting from untrammelled enterprise operate to reduce 
economic rents. In this way —  a way typical in this type of controversy ■
m
both group# focus their attention upon a part of the relationship and 
argue tn terns of th# values held by th# opposition*
at firei glance it might seem that human right# are no# 
being found after haring been lost for ©any years, A mvo realistic 
interpretation would seem to b# that human right# are now in danger of 
being loot aft«r hairing boon tahee for granted for ©any years, Actually 
thos# values that are moot secure in a community arc those values 
that prevail at th# unconscious level. As soon as it Is necessary to 
consciously purse# a valuef the value has become insecure, $hen a human 
body finds it a###ssary to consciously pursue health, th# body meet b# 
unhealthy*
As long as business in America regained traditionally small, 
end as long as the land frontier persisted, (it will be recalled that 
John Look# —  the famous English exponent of property rights — * assumed 
throughout his philosophy that every family owned and operated a 
small fern) human rights were never really in danger, For many years th# 
real land frontier has been disappearing# today it has been estimated that 
in the average manufacturing establishment an investment in machinery, 
buildings, etc* of #5,000 per esployee is a prerequisite, in the light of 
this evolution it would be unrealistic indeed to claim that we are just new 
finding human rights. Rather, the problem is that of redefining human 
rights in a new world.
As evidence of the fact that human rights have always been 
implicitly paramount, it is significant that when America first began to 
adjust itself to the corporate form of business organisation the
corporation was defined as a person* Begul&tory law has continued to 
consider the corporation In that way. It was* in fact# this development 
that brought the problem of the human being into the focus of consciousness, 
the law wee prone to match one person (corporation) against one person 
(individual) and call it equality. It Is only recently that a collection of 
individuals has been allowed a status before the law equivalent to that long 
allowed a collection of buildings and a various assortment of machines* this 
development is possibly the beginning of a concerted attack upon the legal 
fiction of the corporate personality* If so it can confidently be ejected to 
continue until we have succeeded in thoroughly orienting the individual into 
modern capitalistic society*
A third major consequence of ths rift in American community* 
and the final one to be discussed here* is the apparent revolt from reason 
that wdH characterise the social scene as a result* IShe** a community 
is predicated solidly upon & single principle social relationships proceed 
In logical conformity to the principle* The faculty of attention of the 
individual Is oriented by hie 'apperceptive mass' which is the community 
principle* Thus problems are Interpreted and solved in accordance with the 
principle* The facts upon which decisions are baaed are accepted because 
there is agreement upon the frame of reference to be used*
But when, on the other hand, a community principle splits 
into opposing factions* the solution of problems and the rendering of 
decisions proceed on the basis of compromise rather than outright agreement* 
Since each faction has a somewhat different frame of reference it focuses 
its attention upon a different portion of the situation* As a result 
adjustments lose the appearance of following the pattern of premise and
265
conclusion. In short, government begins to look arbitrary rather than 
reasoned*
Individualism was originally predicated upon reason* In 
implementing what was intended to be *a government of laws not men* great 
emphasis was placed upon principle. In an environment consisting of 
opposing forces actual adjustments will range all the way from the adjust­
ment directly favoring one or the other of the forces to the adjustment 
representing a precise compromise between them. Principle Is thus lost in a 
flurry of compromise, except, of course, in so far as the compromise Itself 
can be considered a principle for analytical purposes.
In such an environment objectivity must be rare. In fact 
the individual who seriously attempts real objectivity becomes an object 
of suspicion by all concerned. Government is no exception to this rule. The 
premium placed upon political activity makes it certain that every sizable 
force will have its representation among public officials* Thus the real 
integration of government can never be found, under these circumstances, in 
any isolated Incident of government. Rather the Integration of government 
exists only theoretically as a mental matching of extremes against other 
extremes and thus arriving at what may be considered the mean approach of 
government to its problems of adjustment. Note, however, that to the 
individual the important fact is not the mean approach but the approach in 
the case at hand. In the light of these facts it is not surprising that the 
philosophy of absolutes has appeared to give away before the philosophy 
of relatives* No other practical approach is possible when the community 
that makes objectivity possible is substantially lacking.
5866
fhle irend, too, cam bo expected to aontinue until a 
broader basis f&# agreemsnt on tmdmmmtala exists* Until that time 
one e m  only «*ge patience with the apparent arbitrariness of everyday 
adjustments and understanding that these little incidents that seem 
askew are part of a larger pattern of oonsproaiise —  a compromise made 
necessary by an evolution that only the utmost in patience and understanding 
can aptly integrate in a way consistent with human values*
Every social condition has its cent history, not only 
retrospectively but prospectively* the social condition in America 
resulting from a split of philosophy into two parts is no exception* A 
phase three in this history is already in the making* this phase can be 
called the Social Minimum phase* the thesis of this compromise is that 
government should take whatever responsibility is necessary to guarantee 
every individual a minimum standard of existence while allowir̂ r 
enterprisers freedom to have for themselves a higher standard to whatever 
degree that standard Is consistent with the social minimum*
It must be emphasised that this adjustment does not destroy 
the conflict* But, of course, social conflict is not of such a nature 
that it can be destroyed in one fell swoop by acts of men* It can, to be 
sure, be rather effectively covered up for a time through dictatorship*
A reel disappearance of conflict, however, depends upon a process of social 
conditioning In the direction of successive compromises*
Already the fact of government restraint has been 
universally accepted* the provision of a social minimum requires in 
addition government responsibility for full employment, as well as other
m
positive m m  creations through formal authority. %  are now wall 
along toward universal acceptance of thla stop.
These necessary directions for government action oat
the stage for future evolution. For, to a largo extent positive control#
operate la conflict with negative controls. Full employment depends la 
tha last analysis upon the attitude of business* while government action 
operates In part to adversely affect business attitudes, thus government 
must either minimise negative regulation or accept at first a lesser 
responsibility for full employment. Kither alternative adds up t© the 
provision of a lower social minimum.
Meanwhile the forces of equality will also be actively at 
work endeavoring to raise the minimum, they will very possibly attempt 
to bring about a higher minimum than le consistent with the optimum 
mercies of positive and negative controls by government.
Fortunately* it Is easy to be optimistic. In a society
that is primarily cohesive* and in which war is not an imminent probability*
the forces of coaproiaise will normally triumph over the forces of 
totalitarianism. Zt is believed by the writer that these conditions 
describe America* although by a narrower margin than is thought to be the 
case by cany.
In conclusion* It seems proper to say a brief word on 
the subject of freedom* particularly since the preceding pages appear to add 
up to more government activity rather than lees. When a child complains 
of restraint by his parents one Is led to suspect that the child has strong 
inclinations in disapproved directions. Similarly when a nation is subjected 
to a large measure of control one can not but reach the conclusion that 
disunity exists.
268
Where eonB&unity prevalla and social action la spontaneous 
freedom is the rule* Where differences prevail resting upon a strong 
under-pinning of coamunity, control is the rule to the degree dictated 
by coaqpromise between opposing factions. Where differences prevail to the 
extent that they cut through the community underpinning, control will again 
be the rule, but tnis time extending to the degree dictated by the extreme 
position of the ruling faction*
to the writer the problem of understanding freedom and 
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